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Chapter 1
Introduction
This thesis consists of three distinct research articles which belong to the field of fi-
nancial economics. A central theme of these contributions is the interaction between
publicly available information, or the lack thereof, and incentives to acquire private
information, primarily in the context of securitized assets traded in financial markets.
Private information is a central issue in many economic interactions as it may inhibit
realization of gains from trade due to a lemons problem.2
Opacity and Liquidity Chapter 2 proposes a novel way of modelling the opacity of
an asset, characterized by the degree of public knowledge about its detailed payoff
characteristics, and investors’ incentives to become privately informed. In this context,
private information is detrimental to welfare as its sole purpose is to exploit less well
informed trading partners. The article sheds light on recent pushes for increased trans-
parency in the financial system: Policymakers typically view transparency as a one-way
street to a better financial system and implicitly presume that opacity harms liquidity
– it increases the scope for agents to have different information sets. With that line of
reasoning, adverse selection should be more pronounced and liquidity low.
However, private information acquisition is in fact endogenous: Not only the scope for
information acquisition, but also the incentives to become informed in the first place
are affected by an asset’s opacity. It is thus not straightforward why information should
be more valuable for opaque assets, resulting in higher degrees of private information
and less liquidity. In fact, many opaque assets are frequently traded and have low bid-
ask spreads, signifying little worry by market makers about asymmetric information.
One example is the banking industry. Banking is considered a very opaque business.
Nonetheless, the major banks’ stocks are heavily traded and display high liquidity.
2See Akerlof (1970).
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The paper provides a formalization of opacity which is independent of the expected
payoff and risk of an asset and provides a microfoundation for the idea that opacity
may in fact deter information acquisition by limiting incentives to become privately
informed. As private information acquisition is not valuable for opaque assets despite
the large scope for information acquisition, these assets should be highly liquid. The
same holds for transparent assets, where the scope for private information is either
small or nonexistent. By contrast, assets of intermediate opacity yield both incentives
and scope for private information acquisition: In equilibrium, these assets display a
lack of liquidity; gains from trade can not be realized due to fear of being exploited by
better informed trading partners.
It can thus be privately and socially optimal to issue opaque assets to deter information
acquisition. This may explain why opacity in the financial system has remained high,
despite the enormous improvements in information dissemination and analysis tech-
nologies in recent decades. Moreover, artificial opacity creation, e.g. by resorting to
complex securitization structures, is not necessarily harmful to investors as often argued
by policymakers. Instead, it may preserve common ignorance and thus liquidity.
The article contributes to the policy debate by providing a simple microfoundation for
why opacity per se is not harmful to market participants. Adverse effects of legislation
increasing transparency of liquidity may arise and should be taken into account by
policymakers. As in many regulatory settings, subsidies are better suited to increase
social welfare (by aligning private and social incentives) than mandatory disclosure
levels.
Securitization Practices before and after the recent crisis Chapters 3 and 4 con-
tribute to the theoretical analysis of securitization practices in both the run-up and
aftermath of the recent financial crisis.
It has been argued that one main driving force of the recent financial crisis were lenders’
incentives to originate-to-sell : By selling securitized loans to investors, lenders were not
liable when borrowers defaulted and thus did not screen potential borrowers carefully
enough (or even deliberately included bad risks in the securitized pools) – this may
lead to a propagation of bad risk in the economy which, through securitization, is
spread to a multitude of agents and has been perceived as one of the main causes of
the collapse in 2007. The argumentation has received empirical support (e.g. by Keys,
Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010), Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012)) and, in light of this as
2
well as anecdotal evidence, motivated policymakers to act, e.g. by requiring minimum
retentions.
However, the relevance of this type of moral hazard problem as a central reason of the
recent crisis is not undisputed. Gorton (2010) argues that adverse selection concerns,
instead of moral hazard, were the driving force behind the crisis. Moreover, Bubb and
Kaufman (2014) provide empirical evidence in direct opposition to Keys, Mukherjee,
Seru, and Vig (2010) and Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012). From a theoretical perspective, it
is also unclear how such a lack of screening can be sustained in an equilibrium framework
with rational agents: Under rationality, the lack of incentives to screen properly should
be anticipated by investors.
Chapter 3 therefore analyzes a theoretical framework in which lenders may condition
their screening and lending decision on a publicly observable signal of borrowers’ cred-
itworthiness such as the FICO score. As screening produces private information for
the lender, this complicates realizations of potential gains from trade in the loan sale
market. The model considers retention by lenders as a signalling device. A key finding
is that, comparing a scenario with and without loan sale opportunities, screening in-
tensity decreases for borrowers with an intermediate FICO score: While both equilibria
with and without screening can be sustained, the lack of private information in the
no-screening case allows for comparatively greater realization of gains from trade at the
loan sale stage, which increases lender profitability.
The article thus provides theoretical evidence that securitization may in fact decrease
screening intensity at least for some borrowers in a framework where agents are fully
rational. Moreover, this may be detrimental to borrower welfare: Borrowers who obtain
a loan only in the securitization regime, i.e. borrowers who are not screened but where
screening would have revealed negative information, may ex post prefer never to have
applied for (and received) a loan – however, as they are never screened, they can
never infer their type from the lender’s behavior in equilibrium. The framework is also
consistent with empirically observed discontinuities in lending and default rates around
a FICO score of 620. A key prediction is that ex-post retention by lenders should be
differential across the range of FICO scores, which is seemingly opposed to empirical
findings by Bubb and Kaufman (2014). However, the article argues that a true empirical
assessment needs to focus not on securitization but on actual risk transfer as a measure
of retention by lenders. This relates to the literature on securitization without risk
transfer (see e.g. Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013)): Securitization often occurs
via conduits where the lenders as sponsors retained the risk of the securitized loans
3
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by guaranteeing that the conduit will not default. This implicit risk retention is in
line with retention serving as a signalling device when private information by lenders
is a concern. This purpose may also explain the prevalence of securitization via ABCP
conduits despite its lack of profitability.
Finally, Chapter 4 focuses on a different interaction between public and private infor-
mation. The article characterizes securities which are most robust to interim public
information in a security design and trading framework which builds on Dang, Gorton,
and Holmstro¨m (2011). While private information acquisition itself is not contained
in the analysis, the securities most robust to public information are found to be con-
tracts composed of debt-like tranches. These complex securities best preserve value
irrespective of whether interim public information is positive or negative by putting the
security’s payoff primarily in those parts of the underlying payoff distribution which is
as equally likely as possible to realize under different public signals. In the context of
the model, robustness of this form is desirable as gains and losses from public infor-
mation are realized differentially due to cash-in-the-market pricing: While losses are
fully incurred, gains in value due to positive interim information can not necessarily be
capitalized upon.
However, this introduces a misalignment in the securitizers’ incentives when address-
ing public and private information concerns: Complex securities composed of debt-like
tranches are most robust to public information, while standard debt contracts mini-
mize private information acquisition incentives. This is in contrast to Dang, Gorton,
and Holmstro¨m (2013), which restricts the type of public information considered. The
prevalence of debt-on-debt in securitization practices before the crisis can thus be in-
terpreted as having been potentially optimal from an ex-ante perspective (if private
information concerns dominate); ex-post, however, these security structures were (too)
vulnerable to interim public information, which contributed to the crisis.
To summarize, this thesis contributes to the theoretical analysis of securitization prac-
tices before and after the recent financial crisis by focussing on the interaction of public
information and private information acquisition incentives in various settings. The
findings are relevant for policy debates such as the push for increased transparency
in the financial system and the mandatory retention by lenders, which are already
implemented by legislators in several countries.
4
Authorship Of the three articles featured in this thesis, two are single-authored (Chap-
ters 3 and 4). Chapter 2 builds on joint work with Wolf B. Wagner (Tilburg Univer-
sity).
Relationship to Previous Work This thesis consists of five chapters, and includes
three distinct research papers. Chapters 1, 2, 3 and 5 were exclusively created after
my Master’s thesis. Chapter 4 extends my own work of Stenzel (2011), submitted as a
Master Thesis at the University of Mannheim. The main results, however, are all novel.
The previous work focused on generalizing Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011) with
respect to the optimality of debt in precluding private information acquisition. The
current focus is on the optimal security with respect to a generalized formulation of
interim public information. Stenzel (2011) did contain Example 2, which served as a
starting point for the present contribution.
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Chapter 2
Opacity and Liquidity
Abstract
We present a model that links the opacity of an asset to its liquidity. While
low opacity assets are liquid, intermediate levels of opacity provide incentives for
investors to acquire private information, causing adverse selection and illiquidity.
High opacity, however, benefits liquidity by reducing the value of a unit of pri-
vate information to investors. The cross-section of bid-ask spreads of U.S. firms
is shown to be consistent with this hump-shape relationship between opacity and
illiquidity. The analysis suggests that uniform disclosure requirements may not
be desirable; optimal information provision can be achieved by subsidizing infor-
mation. The model also delivers predictions about when it is optimal for asset
originators to sell intransparent products or pools composed of correlated assets.
2.1 Introduction
Opacity and illiquidity are two central concepts in economics. They are, however,
rarely distinguished from each other. Both arise from incompleteness of information.
An asset can be said to be opaque when agents generally have limited knowledge about
its pay-offs. By contrast, when some agents know more than others about an asset,
the asset tends to be illiquid because of adverse selection problems. Thus, opacity
reflects incompleteness of public information, while illiquidity arises from asymmetric
realizations of private information.
This chapter is based on joint work with Wolf B. Wagner. We thank participants of the Annual
Meeting of the European Finance Association 2014 and the Econometric Society European Meeting
2014, as well as the ENTER Jamboree 2015, and seminar audiences at Cambridge, ULB-ECARES,
Leicester, Rotterdam School of Management, Mannheim and Tilburg. We are grateful to Jacques
Cre`mer, Paolo Conteduca, Raphael Levy, Volker Nocke and Yuki Sato for valuable comments.
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How can the two be related? At first, one would expect a positive link between opacity
and illiquidity. When there is more opacity, there is more scope for agents having
different information sets. Adverse selection should be more pronounced and liquidity
be low. This reasoning is consistent with common thinking among policy makers that
transparency is beneficial for the financial system: more public information should deter
wasteful private acquisition of information and also reduce the potential for asymmetries
among investors.
This argumentation, however, ignores the fact that private information is endogenous.
Gathering it is costly; hence it has to be profitable for investors to acquire it. The
relationship between opacity and liquidity will thus depend on the scope for private
information as well as on the incentives to acquire such information. It is not obvious
why the value of information should be higher for opaque assets. Casual observation
also throws doubt on an exclusively positive link between opacity and illiquidity. Many
opaque assets are frequently traded and have low bid-ask spreads. A case in point is
the banking industry. Banking is considered a very opaque business. Nonetheless, the
major banks are heavily traded and their stocks display high liquidity.
This paper presents a model that analyzes the link between opacity and liquidity. We
consider an investor who holds an asset of given opacity, where opacity is defined as
the fraction of states of the world in which it is publicly not known what the pay-offs
are. The investor can decide how much he wants to learn about these states.3 Doing so
incurs a fixed cost per state. Following this, the state of the world becomes known. The
investor may be hit by a liquidity shock that forces him to sell the asset to the public.
Illiquidity arises at this stage since market participants anticipate that the investor will
sometimes trade opportunistically on his private information.4
For a completely transparent asset, there is no scope for private information. Such an
asset trades without an adverse selection discount and hence is liquid. At the other
extreme, for a very opaque asset the scope for private information is maximal. At
the same time, however, the incentives to acquire information are low. The reason
is that acquiring knowledge about a certain number of states is then less valuable as
these states constitute a smaller share of the overall number of opaque states. For a
3Learning about a state can be thought of as understanding how the asset’s pay-off depends on a
certain factor, e.g., an oil price change or a recession. For more opaque assets, the set of states
that would need to be analyzed is naturally larger.
4In this sense, information acquisition is ultimately self-defeating as it is anticipated and priced by
investors in equilibrium. This is reminiscent of Glode, Green, and Lowery (2012), where investments
in financial expertise are offset by similar investments by counterparties.
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sufficiently high level of opacity, it can be shown that it is never optimal to acquire any
information. Complete symmetry of information is preserved and the asset is liquid.
At intermediate values of opacity, however, the investor always acquires information
and there is adverse selection.5 A key prediction of the model is thus a hump-shape
relationship between opacity and illiquidity; a prediction we find supported in the cross-
section of U.S. firms.
The main analysis considers an asset of given opacity. However, since opacity affects
information acquisition and liquidity, an investor’s valuation of an asset will depend
on its opacity. This in turn affects the incentives of originators of assets. We turn to
the question of how much information an original owner of an asset wants to publicly
release, prior to selling to the investor. The issuer’s decision is guided by two motives.
First, he wants to sell an asset that maximizes value to the investor, as this will benefit
him through a higher sale price. Second, he wants to minimize costs associated with
releasing information to the public (arising, for example, because third parties have to
be hired to certify information).
Two conclusions can be drawn from the analysis of endogenous opacity. First, it can
be (privately and socially) optimal to issue opaque assets such as to deter information
acquisition. This may explain why opacity in the financial system has remained high,
despite the enormous improvements in information dissemination technologies in recent
decades (which should have, by themselves, led to much better public information and
lower opacity). It can even be desirable to increase an asset’s opacity beyond its natural
level (for example, by drawing up complex securitization structures). Second, issuers
may privately choose opacity levels that are higher than the ones that are desirable for
the financial system. This occurs because issuers have to fully bear the cost of reducing
opacity, but only partially internalize any benefits for other agents.
Our framework can be applied to understand other decisions of issuers. Consider for
instance an originator who wants to sell a pool of assets. From a diversification per-
spective, such a pool should contain assets of different risk profiles. This is however in
sharp contrast to the observed practice of pooling mostly similar assets.6 Our analysis
5The seminal paper by Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) considers the incentives of agents to learn about
the expected pay-off of an asset. A lower quality of the signal reduces the incentives to become
informed, leading to equilibrium prices reflecting fundamentals less well. While in Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980) information incompleteness arises with respect to the expected pay-off of the asset
(the “fundamentals”), in our analysis of opacity the latter is known. Instead, learning takes place
about the mapping between (future) states of the world and pay-offs.
6Gorton and Metrick (2012) refer to this as one of the major puzzles of securitization.
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suggests that issuing correlated assets has a benefit because it lowers information costs:
correlated pools avoid duplication of information because learning about one asset is
then informative about the rest of the pool. However, the incentives to acquire informa-
tion are higher in correlated pools, so there is a trade-off. For certain parameter values,
the model predicts that informational costs are minimized by selling a correlated pool.
The model also delivers testable predictions for other characteristics of asset sales, such
as the decision whether to sell assets in a pool or separately.
There are several implications for policy. Uniformly mandated increases in transparency
are not desirable because of the non-monotonic nature of the relationship between
opacity and liquidity (which coincides with welfare in our setting). In principle, a two-
class policy where regulators distinguish between assets according to their opacity can
achieve efficiency. For assets that are fairly transparent, the standard policy prescription
applies that more transparency increases efficiency. However, assets that are relatively
intransparent to start with should not be forced to higher levels of transparency. Such
a conditional transparency regime seems, however, informationally demanding.7 A
better approach is to provide subsidies for issuers to voluntarily increase transparency.
Subsidies are efficiency-enhancing regardless of a firm’s opacity level since they directly
address the source of inefficient information choices of issuers (the positive externality of
information for other agents in the financial system). They may, for example, take the
form of governments sponsoring infrastructure for services that promote transparency,
such as public information repositories.
2.1.1 Related Literature
Our setting is closely related to recent literature which has analyzed how security de-
sign affects information acquisition by investors. While the focus in the present paper
is on the question of how much information should be released about an asset, the
security design literature studies how an asset’s pay-off streams can be separated into
different parts to make information acquisition less attractive. A central theme in this
literature is the optimality of debt contracts: because debt has a flat payoff for most
of the domain (and otherwise its payoff is determined by limited liability), it minimizes
the benefits of acquiring private information.8 Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2013)
7Although differentiated disclosure policies exist in practise (for example, different standards for listed
firms).
8The literature mostly considers situations where only one party in a potential trade can become
informed, in which case information acquisition is welfare-reducing. Farhi and Tirole (2014) study
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formally introduce the concept of the information sensitivity of a security and show in
a model of strategic security design and multiple trading rounds that debt contracts
minimize market participants’ incentives to acquire information. Using a generalized
information structure, Yang (2012) finds standard debt to be least sensitive to private
information, irrespective of the composition of the underlying asset pool. Farhi and
Tirole (2014) highlight the importance of commonality of information. They show that
for an asset to be liquid it is important that information is symmetric. This can be
achieved either by common knowledge or by common ignorance. In our paper, infor-
mational symmetry arises either for very transparent assets (common knowledge) or for
very opaque assets (because of common ignorance). Intermediate levels of opacity, in
contrast, lead to one-sided information and cause adverse selection.
There is a small but growing literature that analyzes asset opacity. Kaplan (2006)
examines a bank’s choice of whether to release information about assets at an interim
stage. The paper shows that it can be efficient for the bank to commit to keep informa-
tion secret, even though this forces the bank to offer non-contingent deposit contracts
ex-ante. The reason is that the cost of revealing negative information at an interim
stage can outweigh the benefits of positive information. Sato (2014) considers a setup
with opacity at the fund and the asset level. He finds that opaque funds invest in opaque
assets and that such funds can trade at a premium. The reason is that managers of
opaque funds inflate investors’ beliefs about future returns by (secretly) overinvesting
in opaque assets and levering up.
Pagano and Volpin (2012) analyze a model where investors differ in their ability to
process information. Releasing information about assets is subject to a trade-off. On
the one hand, information decreases primary market liquidity because it induces a
“winner’s curse” problem for unsophisticated investors who cannot parse information.
On the other hand, information increases secondary market liquidity as information not
released by issuers creates scope for private information acquisition and hence leads to
adverse selection. The second channel is also present in our model. While in Pagano
and Volpin (2012) information is of an all-or-nothing nature, in our model information
is continuous. This allows us to show that the value of a unit of information can
vary with the asset’s level of opacity, which is the source of the opacity benefit in our
paper. A second, related, difference to the literature is that opacity in our framework
continuously alters the degree of publicly available information while the literature
information acquisition on both sides. In this case, information acquisition can improve liquidity
as it can increase symmetry across agents.
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typically distinguishes between opacity and transparency in a binary form, where only
for transparent assets information can be acquired at all.9
Carlin, Kogan, and Lowery (2013) focus on an issue similar to the differential informa-
tion processing in Pagano and Volpin (2012). They consider an experimental setting
in which the complexity of an asset is varied. Complexity relates to the computational
difficulty required to obtain information about the asset’s payoff. Carlin, Kogan, and
Lowery (2013) find that when subjects are aware that other subjects are more adept
at performing the required calculations, adverse selection becomes pronounced. This
is consistent with agents anticipating a lower degree of common information present in
markets.
While in our setting there is no social benefit to information, recent papers by Monnet
and Quintin (2015) and Dang, Gorton, Holmstro¨m, and Ordon˜ez (2013) have shown
that transparency (i.e. more information) can lead to more efficient interim decisions.10
However, there is also a cost, as investors may be forced to liquidate their positions in
response to negative information. In the presence of secondary markets that are not
always liquid, the benefits of good interim information cannot be fully capitalized by
investors. Transparency is shown to mitigate this problem, at the cost of allocative
efficiency.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 sets up the baseline
model for the analysis of the link between opacity and illiquidity. Section 2.3 examines
the cross-section of U.S. firms to see whether it exhibits a hump-shape relationship. In
Section 2.4 we consider the incentives of asset originators. Section 2.5 discusses some
policy implications. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 The Model
We develop a very simple model of information acquisition that nevertheless micro-
founds how the cost and value of information depends on an asset’s opacity. In the
model, an investor can learn about an asset of varying degrees of opacity. This learning
9This binary structure of asset opacity is also present in Di Maggio and Pagano (2014), who analyze
it in conjunction with different degrees of market transparency. Market transparency, as opposed
to asset transparency, is also the focus of e.g. Fuchs, O¨ry, and Skrzypacz (2015).
10Boot and Thakor (2001) provide an analysis of disclosure of various types of information that are
all beneficial (as it reveals agent’s types). They show that in equilibrium firms find it beneficial to
disclose all types of information.
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is not about the asset’s expected pay-off (which is the focus of Grossman and Stiglitz
(1980) and several other papers) but about how it pays in different states of the world.
This can be likened to an investor (or the risk manager of a financial institution) exert-
ing effort in analyzing how an asset performs under several scenarios (e.g., an oil price
shock, deflation or an economic downturn). For opaque assets, this will be inherently
more difficult than for transparent ones.
Take for instance the stock of Coca-Cola (or a community bank) versus the stock of JP
Morgan. The business models of Coca-Cola and the community bank are simple and
transparent; it is hence easy to predict how their stock will perform in a set of circum-
stances. By contrast, the operations of JP Morgan are extremely complex, involving
a wide set of activities (such as trading in derivatives, or holdings of securitization
products) which are often difficult to understand even on an individual basis. Learning
about how JP Morgan’s business will perform under different circumstances is hence
difficult and requires substantial effort by investors. Another example is credit prod-
ucts. A mezzanine tranche formed from a portfolio of credits, for instance, is much
more opaque than an exposure to a single name. As a result, learning about its pay-
offs in different states (for instance, its dependence on a clustering of default events in
the economy) is more demanding. Conglomerates can also be seen as opaque firms, as
opposed to standalone firms, as it will be more challenging to understand how they are
impacted by shocks.11
The economy consists of an investor I and an agent M , representing the market. There
are two dates, t = 1, 2. The preferences of both agents are linear and given as follows:
• The investor’s utility depends on whether she is patient or impatient. If patient
(occurring with probability pi ∈ (0, 1)), the investor can consume at both dates:
U I = CI1 + C
I
2 . If impatient, the investor derives only utility from consumption
at date 1: U I = CI1 . The investor privately learns her type (patient or not) at
t = 1 and this information is not verifiable.
• The market agent consumes at both dates: UM = CM1 + CM2 .
The endowments of the agents are as follows. At t = 1, the investor holds an asset
which pays off at date 2. This asset returns one in a subset L (of mass l ∈ (0, 1)) of
uniformly distributed states of the world s ∈ S = [0, 1] and zero otherwise. Given the
uniform distribution, the unconditional value of the asset is hence l. While the set L
11Consistent with this, Cohen and Lou (2012) provide evidence that it takes more time for a piece of
information to be incorporated in the price of a conglomerate.
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is unknown, its mass l is publicly known. The market agent has a cash endowment of
wM > 1 at date 1.12 The agents hold no other endowments.
Given the allocation of endowments, it is natural that gains from trade can be realized.
If the investor turns out to be impatient at date 1, she can sell the asset to M . How-
ever, reaping these gains is complicated by the opportunity for the investor to acquire
private information about the asset prior to trading: Acquisition of private information
results in adverse selection when trading with the market. The incentives to acquire
information, in turn, are affected by the asset’s opacity.
Opacity is modeled as follows. There is a set of states O containing the payoff states
(L ⊆ O). This set O is publicly known. We refer to the mass of this set, o (∈ [l, 1]),
as the asset’s opacity. Maximum opacity (o = 1) arises when there is no information
about the set of payoff states. At the other extreme, if o = l, the precise set of payoff
states is common knowledge and there is no scope for private information acquisition –
the asset is transparent. For o ∈ (l, 1), opacity is of an intermediate degree and there is
incomplete knowledge about payoff states. The more transparent the asset, the smaller
o and the more precise is the public information about the location of the payoff states,
that is, the circumstances under which the asset pays off. Note that opacity is distinct
from the asset’s ex-ante return and risk: the expected payoff is l and variance of the
asset is l(1− l).
At the beginning of date 1, the investor has the option to acquire private information.
Specifically, she decides on an amount a (∈ [0, o−l]) of information to acquire. Following
this, nature reveals a random subset of states A of mass a from O for which the asset
does not pay off. Private information acquisition reduces the size of the set containing
the payoff states from o to o− a. There are proportional costs of acquiring information
kI · a, where kI > 0. We assume that these costs take intermediate values:
Assumption 2.1
pil(1− pi)
1− pil < kI < pi.
This assumption ensures that information acquisition is nontrivial.
The choice of a as well as the realization of the subset A are private to the investor and
are not verifiable. Following the investor’s information acquisition decision, the state
12We abstract from issues that can arise because endowments are constrained (as in Dang, Gorton,
Holmstro¨m, and Ordon˜ez (2013)), which potentially lead to cash-in-the-market pricing.
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of the world s becomes available. Subsequently, the investor can sell the asset to the
market. For this we assume that the market posts a competitive price for the asset and
the investor decides whether or not to sell at this price.13
To focus the analysis, it is convenient to rearrange the states s of the world. Specifically,
we reorder states such that the payoff states are on [0, l], the public set of potential
payoff states is on [0, o], and the set of potential payoff states privately known to the
investor is [0, o− a]. In addition, agents no longer observe the exact state, but only the
set in which the state falls. If s > o, both investor and the market learn that the state
of the world falls outside the public set O, and hence that the asset does not pay off. If
s ∈ (o−a, o], the state of the world is in the public set of possible states of the world O,
but not in the investor’s private set. The investor privately learns that the asset does
not pay, while the market only learns that s is within the public set of potential payoff
states of mass o. If s ≤ o − a, both investor and market have incomplete knowledge
about the payoff. The investor knows that s is within the private set of payoff states,
while the market only observes that the state is within the public set.
The timing of the model can be summarized as follows:
t
t = 1
(1) investor decides on extent
of information acquisition a
(2) information about s is publicly
revealed and investor privately
learns whether she is patient or not
(3) investor decides whether to sell asset
to market at competitive price
t = 2
(1) asset returns 1 iff s ∈ [0, l]
Figure 2.1: Timeline of the Baseline Model
2.2.1 Trade with the Market
To solve for an equilibrium of the game, we first analyze the final stage in which the
investor has the opportunity to sell to the market. At this stage, public information
about the state s has been revealed. The public set of payoff states depends on the
asset’s opacity level and is given by [0, o]. Furthermore, the investor has potentially
13This avoids the use of price as a signal about the asset’s quality or the investor’s type. A competitive
price may, for example, arise if market participants compete by posting bid prices for the asset.
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acquired information a; her private set of payoff states is thus [0, o − a]. Denote by
a˜ the market’s beliefs about how much information the investor has acquired, and by
p(a˜, o) the competitive price given these beliefs and the opacity level o.
We first analyze the investor’s selling decision for a given price p. To rule out no-trade
equilibria, we assume that the investor has a weak preference for selling when she is
impatient, and a weak preference for not selling when she is patient. We focus on pure
strategy equilibria.
The following cases arise depending on the realization of s. First, there is the trivial
case of s being outside the public set (s > o). Both the investor and the market know
that the asset does not pay off and trade is irrelevant. We can ignore this case for the
analysis of the trade equilibrium as trade, if it takes place, occurs at a price of zero.
Consider next the case of s being inside the public set (s ≤ o). If an investor is
impatient, she will sell regardless of price (given her weak preference for selling) since
there is zero utility from holding on to the asset. For a patient investor, the decision
to sell depends on whether the signal is in the private set. If the signal is outside the
private set (s > o − a), the investor knows that the asset is worthless. She will hence
sell at any positive price. If the signal is inside the private set (s ≤ o−a), the investor’s
expected utility of keeping the asset is l
o−a . Taking into account the weak preference for
holding on to the asset, she will hence sell the asset if and only if the price p is larger
than l
o−a . Such a price, however, is inconsistent with market rationality. To see this,
note that l
o−a is higher than the value of the asset even without adverse selection (that
is, when the investor only sells when she is impatient). The market can hence never
break even at this price and such a price cannot prevail in equilibrium. It follows that
when s ≤ o− a the patient investor does not sell the asset.
We can summarize these results as follows:
Lemma 2.1 In equilibrium, the asset is offered to the market (when s ≤ o) iff
i) the investor is impatient, or
ii) the investor is patient and s is in her public set but outside her private set (s ∈
(o− a, o]).
We next solve for the price at which an asset is sold (in the case of s ≤ o). Since the
price is set competitively, the market breaks even in expectation. The price hence has
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to be equal to the asset’s expected value (given beliefs a˜) conditional on being sold.
According to Lemma 2.1, the asset is sold either when the investor is impatient, or
when she is patient and the state is outside her private set. The first case occurs with
probability 1 − pi and the likelihood of the asset paying off in this case is l
o
, i.e., the
ratio of the size of the payoff set l to the size of the public set o. The second case,
a patient investor with s outside her private set, is perceived by the market to occur
with probability pi · a˜
o
( a˜
o
is the likelihood of the state being outside the private set
given beliefs a˜ about the extent of information acquisition). The asset is worthless in
this case. The expected value of the asset (conditional on being sold) is hence
(1−pi) l
o
1−pi+pi a˜
o
.
Rearranging yields the competitive price p(a˜, o) given beliefs a˜ and opacity level o:
p(a˜, o) =
1− pi
o− pi(o− a˜) l. (2.1)
Note that for a˜ = 0 (that is, if the market believes there is no private information) we
have p(0, o) = l
o
. Furthermore, ∂p
∂a˜
< 0 because if the market believes that the investor
privately acquired more information, it prices in more adverse selection as it becomes
more likely that a worthless asset is offered.
2.2.2 Information Acquisition
Consider a candidate for information acquisition a∗, and corresponding market beliefs
a˜. For a∗ to constitute an equilibrium amount of information acquisition, it has to be
the case that a∗ maximizes the investor’s utility given that the market believes a˜ = a∗.
We thus have for a∗ that
a∗ = argmax
a∈[0,o−l]
u(a, a∗),
where u(a, a˜) denotes the investor’s expected utility given that she chooses a level of
information acquisition a and the market holds beliefs a˜.
We can derive u(a, a˜) as follows. With probability 1 − o, the state of the world falls
outside the public set (s > o). In this case, the investor does not derive any utility
from owning the asset as it is common knowledge that the asset is worthless. With
probability o, the state of the world falls inside the public set (s ≤ o). The investor
then sells whenever she is impatient or when she is patient and the state is outside
her private set (s ∈ (o − a, o]). The combined probability for this is 1 − pi + pi · a
o
and
she obtains p(a˜, o) from selling the asset. When she is patient and the state is inside
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the private set (s ∈ [0, o− a]) she holds onto the asset. This happens with probability
pi · o−a
o
and she receives (in expectation) l
o−a from the date-2 return. Together with the
information costs kI · a, her utility is thus
u(a, a˜) = o
(
(1− pi + pia
o
)p(a˜, o) + pi
o− a
o
l
o− a
)
− kI · a. (2.2)
Note that when beliefs are consistent with actual information acquisition (a˜ = a), the
above simplifies to l − kI · a.
Differentiating with respect to a, we obtain the marginal gain from acquiring informa-
tion:
∂u(a, a˜)
∂a
= pip(a˜, o)− kI . (2.3)
Equation (2.3) shows that information acquisition trades off marginal benefits pip(a˜, o)
with information acquisition costs kI . The benefits are derived as follows: By acquiring
one additional unit of information, the investor reduces her private set by one state. If
this state realizes, she knows that the asset is worthless. If she turns out to be patient,
she will hence sell and obtain p(a˜, o), while before she would have held a worthless asset.
Note that the incentives to acquire information increase in the asset’s price.
The marginal benefits in (2.3) are constant as they do not depend on the amount of
information acquired (a). There are hence three cases to consider. If pip(a˜, o)− kI < 0
(or rearranging, if p(a˜, o) < kI
pi
), the marginal benefits are always outweighed by the
marginal costs. Zero information (a∗ = 0) thus maximizes investor utility. Likewise,
if pip(a˜, o) − kI > 0 (p(a˜, o) > kIpi ), the marginal benefits outweigh the marginal costs
and the highest possible level of information acquisition (a∗ = o− l) maximizes utility.
Finally, if p(a˜, o) = kI
pi
, the investor is indifferent as to which level of information
acquisition to choose. We can hence summarize for the investor’s choice of information
given beliefs a˜:
argmax
a∈[0,o−l]
u(a, a˜) =

0 if p(a˜, o) < kI
pi
[0, o− l] if p(a˜, o) = kI
pi
o− l if p(a˜, o) > kI
pi
.
(2.4)
This allows us to solve for equilibrium information acquisition. Note that higher opac-
ity reduces the price p for a given belief a˜ (equation (2.1)) and hence the incentives
to acquire information. Define
¯
o as the critical opacity level which just leads to full
information acquisition (a∗ = o − l). Recall that in equilibrium, we have that a∗ = a˜.
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Inserting a˜ =
¯
o − l into p(a˜,
¯
o) = kI
pi
, we obtain after rearranging:
¯
o = pil + pi(1−pi)l
kI
.
Likewise, define o¯ as the critical opacity which deters acquisition of any information.
We obtain o¯ = pil
kI
by rearranging p(0, o¯) = kI
pi
. For intermediate values of o , an interior
equilibrium arises. By solving for a˜ in the condition p(a˜, o) = kI
pi
, we obtain for the
interior equilibrium that a∗ = a˜ = (1−pi)
pi
( pil
kI
− o).
Note that Assumption 2.1 ensures
¯
o < min{o¯, 1}, which allows to summarize
Proposition 2.1 The equilibrium level of information acquisition a∗ is
a∗(o) =

o− l if o ≤
¯
o
(1−pi)
pi
( pil
kI
− o) if o ∈ (
¯
o, o¯)
0 if o ≥ o¯
(2.5)
with
¯
o = pil + (1−pi)pil
kI
and o¯ = pil
kI
.
o
a∗(o)
l o o¯ 1
0
a∗(o)
Figure 2.2: Information Acquisition as a Function of o
Figure 2.2 shows equilibrium information acquisition a∗(o) as a function of an asset’s
opacity o. At o = l, the asset is fully transparent and it is not possible to acquire
information (a∗ = 0). For values of o between l and
¯
o, the maximum feasible amount
of information is acquired (a∗ = o − l). In this range, opacity increases information
acquisition, as higher opacity increases the feasible amount. Beyond
¯
o, however, opacity
reduces information acquisition. This is until o¯ is reached, at which point no information
is acquired. Note that while in the figure we have that o¯ < 1, this is not necessarily
always the case. If not, information will be acquired even at full opacity.
What is the reason why opacity can deter information acquisition? When opacity
is high, the public set is large and hence a realization of s in this set becomes less
informative about payoffs. This can be appreciated from the fact that p (for given a˜) is
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declining in opacity (see equation (2.1)). A lower p in turn means that learning about
a given number of states in the public set becomes less valuable for the investor as the
investor benefits from private information by selling to the market in cases where the
asset is worthless.
Note that the non-monotonic impact of opacity on information acquisition translates
also into a non-monotonic impact on liquidity as well as welfare. This is, first, be-
cause information acquisition always lowers liquidity, and second, because information
acquisition is the only source of welfare losses in our setting.
2.2.3 Robustness
In this section, we discuss several modifications of the model.
Random Discovery of the Payoff Interval
We have considered an information acquisition technology which is deterministic: The
investor eliminates non-paying states from the set of potential payoff states with cer-
tainty. This has significantly simplified the analysis. Alternatively, the outcome of
information acquisition may be random. In particular, the investor may decide to an-
alyze a specific state and then find out whether the asset pays off in this state or not.
Following this, she may decide to acquire information about more states. A consequence
is that the extent to which opacity is eliminated becomes random: the investor may be
lucky and discover the payoff interval early on or she may be unsuccessful and decide
to stop after having acquired a certain amount of information. Another consequence
is that the amount of information acquired (and hence also the deadweight loss from
information acquisition) becomes random is well.
Appendix 2.A analyzes an information technology with random discovery of states. The
results from the baseline model carry over in that information acquisition is first in-
creasing and then decreasing in opacity. There can also be interior equilibrium amounts
of information acquisition, where there is a threshold for information acquisition such
that an investor acquires information until this threshold is reached or until the pay-off
interval is discovered.
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Learning about Loss States
What happens when information acquisition allows us to learn about the set of states
where the asset does not pay off? Suppose that – the exact opposite of the baseline
model – the asset pays off on [l, 1] but not on [0, l]. In addition, suppose that reducing
opacity and information acquisition also work in the opposite way: the owner’s opacity
choice narrows down the set of loss states to [0, o], while information acquisition further
narrows it to [0, o− a].
A difference to the baseline model is that the investor now benefits from states in which
he has positive private information about the asset. The intuition for this observation
is as follows (Appendix 2.B contains the full analysis). Suppose that selling the asset
yields a given price p. Suppose a state s realizes in which the investor knows that the
asset pays off but the market does not (s ∈ [o− a, o]). A patient investor will then not
sell the asset and thus realize a return of 1, whereas she would have realized p without
information acquisition. Suppose next that a state of the world realizes where both
investor and market are uncertain about whether there is a pay-out (s ∈ [l, o − a]).
Since the investor also observes that this state is not within her private set of payoff-
states [o − a, o], she perceives a higher chance that the asset will not pay than the
market. This will cause her to sell the asset when patient. However, under symmetric
information, the investor would have been indifferent between selling and not selling so
that no additional gains are incurred.
Information acquisition makes it more likely that a state realizes where the investor
has positive information about the asset. In such a state the investor will refrain from
selling the asset, while prior to information acquisition she would have sold the asset. A
consequence is that the gains from information acquisition are decreasing in the market
price p, the opposite to the case in the baseline model (equation (2.3)). This eliminates
the possibility for interior choices of information acquisition. However, as shown in the
appendix, it is still the case that opacity lowers information acquisition at low opacity
levels and that sufficiently high opacity prevents information acquisition.
State-Dependent Information Acquisition Costs
The baseline model assumes that the cost of acquiring information is proportional to
the number of states which are analyzed. Implicit to this is that states have equal
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information costs. Alternatively, information costs may differ across states. For exam-
ple, it might be easier to ascertain the value of an asset in the case of an inflationary
shock, than for instance in the event of a financial crisis. If costs are state-dependent, it
becomes optimal for an investor to first analyze cheaper states, resulting in increasing
marginal information acquisition costs. Intuitively, increasing costs make it more likely
that we obtain an interior equilibrium. Appendix 2.C contains the analysis of increas-
ing marginal costs, showing that the qualitative results are the same as in the baseline
model. In particular, the relationship between opacity and information acquisition still
follows a hump-shape.14
It is critical, however, that the total cost of gathering information is higher when more
states are analyzed. To see this, suppose to the contrary that any level of information
acquisition incurs a fixed cost, independently of how many states are analyzed. The
marginal benefit from information once some information has been acquired (a > 0)
is then strictly positive (∂u(a,a˜)
∂a
= pip(a˜, o) > 0 from equation (2.3) for kI = 0). Hence
there can no longer be an interior equilibrium. The investor will hence either acquire no
information or all information. This case corresponds to the technology of information
acquisition considered in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2013) and Dang, Gorton,
Holmstro¨m, and Ordon˜ez (2013).
Alternative Mechanisms
In our model, opacity discourages information acquisition by reducing the price at which
an asset can be sold in the case of negative private information. An opaque asset is
worth less in such a sale for the following reason: when the public domain is wider,
it is less likely that a state in this domain belongs to the payoff interval. The main
mechanism, however, does not rely on this aspect of the model. There are various
other reasons for why opaque assets generally will command lower prices. For instance,
market participants may have heterogenous preferences for assets (arising, for example,
because they have different endowment profiles). For transparent assets there is more
knowledge about when the asset pays out, allowing market participants with the highest
valuation for these states to bid for the asset. Alternatively, more transparency may
allow for more efficient hedging in the transparent region, decreasing hedging costs.
14The analysis of state-dependent information acquisition costs is similar to an analysis where states of
the world are not uniformly distributed: While state-dependent costs alter the cost-side of acquiring
information, different distributions alter the benefits.
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In appendix 2.E we develop a model of endogenous valuation of opaque assets based
on inefficient liquidations. We consider a setting in which a market agent, after having
bought the asset, may decide to scrap the asset before t = 2. Efficiency requires to
scrap whenever the asset is worthless at t = 2. If the asset is opaque, it is more likely
that the scrapping decision is inefficient as there are then less states where the market
is informed about the future payout. Anticipating this, the market’s valuation of an
opaque asset will be lower at t = 1. This in turn makes information acquisition less
attractive for investors. The appendix shows that in this richer setup it still holds that
information is only acquired when opacity is not large. For sufficiently large opacity,
there is no information acquisition.
2.3 The Cross-Section of Bid-Ask Spreads and Opacity
The model’s key prediction is that opacity encourages private information only up to
a point. Beyond this point, the relationship inverts, and opacity makes information
acquisition less attractive (see Figure 2.2). In this section we analyze firm-level data to
see whether such a pattern is consistent with the data.15
Following the theoretical contributions of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Kyle (1985),
private information leads to higher bid-ask spreads on a firm’s stock. Market makers
need to be compensated for the risk of trading with an informed party, leading them to
widen the bid-ask spread when they expect private information to be more prevalent.
Similarly, in our model, the market bids less when information asymmetries are higher.
Empirically, it is well documented that adverse selection is an important determinant
of bid-ask spreads (see e.g. Stoll (1989), Huang and Stoll (1997)). We hence proxy the
amount of private information on a firm using its stock’s bid-ask spread.
The opacity of a firm is measured by the extent of disagreement among analysts about
future earnings (following Flannery, Kwan, and Nimalendran (2004) and others). The
idea is that opaque firms exhibit large potential for divergence among analysts, while
15Agarwal (2007) finds a hump-shape relationship between institutional ownership and liquidity. This
is interpreted as the presence of two offsetting effects. On the one hand, higher institutional
ownership leads to more informational assymmetries and hence lower liquidity. On the other
hand, it leads to more competition (among institutions) which should result in pricing better
reflecting information and hence higher liquidity. This exercise differs from ours in that we vary
asset characteristics (opacity) rather than characteristics of the holders of the asset.
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disagreement is naturally limited for transparent firms.16 The literature has suggested
alternatives to the dispersion proxy, which are however less appropriate for our pur-
pose. For example, Morgan (2002) uses rating splits as measure of firm opacity. While
conceptually similar to analyst dispersion, rating splits are not ideal in our context
because testing our theory requires an opacity measure that varies over a sufficiently
large interval in order to be able to identify a non-monotonic relationship (rating splits,
in their simplest form, are a binary measure). Another measure of opacity that is used
in the literature is the number of analysts following a firm, see e.g. Roulstone (2003).
This measure does not measure underlying firm opacity itself, but rather the extent to
which analyst activity alleviates this opacity. We will account for this in our analysis
by including the number of analysts following a stock as a control variable.
2.3.1 Data
We conduct an analysis of firms listed in the U.S. by relating their bid-ask spreads to
the dispersion in analyst forecasts. In our analysis, we control for factors that may
affect bid-ask spreads and which are unrelated to adverse selection.
We use the universe of firms contained in the CRSP database. Our measure of the
bid-ask spread is the average of a firm’s bid-ask spread in CRSP during the last three
months of 2013 (October 2013-December 2013). In addition, we obtain various controls
from CRSP: the (log) of the market capitalization as a measure of firm size and the stock
price itself (both as of October 2013); the standard deviation of stock price returns,
trading volume and the standard deviation of trading volume averaged over the two
years prior to October 2013.
The dispersion measure is obtained from the monthly summary statistics of the I/B/E/S
database. Specifically, we calculate dispersion as the average standard deviation of
monthly one-year ahead earnings forecasts. We calculate this average over the two years
prior to October 2013 (October 2011 until September 2013) and scale the standard
deviation by the mean earnings forecast. We deliberately choose a long horizon to
capture structural disagreement among analysts and to mitigate the impact of any
short term events that may cause analysts to diverge or converge in their forecasts, e.g.
16Suppose that we enrich our model by “analysts” who all randomly learn about different parts of the
set of potential pay-off states. If polled about the asset value after the state s is revealed, there
is a higher chance of divergence among analysts for an opaque asset as it is then more likely that
analysts have different information sets.
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earnings announcements. We also obtain the average number of analysts submitting
forecasts following a firm from I/B/E/S.
To be included in our final data set, we require firms to have complete information
during each month over which averages are computed and to have at least two analyst
forecasts in any month (results are robust to requiring a higher number of analysts). As
there are outliers in both the spread and dispersion measure, we exclude observations
in the 1% tail in either variable. We also drop stocks with an average price of less than
$5 (a common practice in the literature) because such stocks tend to trade infrequently.
We arrive at a final sample of 2067 observations. Table 2.1 in Appendix 2.F contains
the summary statistics for all variables.
2.3.2 Results
We first summarize the relationship between spreads and analyst dispersion using rolling
windows which sort on dispersion. Figure 2.3 depicts the results for a window size of
500 (the first datapoint is the mean spread of the sample of firms with the 500 smallest
dispersion measure, the second datapoint is the mean of the firms with a dispersion rank
between 2 and 501, ...). Up to around window 800, there is a clear positive relationship
between dispersion and bid-ask spreads. However, for subsequent windows, the bid-ask
spread drops significantly. There is thus a non-monotonic relationship between the two
variables – as predicted by theory. Interestingly, for the extreme dispersion portfolios
(starting at around window 1300) the negative relationship ceases. Spreads no longer
fall (and even increase somewhat). A potential explanation for this is that at this point
the degree of opacity that prevents information acquisition is reached (o¯ in our model).
We also note that the range of spreads implied by dispersion changes is large. While
portfolios with intermediate dispersion have an average spread of around 0.028, spreads
at the low and high end of the dispersion spectrum around are at 0.024 and 0.023 (the
standard deviation over the entire sample is 0.03).
The rolling window analysis of Figure 2.3 is based on the raw data and is subject to the
disadvantage that for any window information from the observations outside the window
are completely ignored. This is an inefficient use of data and, among others, results
in a more variable relationship in the figure. In addition, it does not allow inferences
for individual specific dispersion levels, as each datapoint equally summarizes 500 data
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Figure 2.3: Rolling Windows Analysis of Bid-Ask Spreads
points. As an alternative, we analyze the relationship using Lowess smoothing.17 Figure
2.8 in Appendix 2.F presents the results, which confirm the rolling windows analysis.
In particular, there is a monotonically increasing relationship between dispersion and
spreads up to the 36th dispersion percentile of firms, after which a negative relationship
obtains. Around the 86th percentile, the lowest bid-ask spread and hence highest
liquidity is reached. Beyond, only smaller fluctuations in the liquidity proxy occur,
consistent with opacity levels that preclude information acquisition being reached.
Previous research has indicated that bid-ask spreads reflect other factors besides ad-
verse selection costs. It is thus important to control for these factors in the analysis.
Addressing this, we analyze bid-ask spreads which are net of these factors. For this, we
first regress bid-ask spreads on a set of controls and obtain residuals from this regres-
sion. We proceed to analyze the spread residuals using rolling window portfolios and
Lowess smoothing (Cleveland (1979)).
As a first control, we use size (the log of market capitalization) as larger firms are ex-
pected to have smaller spreads independent of adverse selection considerations. Second,
we include the stock price, as higher price firms have a tendency to have larger spreads.
We also include proxies for inventory costs, as prior literature has emphasized that such
costs should result in wider spreads by market makers. A first (and inverse) proxy is
trading volume (scaled by market capitalization). Higher trading volume makes it eas-
ier for market makers to adjust their inventory and should hence lead to lower spreads
(see e.g. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000)). A second proxy is the standard
17Lowess smoothing (Cleveland (1979)) is based on a series of local regressions which are combined
using non-parametric smoothing.
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deviation of the stock return. This variable captures firm risk, which has the effect of
increasing the cost of holding inventory and results in larger spreads. We also include
the number of analysts following a stock. This is because the presence of more analysts
is considered to lead to more efficient information transmission to other market partici-
pants, effectively reducing private information (see e.g. Roulstone (2003)) and thus the
spread. Finally, we include the standard deviation of the daily trading volume (scaled
by market capitalization) as firms with volatile trading volumes require more market
depth to provide smooth pricing (Roulstone (2003)).
Table 2.2 in Appendix 2.F summarizes the results of a regression of the spread on these
controls. Several controls are significant: market capitalization, price, volatility of
returns and number of analysts. In each case, the coefficient of the significant variable
has the expected sign. We calculate the residuals from this regression to separate
the components that do not relate to adverse selection. Figure 2.4 depicts the rolling
window analysis of the residuals, using the same approach as in Figure 2.3. The pattern
looks fairly similar to the previous analysis, one noticeable difference being that there
is now a more pronounced peak in residual spreads (at around window 820). Figure
2.9 in Appendix 2.F presents a locally smoothed graph based on Lowess regressions
which plots residual spread against dispersion rank, again showing the hump-shaped
relationship.
Figure 2.4: Rolling Windows Analysis of Bid-Ask Spreads Residuals
The basic result of a non-monotonic relationship between spreads and dispersion is
robust to various considerations. First, the length of the rolling window can be mod-
ified within reasonable ranges without fundamentally modifying the observed pattern
(similarly, results are robust to variations in the bandwidth for the Lowess regression).
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Second, trading volume (which we use here as a control) arguably can be considered
as a measure of liquidity itself. We hence re-run Figure 2.4 excluding trading volume
in stage 1, with results unchanged. Furthermore, the results are robust to exclusion of
the number of analysts as control. This is potentially important since the number of
analysts may itself be a function of firm opacity, which may obscure the analysis. The
analysis is also robust to requiring a high number of analysts following a firm (i.e., a
minimum requirement of 5, 7 or 10 analysts following the firm). Finally, results are
robust to different outlier treatments, such as including stocks with a price of less than
$5 and extending the tail cut-off for the spread and dispersion measures.
In sum, the empirical analysis provides evidence that the relationship between opacity
and liquidity is not a simple negative one, as often presumed. In particular, the high
liquidity of stocks with a large dispersion in analysis forecasts indicates that opacity
may sustain common ignorance – even if market participants could exercise effort to
acquire private information – and thus preserve liquidity.
2.4 The Incentives of Asset Originators
In this section, we endogenize several characteristics of the asset held by the investor.
For this, we consider an original owner of the asset who can influence an asset’s charac-
teristics before selling it on to the investor. We first analyze the question of how much
information an owner wants to release about an asset prior to the sale. Following this,
we consider implications for which assets should be sold and how to sell them. Often
originators (which may for instance be banks) have several assets for sale. In this case,
they can decide whether to sell them together or separately, and when they sell them
together, which assets to include in the bundle.
To analyze these questions, let us assume that there is an original owner of the asset, O.
Prior to selling the asset to the investor, the owner can choose (some) characteristics
of the asset. The choice of these characteristics affects future information acquisition
by the investor, and through this, the price at which the owner can sell in the primary
market.
Incorporating the owner, the economy now consists of three agents: an owner O, an
investor I, and the market M . There are three dates (t = 0, 1, 2) of which date 1 and
2 are identical to the baseline model. The preferences of agents are as follows:
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• The owner derives utility from consumption at date 0 only: U0 = CO0 .
• The investor can now also consume at date 0. His utility when patient is hence
U I = CI0 + C
I
1 + C
I
2 and U
I = CI0 + C
I
1 when impatient.
• The utility of the market is unchanged: UM = CM1 + CM2 .
At date 0, the owner is endowed with the asset. The owner has no other endowment
besides the asset. The investor has an endowment of wI (> l) at date 0; the market
still has an endowment of wM (> 1) at date 1.
The owner first decides on the characteristics of the asset. Following this, he can sell
the asset to the investor. For this, we assume that the owner and the investor bargain
and that the owner captures a fraction δ ∈ (0, 1] of the investor’s surplus. Following
this, actions proceed as in the baseline model. Figure 2.5 depicts the timeline.
t
t = 0
(1) owner chooses asset characteristics
(opacity, correlation, pool or split)
(2) owner and investor bargain over
asset price
t = 1
(1) investor decides on extent
of information acquisition a
(2) information about s is publicly
revealed and investor privately
learns whether she is patient or not
(3) investor decides whether to sell asset
to market at competitive price
t = 2
(1) asset returns 1 iff s ∈ [0, l]
Figure 2.5: Timeline of Extended Model
2.4.1 Opacity
We first analyze the owner’s choice of opacity. We assume that the owner is perfectly
informed about the states in which the asset pays off. Before selling to the investor, he
decides how much of this information to release. Specifically, he discloses a set of states
of measure o which contain the payoff states. Releasing information comes at a cost
for the owner: reducing opacity from 1 to o incurs a proportional cost of kO · (1 − o)
(kO > 0).
18 Such costs arise because it is costly to collect information about an asset
and to convey it credibly to the other agents in the economy.
18A richer model could allow assets to differ with respect to fundamental opacity, that is, the level of
opacity before any efforts by the owner to reduce opacity.
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Efficient Opacity
Since the owner does not capture the full surplus whenever δ < 1, his choice of opacity
may differ from the welfare maximizing one. We first solve for the welfare-maximizing
opacity level and subsequently contrast it with the owner’s opacity choice.
From date 1 onwards, the setup is identical to the model of fixed opacity; trading and
information acquisition are still characterized by Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 2.1. We
now analyze the level of opacity that maximizes welfare. Given linearity of utility,
(utilitarian) welfare is simply the expected sum of resources in the economy that are
available for consumption. Welfare thus consists of the endowments, wI + wM , the
asset’s expected payoff, l, minus the cost of reducing opacity kO · (1−o), minus the cost
of acquiring information kI · a∗(o):
W (o, a∗(o)) = wI + wM + l − kO · (1− o)− kI · a∗(o). (2.6)
Welfare is hence maximized by minimizing the sum of the two costs in the economy.
The opacity choice has two effects on welfare. There is the direct cost of opacity reduc-
tion kO · (1− o) incurred by the owner. Furthermore, opacity affects date-1 information
acquisition a∗(o) and hence the information acquisition costs. Two cases arise. If o¯ ≤ 1,
information acquisition can be deterred by leaving the asset fully opaque, that is set-
ting o = 1 (see Proposition 2.1). As this induces neither information acquisition (and
associated costs) nor costs of opacity reduction; the first best is reached.
If o¯ > 1, this is not possible. In this case, the problem can be broken down as follows.
First, choosing an opacity level that leads to partial information acquisition (that is,
choosing an o on [
¯
o, 1)) such that a∗(o) ∈ (0, o − l) is never optimal. A completely
opaque asset (o = 1) would dominate this choice as it would entail less information
acquisition (recall that information acquisition is decreasing in opacity in the interior
range) and also no opacity reduction cost. Second, when an opacity level of [l,
¯
o) is
chosen, all possible information is acquired (a∗(o) = o− l) and welfare is given by
W (o, a∗(o)) = wI + wM + l − kO · (1− o)− kI · (o− l). (2.7)
Equation (2.7) shows that optimal opacity depends on which cost parameter is larger.
If information is more costly (kI > kO), welfare is maximized by choosing the smallest
opacity in the range: o = l. If this is not the case (kI ≤ kO), the optimal choice would
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be to choose the largest opacity in the range: o =
¯
o. However, as previously discussed,
¯
o is dominated by a completely opaque asset (o = 1).
It follows that to find the optimal opacity level o whenever o¯ > 1, one has to compare
welfare for a fully transparent and a fully opaque asset (o = l versus o = 1). This boils
down to comparing the cost of fully eliminating opacity, kO · (1 − l), with the cost of
investor information acquisition that arises for an entirely opaque asset, kI · a∗(1).
Summarizing:
Proposition 2.2 Selling an opaque asset (o∗ = 1) maximizes welfare if
(i) this deters information acquisition (o¯ ≤ 1), or
(ii) kI · a∗(1) < kO · (1− l).
Otherwise, selling a fully transparent asset maximizes welfare (o∗ = l).
There are three important messages. First, it can be optimal to sell a fully opaque asset
– independent of the magnitude of opacity reduction costs kO. This is because under
certain conditions, full opacity prevents any information acquisition by the investor.
Second, intermediate degrees of opacity are undesirable as such opacity levels induce
the investor to acquire costly information. Third, if the costs of opacity reduction are
sufficiently small, it can be optimal for the owner to sell a fully transparent asset, which
precludes information acquisition.
Adverse selection costs: Even though there is adverse selection at the trading stage
(since a patient investor sells when he has negative private information), there are
no direct welfare consequences of this in our model. This is because the impatient
investor and the market have identical marginal utilities of consumption. A lower
market price resulting from adverse selection thus does not affect the gains from trade
(the equation for welfare does not contain the price). If an impatient investor were
to have higher marginal utility than the market, this neutrality no longer obtains.
Appendix 2.D analyzes this case, showing that information acquisition then has an
additional, negative, effect on welfare through its effect on the equilibrium price. This,
however, does not affect the key results. In particular, the hump-shaped relationship
between opacity and information acquisition is still obtained.
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The Owner’s Choice of Opacity
The owner maximizes the price at which he can sell the asset to the investor, minus
any cost incurred by him. Given that the investor’s surplus is l − kI · a∗(o), the owner
maximizes
WO(o, a
∗(o)) = δ (l − kI · a∗(o))− kO · (1− o). (2.8)
The owner thus minimizes a combination of costs of opacity reduction and information
acquisition costs. However, his objective function is not identical to the social one as
he only internalizes a fraction δ of the investor’s information acquisition costs.
Similar to the previous section, the solution can be derived as:
Proposition 2.3 The owner sells a fully opaque asset (o = 1) if
(i) this deters information acquisition (o¯ ≤ 1), or
(ii) δkI · a∗(1) < kO · (1− l).
Otherwise, he sells a fully transparent asset (o∗ = l).
Proof. The owner’s opacity choice mirrors the one in the baseline model. If 1 >
o¯, information acquisition can be deterred and the owner can avoid costs entirely by
choosing full opacity (o = 1). If this is not the case, he chooses either full opacity
or full transparency. The respective utilities from these choices are WO(1, a
∗(1)) =
δ (l − kI · a∗(1)) and WO(l, a∗(l)) = δOl − kO · (1− l). He hence chooses full opacity iff
δkI · a∗(1) < kO · (1− l).
This yields the following corollary
Corollary 2.1 The owner chooses an opacity level that is inefficiently high if and only
if δkI · a∗(1) < kO · (1− l) < kI · a∗(1). Otherwise his choice of opacity is efficient.
Proof. Follows from comparing condition (ii) in Proposition 2.2 and 2.3.
The intuition is clear. Since the owner incurs transparency costs fully but only inter-
nalizes a fraction of the investor’s information acquisition costs, he has comparatively
lower benefits from outcomes where transparency is high and information acquisition
low. He hence may not sell a transparent asset even when transparency maximizes
welfare.19
19Note that a sharing of rents between the investor and the market in the secondary trading stage does
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Fundamental and effective opacity: The effective opacity of an asset (that is, the
opacity of an asset when sold to the investor) will in practice consist of two factors.
First it consists of the fundamental opacity of the asset, determined by its business
characteristics. This was the focus of the analysis in the baseline model. For example,
firms in certain industries are intrinsically more opaque. Large and complex firms
will also have a fundamental tendency towards higher opacity. Second, there is the
opacity choice of the owner (which we focused on in this section). This choice can be
understood as efforts by the owner to reduce opacity below its fundamental opacity.
In cases where such efforts are not taking place, effective opacity may approximate
fundamental opacity. In addition, reaching a certain level of transparency will be more
costly when initial opacity is high. In practice we would thus expect to observe a wide
range of levels of effective opacity, with higher levels generally corresponding to a higher
fundamental opacity.
2.4.2 Correlation
Suppose an owner wants to sell a number of assets, for instance, through a securitization.
Should he include correlated or uncorrelated assets in the sale? And does this decision
depend on the characteristics of the assets available?
To analyze this, we consider the following modification of the model. At t = 0, the
owner is endowed with two pools of assets, each containing x (x ≥ 2) assets of fixed
opacity o. The assets in each pool are individually identical to the that of the baseline
model: an asset pays 1 in a mass l states of the world and zero otherwise. The investor
can narrow down the set of pay-off states for each individual asset by incurring cost
a. The only difference between the two pools is that in the first pool, assets pay
off in exactly the same states of the world. In the second pool, the payoff-states are
independently distributed across assets.
At t = 0 the owner decides which pool of assets to sell. This choice is public informa-
tion. At t = 1 the investor can acquire information about each asset in the pool and
subsequently sell assets to the market. We assume that assets are sold individually to
market participants and that each market participant cannot observe how many assets
in total the investor is selling. To focus the analysis, we analyze in the following the
not lead to any bias in the owner’s opacity choice as it does not create a wedge with the welfare
maximizing level of opacity.
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case of δ = 1, in which case there is no conflict between the owner’s incentives and the
welfare maximizing outcome.
Suppose first that the owner chooses to sell the pool consisting of correlated assets.
At the trading stage, the investor has to decide for each individual asset whether or
not to sell it. The market has formed beliefs about information acquisition and since
assets are identical, these beliefs boil down to a single parameter a˜ about the investor’s
private information set [o− a˜, o]. The decision whether or not to sell is identical to the
baseline model, but now applies to x-assets at the same time. That is, the investor will
sell all assets whenever she is impatient or when she privately knows that the assets are
worthless (s ∈ [o− a, o]).
At the beginning of t = 1, the investor decides how much information to acquire about
each asset. Since assets are perfectly correlated, it is strictly optimal to acquire infor-
mation about one asset only. The investor thus has a single choice a, as in the baseline
model. However, acquiring information about one asset now provides additional bene-
fits: Because of perfect correlation, the investor learns about several assets at the same
time. Similar to equation (2.2), we can write the utility of the investor as
u(a, a˜) = x · o
(
(1− pi + pia
o
)p(a˜, o) + pi
o− a
o
l
o− a
)
− kI · a. (2.9)
From this we can derive the investor’s optimal information acquisition:
Proposition 2.4 The equilibrium level of information acquisition for the correlated
pool of assets is
a∗C =

o− l if o ≤
¯
oC
(1− pi)(x l
kI
− o
pi
) if o ∈ (
¯
oC , o¯C)
0 if o ≥ o¯C
. (2.10)
with
¯
oC = pil + x
pi(1−pi)l
kI
and o¯C = x
lpi
kI
.
Proof. Analogous to Proposition 2.1.
Compared to the sale of a single asset, information acquisition now tends to be higher.
First, the threshold at which the investor starts to acquire information is higher (o¯C >
o¯). Second, information acquisition in the interior cases is always higher (a∗C > a
∗ for
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given o). The reason for this is that since information can be applied to several assets,
it becomes more attractive to acquire information.
Suppose next that the owner has sold uncorrelated assets. At the trading stage the
market will again have beliefs a˜ about the level of private information for each asset.
These beliefs will be asset-independent due to symmetry of the setup. The trading
stage for each asset is hence the same as in the baseline case. Consequently, information
acquisition for each individual asset is also unchanged and given by a as laid out in
Proposition 2.1. Total information acquisition, however is x · a∗.
We can now turn to the owner’s choice of which assets to sell. Since the owner only
consumes at t = 0, he does not care about the assets that are retained.20 He will hence
sell the pool that obtains the highest price, which will be the one with the lowest infor-
mation cost. The owner’s problem is thus to identify the pool that induces the lowest
amount of private information. This choice will be subject to a basic trade-off. The
incentives to acquire information for an individual asset are stronger in the correlated
pool, as shown above. This speaks for the uncorrelated pool. However, for a given
amount of information acquired about an asset, total costs are higher in the uncorre-
lated pool because information is then acquired about each asset individually.21
The consequences for the owner’s decision are as follows. When information acquisition
is sufficiently unattractive (o ≥ o¯C), there will be no information acquisition for either
pool and the owner is indifferent between the pools. When o¯ < o < o¯C , there will
be information acquisition in the correlated pool only; hence the uncorrelated pool is
preferred. For lower levels of opacity (o < o¯), information is acquired in both pools. In
this case the above trade-off comes into play. If o >
¯
oC (that is, there is incomplete
information acquisition in the correlated pool), an uncorrelated pool still maximizes
welfare. This can be seen by noting that interior information acquisition in the cor-
related pool, a∗C = (1 − pi)(x lkI − opi ), is always higher than in the uncorrelated pool,
xa∗ = x(1− pi)( l
kI
− o
pi
). However, for o that is sufficiently below
¯
oC , information costs
in the uncorrelated pool dominate (information acquisition in the correlated pool even
20If the owner could also consume at t = 2, he would still be indifferent as to which assets are retained
as both pools have the same expected payoff.
21Dang, Gorton, Holmstro¨m, and Ordon˜ez (2013) also analyze the impact of diversification on the
incentives for information acquisition. They show that selling a diversified portfolio discourages
private information acquisition by hiding private information. They do this in a setting where
the cost of acquiring information is independent of the security design. Our model of endogenous
information acquisition shows that while incentives to acquire information are indeed lower in the
case of uncorrelated assets, correlated pools avoid duplicating private information production and
may thus be preferred.
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decline because they are then already at their maximum feasible level, o− l). The crit-
ical opacity level at which this happens is determined by the condition o− l = xa∗(o).
Rearranging yields:
ô =
x(1− pi) pi
kI
+ 1
x(1− pi) + 1 l. (2.11)
o
x · a∗(o) and a∗c(o)
l o oˆ oC o¯ o¯C 1
0
uncorrelated assets: x · a∗(o)
correlated assets: a∗c(o)
correlated assets preferred uncorrelated assets preferred
Figure 2.6: Information Acquisition as a Function of o
Figure 2.6 illustrates the different cases. We can summarize:
Proposition 2.5 Consider the owner’s choice to sell a correlated or uncorrelated pool
of assets.
1. If o ≤ ô, the owner prefers to sell a correlated pool of assets.
2. If o ∈ (ô, o¯C), the owner prefers to sells an uncorrelated pool of assets.
3. If o ≥ o¯C, the owner is indifferent between both pools.
In their review of securitization practices, Gorton and Metrick (2012) identify the lack
of diversification as one of the main puzzles: “The choice of loans to pool and sell to the
SPV also remains a puzzle. Existing theories cannot address why securitized-loan pools
are homogeneous – all credit cards or all prime mortgages, for example. The existing
theory suggests that credit card receivables, auto receivables, mortgages, and so on
should be in the same pool – for diversification, but this never happens.” Proposition
2.5 shows that selling homogenous (or correlated assets) can be optimal. The reason
is that this lowers the total cost of private information acquisition because information
acquisition costs do not need to be spend on each individual asset.22
22On the investors’ side, Van Nieuwerburgh and Veldkamp (2010) consider a framework with endoge-
nous information acquisition and investment and show that, when investors can acquire information
before making their investment choice, non-diversified portfolio holdings may emerge endogenously.
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2.4.3 Splitting and Pooling
Information acquisition also has consequences for whether an owner should sell cash-
flows individually, or in a pool. To this end, consider that the owner has at date 0 an
asset that pays x in l states and zero otherwise. The owner has the option to sell this
asset in its entirety. Alternatively, he can split the asset into x smaller assets (each
paying 1 in l states) and sell them to x separate investors. Assume that per-state
information costs are kI regardless of the size of the asset. In addition, assume that
investors cannot credibly reveal information to each other (otherwise, one investor could
obtain the information and sell them to all other investors) and that the market cannot
observe how many investors are selling assets (this would reveal the private information
of investors).
Consider first the sale of the asset in one piece. This case is identical to that of a
correlated pool in the previous section. While for a correlated pool information acqui-
sition for one asset applied to x assets of size one, it now applies to one asset of size
x. Information acquisition is hence a∗C as given by Proposition 2.4. Consider next the
sale of split assets to different investors. Each investor is in the same situation as in the
baseline model: he can decide to acquire information about an asset of size 1. Thus,
the results from the baseline model apply. However, since there are now x investors in
total, overall information costs are x ·a∗, identical to the case of an uncorrelated pool.
The decision whether or not to split the asset thus creates the same trade-off as the
decision whether to sell a correlated pool. We can conclude:
Proposition 2.6 Consider the owner’s choice to split an asset for sale.
1. If o ≤ ô, the owner prefers not to split.
2. If o ∈ (ô, o¯C), the owner prefers to split.
3. If o ≥ o¯C, the owner is indifferent.
The intuition behind the trade-off is as follows. On the one hand, the incentives to
acquire information for an investor who has bought the entire asset are high because
private information can then be applied to an asset that pays off x > 1. On the other
hand, when investors who have bought the split assets acquire information, informa-
tion acquisition is duplicated because each individual investor will acquire information.
This means that in cases where there are large incentives to acquire information, the
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owner should sell the entire asset in order to avoid duplication of a large amount of
information.
2.5 Public Policy
Regulation of information disclosure by firms has a long tradition and takes many forms.
Examples are requirements for listed companies to publish certified accounts at specified
intervals or to disclose material information in a timely fashion. Prior to the crisis of
2007-2009, disclosure policies were predominantly targeted at protecting investors in
standard securities (debt and equity). Following the breakdown of trade in various
classes of asset-backed securities, a new focus of regulation is on the transparency
of assets issued by financial institutions. For example, the Dodd-Frank act requires
disclosure of information about asset-backed securities.
Transparency policies typically take the form of minimum standards. Issuers are obliged
to follows these standards, but are free to implement higher standards of transparency.
The non-monotonic nature of opacity suggests that a (uniform) minimum standard is
not a desirable approach to regulation. We have shown that transparency reduces ad-
verse selection only when transparency is sufficiently large, while increasing it otherwise.
Consider Figure 2.3 and 2.8, which depict the (smoothed) cross-sectional relationship
between opacity and bid-ask spreads at the firm level. The turning point at which
transparency reduces asset liquidity is around the 40th percentile in both figures, sug-
gesting that a mandated increase in transparency may increase bid-ask spreads for a
large share of the population of firms. Since higher transparency brings about costs for
issuers, the net effect of uniformly higher transparency may hence easily be negative.23
Note that this does not imply that transparency regulation per se is undesirable as
actual opacity levels already reflect existing efforts to enhance transparency.
Nonetheless, our analysis provides a clear rationale for regulation: issuers do not inter-
nalize the full cost of opacity for other agents in the economy and may hence choose
inefficiently low amounts of transparency. Firm-specific disclosure standards that take
into account that optimal opacity is heterogenous are in principle welfare-enhancing.
However, as the analysis in Section 2.4.1 has shown, the extent to which transparency
23Kurlat and Veldkamp (2015) provide an alternative reason for why disclosure can reduce welfare.
The channel is based on a general equilibrium effect. Disclosure makes assets less risky. This, in
turn, will result in assets commanding a lower return in equilibrium.
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is optimal depends on deep parameters such as the cost of information to firms and in-
vestors. Regulation that conditions on these parameters seems practically infeasible.
A less demanding approach is to provide subsidies (implicit or explicit) to issuers for
reducing transparency. From previous analysis we know that issuers sometimes choose
inefficient opacity since they only take into account a fraction δ < 1 of the full cost of
opacity, kI · a∗(1). A subsidy of (1− δ)kI · a∗(1) for each issuer can hence implement ef-
ficiency (essentially, a negative Pigouvian tax). And when the regulator has incomplete
knowledge about the size of externalities posed by individual issuers, he can still im-
plement a welfare-improving policy through a subsidy that is equal to the minimum of
(1−δ)kI ·a∗(1) across all firms (in this case, transparency will be optimally increased at
some firms – without leading to any increases in transparency that are welfare-reducing
at other firms).
A subsidy could, for example, take the form of a government-sponsored rating agency
that allows issuers (at their discretion) to obtain free ratings. In addition, publicly-
run information repositories could help reduce the costs of providing transparency to
issuers. It is crucial, however, that participation is left to the discretion of the issuers
– compulsory participation suffers from the same problem as mandatory disclosure
requirements.
Our analysis also speaks to the current discussion on asset correlation in the financial
system. There are good reasons to believe that at the system-level financial institutions
inefficiently invest in assets with high correlation, due to the externalities associated
from creating systemic risk (see e.g. Acharya (2009) or Wagner (2011)). Correlation is
hence typically viewed with suspicion by policy-makers. On the micro-level, there is the
puzzle that securitization pools predominantly consist of similar assets, which flies in
the face of diversification (Gorton and Metrick (2012)). Our analysis suggests that there
is also a benefit to issuing assets with high correlation: it minimizes information costs in
the economy as information about one asset can be applied to other assets as well. Thus
even though adverse selection problems for correlated assets were observed during the
recent crisis, this does not necessarily indicate inefficiency, as issuing correlated assets
can be optimal under certain circumstances. Similarly to asset correlation, opacity is
also often associated with inefficiencies. Commentators have been especially alarmed by
the opacity of complex securitization structures. Since opacity also comes with benefits
– it may discourage people from obtaining private information – one has to be careful
in deriving direct implications from this.
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2.6 Conclusion
How does opacity affect liquidity when investors can acquire information about an
asset? This paper has suggested that the link between the two is non-monotonic.
Both very transparent and very opaque assets preserve commonality of information.
While full transparency directly precludes information asymmetries, sufficiently large
opacity deters acquisition of private information by making learning about an asset
more costly. Assets with either very low or very high opacity can hence be expected to
be liquid. Assets which display intermediate degrees of opacity, in contrast, are prone to
information acquisition. These assets may suffer from adverse selection problems when
they need to be traded. An empirical analysis of the cross-section of listed U.S. firms
strongly supported this hump-shape relationship between opacity and illiquidity.
Our analysis points to a significant benefit to opacity, which may help understand the
phenomenon that issuers often choose to sell surprisingly opaque assets, as for instance
observed in the case of securitization products. Policy makers thus have to be careful in
equating opacity with inefficiencies. The results also have implications for transparency
regulation. In particular, our analysis suggests that uniform transparency requirements
are not desirable. This is simply because they may increase adverse selection for the
more opaque assets in the economy. Rather, a more appropriate policy is to subsi-
dize the provision of information by issuers. This can help internalizing the externali-
ties associated with opacity, while allowing issuers to optimally preserve heterogeneous
transparency levels.
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Appendix
2.A Random Discovery of the Payoff Interval
This analyzes a stochastic information acquisition technology. While in the baseline
model information acquisition started at the upper end of the interval [l, o], we now
consider a random starting point. Specifically, we denote the starting state for infor-
mation acquisition with y and assume that it is uniformly distributed on [l, o]. The
distribution of the starting state is known by the investor, but not its realization.
As before, the investor learns about an interval of mass a when choosing a level of
information acquisition a. For given starting state y, the investor thus learns about the
interval [y− a, y]). If a is such that y− a > l, she learns that the interval [y− a, y] does
not contain payoff states, as in the baseline model. If a is sufficiently large such that
y − a ≤ l, she “discovers” the payoff interval. In this case, she ends up with complete
knowledge about the distribution of payoff states.
We allow information acquisition to take place sequentially, that is, the investor can
first decide to obtain information about a certain mass of states, and following this
decide whether to analyze more states (and so on). Note that since the investor does
not know the realization of y, she does not know in advance whether a certain amount
of information acquisition will lead to discovery of the payoff interval.
It is easy to see that the modification in the information technology does not alter the
investor’s incentives to sell to the market at date 1 (Lemma 2.1): she will offer the
asset if impatient; otherwise she will offer the asset only if she knows that the asset
is worthless. The price of the asset will again depend on the market’s belief about
information acquisition. These beliefs, however, are no longer necessarily characterized
by a single parameter since information acquisition can become stochastic (for instance,
depending on y, investor may discover the payoff interval early on and stop). Let us
denote the market price with p˜ to indicate its dependence on beliefs.
We start with the analysis of the investor’s incentives to acquire information. When
deciding about information, the investor takes as given the price p˜ at which she can
sell to the market. We consider information acquisition that takes place by acquiring
knowledge about (small) intervals of size b > 0 (we later consider the limit of b tending
to zero).
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Consider first that the investor has already discovered the payoff interval. She then has
complete information about the asset, and hence will not acquire any further informa-
tion.
Consider next the decision of an investor to acquire information about an interval b
given that she has already acquired an amount a ≥ 0 of information and has not yet
discovered the payoff interval. Two cases arise. First, if a is sufficiently large such
that o − a − b ≤ l, the investor knows that the payoff interval will be discovered with
certainty with the next information acquisition. The discovery will benefit the investor
when a state of nature s materializes that falls in the interval [l, o − a] and when she
is impatient. The probability of this is (o− a− l)pi, in which case she is able to sell at
price p˜ rather than holding onto a worthless asset. Her expected gains from additional
information acquisition are thus
u(l, p˜)− u(a, p˜) = (o− a− l)pip˜− bkI . (2.12)
These gains are identical to equation (2.3) in the baseline model - except that an
interval of size o − a − l is discovered by incurring costs for b (≥ o − a − l) states.
Equation (2.12) shows that information acquisition is beneficial whenever (o−a−l)pip˜ >
bkI . We can hence define the option value of information acquisition in this case as
max{(o− a− l)pip˜− bkI , 0}.
Second, we have the case of o − a − b > l. In this case the investor does not know
whether the next information acquisition will discover the payoff interval – it depends
on the starting state y. While the realization of y is unknown to the investor, she infers
from not having discovered the payoff interval up to now that y ∈ [l+a, o]. The impact
of information acquisition in this case is as follows. When y > l + a + b, she does
not discover the payoff interval. In this case, she can rule out an interval of mass b as
containing payoff-states. When y ≤ l + a + b, she discovers the payoff interval. She
then rules out in total a mass of o− a− l states. The likelihood of non-discovery and
discovery is 1 − b
o−a−l and
b
o−a−l , respectively. We hence have for the total expected
mass of loss states discovered b(1 + o−l−a−b
o−a−l ). Recalling that the investor benefits from
knowledge about loss states when impatient, we obtain for the total expected gains
from acquiring information
u(a+ b, p˜)− u(a, p˜) = b
(
(1 +
o− l − a− b
o− a− l )pip˜− kI
)
+
(
1− b
o− a− l
)
V (a+ b),
(2.13)
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where V (a+ b) is the option value from acquiring further information when the payoff
interval has not been discovered.
The value of information acquisition can hence be recursively defined as
V (a) =

max{b
(
(1 + o−l−a−b
o−a−l )pip˜− kI
)
+
(
1− b
o−a−l
)
V (a+ b), 0} if a < o− l − b
max{(o− a− l)pip˜− bkI , 0} if a ∈ [o− l − b, o− l)
0 if a ≥ o− l
. (2.14)
Note that f(a) := b
(
(1 + o−l−a−b
o−a−l )pip˜− kI
)
is decreasing in a. This implies that the
value of acquiring information about an interval of size b is declining in the amount
of information already acquired. The reason is as follows. While the likelihood of
discovering the payoff interval ( b
o−a−l) is increasing in a, the expected gains conditional
on discovery are decreasing. The latter is because the mass of states ruled out by
discovery, o−l−a−b, falls in a. Because of this latter effect, the gains from information
acquisition are ultimately decreasing.
It follows that f(a) ≤ 0 implies f(a + b) < 0. In addition, we can conclude that when
a ∈ [o− l− b, o− l) (that is, when the next information acquisition discovers the payoff
interval with certainty) we have f(a − b) > (o − a − l)pip˜ − bkI . From this it follows
that whenever f(a) ≤ 0, the option value of information acquisition beyond the next
interval is zero (V (a + b) = 0). Thus, V (a) = 0 whenever f(a) ≤ 0. The consequence
is that an investor will acquire information as long as f(a) > 0, and will stop when
f(a) ≤ 0 or when the payoff interval is discovered.
An equilibrium strategy for information acquisition is hence defined by a threshold
a∗ ∈ (0, o− l) such that f(a∗) ≤ 0, but f(a∗ + b) > 0. For arbitrarily small intervals of
information acquisition (b→ 0), we find that f(a) = 0 precisely when
p˜ =
kI
2pi
. (2.15)
This condition is almost identical to the condition for an interior equilibrium in the
baseline model (p˜ = kI
pi
). The difference arises because information acquisition is now
more effective as it can result in the discovery of the payoff interval, in which case
the entire distribution becomes known (in the baseline model, it only allowed us to
proportionally narrow down the set of payoff states). In order for the gains from
information acquisition to be identical to the costs kI , the price at which the asset
can be sold when information is of use to the investor hence has to be lower.
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We next derive the break-even market price p˜ as a function of beliefs about information
acquisition. Recall that the investor’s strategy can be summarized by a threshold value
a∗. The market’s beliefs can hence be summarized by a single parameter a˜. Note that
even though information discovery is stochastic, it only has two possible outcomes:
either the investor finds the payoff interval or she reaches a˜ and stops. Given that
the starting point y is distributed on [l, o], the probability of the payoff interval being
discovered is simply
pi0 =
a˜
o− l . (2.16)
The investor will offer the asset if either she is impatient or if she is patient and privately
knows the asset will not pay out. The probability of the latter is o−l
o
when she has
discovered the payoff interval and a˜
o
when she has not discovered the payoff interval.
The total probability of offering is thus
1− pi + pi
(
pi0
o− l
o
+ (1− pi0) a˜
o
)
. (2.17)
An offered asset only has a positive expected value if the investor is impatient (occurring
with probability 1 − pi), in which case the expected value to the market is l
o
. We can
then use (2.16) and (2.17) to express the expected value (and hence the price) of the
asset conditional on being offered as
p(a˜, o) =
1− pi
(1− pi)o+ pi(a˜(2− a˜
o−l))
l. (2.18)
Combining (2.15) and (2.18) to eliminate p(a˜, o), and solving for a∗ = a˜ yields:
a∗ = (o− l)−
√
(o− l)
(
(o− l)− (1− pi)( 2l
kI
− o
pi
)
)
. (2.19)
Differentiating with respect to o gives
∂a∗
∂o
= 1− (o− l)
(
2− 1−pi
pi
)− (1− pi)( 2l
kI
− o
pi
)
2
√
(o− l)
(
(o− l)− (1− pi)( 2l
kI
− o
pi
)
) < 0. (2.20)
Information acquisition (in an interior equilibrium) is hence declining in opacity o, as
in the baseline model.
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The cases of no and full information acquisition are straightforward to analyze. No
information acquisition results if at a = 0 we have f(a) ≤ 0. Noting that zero informa-
tion acquisition implies p = l
o
, we can obtain from f(a) = 0 a critical threshold opacity
of o¯ = 2 lpi
kI
, such that an opacity level of o ≥ o¯ deters information acquisition. Full
information acquisition arises when f(o − l) ≥ 0 (as b → 0, we can ignore the case of
a ∈ [o− l, o− l + b]). Equation (2.18) yields for a∗ = o− l that p = (1−pi)l
o−pil . Combining
with f(o− l) = 0 and rearranging gives a critical threshold
¯
o = pil + (1−pi)pil
2kI
. For o ≤
¯
o
we hence have a full information acquisition equilibrium.
We can summarize
Proposition 2.A.1 The equilibrium threshold for information acquisition a∗(o) is given
by
a∗(o) =

o− l if o ≤ o¯
(o− l)−
√
(o− l)
(
(o− l)− (1− pi)( 2l
kI
− o
pi
)
)
if o ∈ (
¯
o, o¯)
0 if o ≥
¯
o
(2.21)
with
¯
o = pil + (1−pi)pil
2kI
and o¯ = 2 pil
kI
.
2.B Learning about Loss States
Assume that the asset pays 1 if nature selects a state s ∈ [l, 1] and zero otherwise.
Increasing transparency and information acquisition each narrow down the potential
set of states where the asset does not pay off. In particular, for transparency choice o
and information acquisition a, the public knows the set of non-paying (loss) states to
be on the interval [0, o], while the investor knows that the loss states are distributed on
[0, o− a].
For given beliefs about private information acquisition, a˜, the trading decision of the
investor is as follows. When s ≥ o, both investor and market know that the asset will
certainly pay . Its price will hence be 1. An impatient investor will sell the asset, while
a patient investor will not sell given the assumptions we made about the investor’s
actions whenever indifferent. When s ∈ [o−a, o], the investor knows that the asset will
certainly pay off but the market only has imperfect knowledge about the payoff. The
investor has thus positive private information about the asset. If she is patient, she will
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hence not sell. If impatient, the investor will still sell. Finally, when s ∈ [0, o− a], both
investor and market are uncertain about the payoff. However, the investor observes
that s is not in her private set of payoff states [o− a, o]. She thus has negative private
information. She will hence sell, regardless of whether she is patient or not (the expected
value of the asset is o−a−l
o−a in this case). The market price of the asset (conditional on
s < o) can hence be derived as
p(a˜, o) =
o− l − a˜pi
o− a˜pi . (2.22)
Note that for a˜ = 0, this simplifies to p = o−l
o
, which is the expected value of the asset
conditional on s < o. Note also that ∂p(a˜,o)
∂a˜
< 0, because of adverse selection.
Similar to equation (2.2) we can derive the investor’s utility given market beliefs a˜:
u(a, a˜) = 1− o+ o
(
a
o
(pi + (1− pi)p(a˜, o) + o− a
o
p(a˜, o)
)
− kI · a. (2.23)
The derivative with respect to a is
∂u(a, a˜)
∂a
= pi(1− p(a˜, o))− kI . (2.24)
It is useful to contrast this with the marginal benefit of information acquisition in
the baseline model (∂u(a,a˜)
∂a
= pip(a˜, o) − kI). Private information benefits the investor
whenever it causes her to modify her selling decision. In the baseline model, the investor
learns that the asset will not pay off in certain states. A patient investor will then sell
the asset if such a state materializes; and hence benefits from a higher market price.
In the extension considered here, the investor learns about states in which the asset
does pay off. She thus does not sell the asset if such a state materializes. Her gains
hence decline in the market price (which she would otherwise obtain by selling the
asset). This has a consequence: because more information acquisition leads to lower
prices in equilibrium, the gains from information will now be increasing in the amount
of information acquired (formally, we have that ∂u(a,a˜)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=a˜
is increasing in a).
Two cases arise. Consider first that ∂u(a,a˜)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=a˜
> 0 at a = 0. This implies that at a
conjectured equilibrium with no information acquisition, the marginal gains from in-
formation acquisition are positive. Since we know that ∂u(a,a˜)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=a˜
is increasing in a,
the marginal gains from information acquisition are hence also positive for any a > 0.
The unique equilibrium is hence full information acquisition: a∗ = o− l. Consider next
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that ∂u(a,a˜)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=a˜
< 0 at a = 0. In this case, the gains from information acquisition at
an equilibrium with no information acquisition are negative. Hence, no information
acquisition is an equilibrium (a∗ = 0). Since ∂u(a,a˜)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=a˜
is increasing in a, there might
also be a second equilibrium with positive information acquisition. However, this equi-
librium would be pareto-dominated by no information acquisition (which involves no
information cost) and we hence rule it out.
Whether full or no opacity is chosen thus depends on the sign of ∂u(a,a˜)
∂a
∣∣∣
a=a˜
. Using
equation (2.24) one can find that this derivative is zero when o = pil
kI
. We can hence
state
Proposition 2.B.1 When the investor learns about loss states, the equilibrium level of
information acquisition a∗ is
a∗(o) =
{
o− l if o < o¯
0 if o ≥ o¯ (2.25)
with o¯ = pil
kI
.
2.C Increasing Cost of Information Acquisition
To analyze increasing costs of information acquisition, let the total cost of acquiring
information about a mass of a states beKI(a) withKI(0) = 0, K
′
I(a) > 0, K
′′
I (a) > 0.
Differentiating the investor’s utility u(a, a˜) (equation (2.2), after replacing kI · a with
the new information cost function) with respect to a yields
∂u(a, a˜)
∂a
= pip(a˜, o)−K ′I(a). (2.26)
Equation (2.26) determines a new threshold for zero information acquisition o¯. Rear-
ranging pip(0, o) − K ′I(0) = pi lo − K ′I(0) = 0 gives o¯ = pilK′I(0) . Since K
′
I(0) > 0, there
is hence a unique o¯ above which no information is acquired. Likewise,
¯
o is uniquely
pinned down by the condition: pip(o − l, o) − K ′I(o − l) = pi 1−pi1−pi l
o
l
o
− K ′I(o − l) = 0.
This yields
¯
o = pil + (1−pi)pil
K′I(o−l) . Finally, we can write down the condition for the interior
equilibrium: pip(a∗, o) −K ′I(a∗) = pi(1−pi)lo−pi(o−a∗) −K ′I(a∗) = 0. Totally differentiating with
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respect to o and rearranging gives
a∗′(o) = − (1− pi)K
′
I(a
∗(o))
piK ′I(a∗(o)) + ((1− pi)o+ pia∗(o)))K ′′I (a∗(o))
< 0. (2.27)
Thus, opacity reduces information acquisition in an interior equilibrium. We hence
have the same properties as in the baseline model. For o ≤
¯
o we have full information
acquisition (a∗ = o − l). Between
¯
o and o¯ there is an interior degree of information
acquisition which is declining in opacity. For opacity larger than o¯, no information is
acquired.
2.D Adverse Selection Costs
Modify the baseline model by assuming that the utility of the impatient investor is
U I = CI0 + qC
I
1 , with q ≥ 1. (2.28)
This modification does not affect trading with the market: an impatient investor will
always sell while the patient investor only sells when she know the asset is worthless.
Consider next the investor’s incentives to acquire information. Similar to equation
(2.2), utility is now
u(a, a˜) = o
(
((1− pi)q + pia
o
)p(a˜, o) + pi
o− a
o
l
o− a
)
− kI · a. (2.29)
The derivative with respect to a is pip(a˜, o)−kI – the same as in the baseline model (equa-
tion (2.3)). The incentives to acquire information are hence unchanged and Proposition
2.1 still applies. The reason is that information acquisition only benefits the investor
if she turns out to be patient, thus the fact that q may be larger than one does not
matter.
The expression for welfare is now as follows. Whenever the investor is impatient and
sells to the market, there is an additional welfare gain of (q− 1)p(a∗(o), o) compared to
the baseline model. We thus have for welfare that
W (o, a∗(o)) = wI + wM + l + pi(q − 1)p(a∗(o), o)− kO · (1− o)− kI · a∗(o). (2.30)
Opacity now has a new effect, arising because it can affect the price p through a change
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in information acquisition. Since p is declining in information acquisition (equation
(2.1)), opacity-induced increases in information acquisition now have two effects. First,
they directly lead to costs kI . Second, they reduce the gains for the impatient investor
by lowering the price at which she can sell to the market (when q > 1, these losses are
not completely offset by gains for the market).
Optimal opacity is determined analogous to the baseline model. For 1 ≤ o¯, full opacity
maximizes welfare. For 1 > o¯, one needs to compare welfare under full and no opacity
(because of the dependence on p, welfare is now non-linear in the region [l, o¯], but this
does not affect the optimal decision). Full opacity is optimal if and only if W (1, a∗(1)) >
W (l, 0), which is when pi(q − 1)p(a∗(1), 1) − kI · a∗(1) > pi(q − 1)p(0, o) − kO · (1 − l).
Otherwise full transparency should be chosen.
2.E Endogenous Discounting of Opaque Assets
We present a model in which low pricing of opaque assets does not follow from the
assumed information acquisition technology (in the baseline model, a state in the public
domain is less likely to pay-out when opacity is higher, resulting in a lower market price).
Rather, the market values opaque assets less because it does not allow him to make
efficient scrapping decisions.
We modify the baseline model as follows. First, we assume a distribution of asset returns
and a type of information acquisition for which the expected value of an asset in the
public domain is independent of opacity. As in the baseline model, the asset’s pay-off
states are randomly distributed. We assume that each state has the same likelihood of
paying out, given by l. An asset is said to have opacity o when the returns on (o, 1]
are publicly known (there is thus a mass (1 − o)l of known pay-off states and mass
(1 − o)(1 − l) of known non-payoff states) but the returns in the states [0, o] are not.
An amount of information acquisition a results in the investor learning the returns in
the interval [o−a, o]. She will thus know about a mass a · l of pay-off states and a mass
a · (1− l) of states where the asset does not pay off.
Second, we assume that at t = 1, after potential information acquisition by the investor,
a public signal s′ about the state of the world arrives (in the baseline model, the state
itself was revealed at this stage). The signal is imperfect in that only with probability
σ (σ ∈ (0, 1)) it points to the actual state of the world (s′ = s). With probability 1−σ,
the signal is wrong, in which case the distribution of states is identical to the ex-ante
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distribution (each state of the world s ∈ [0, 1] is then equally likely). At t = 1.5, the
state of the world is publicly revealed. Following the revelation of state, a market agent
who has bought the asset can decide to scrap the asset. Scrapping the asset yields a
sure pay-off of γ (< l). We assume in addition that γ < 1−σ
σ
.
All other actions are as in the baseline model. Figure 2.7 summarizes the timing of the
modified model.
t
t = 1
(1) investor decides on extent
of information acquisition a
(2) signal s′ is revealed and investor
privately learns whether she is
patient or not
(3) investor decides whether to sell
asset to market at competitive price
t = 1.5
(1) true state s is observed
(2) market may scrap asset
to receive γ
t = 2
(1) payoff realizes
(if not scrapped)
Figure 2.7: Timeline of Modified Model
The model is significantly more complicated than the baseline model in that multiple
equilibria exist for a range of opacity levels and that small perturbations in the param-
eters can lead to discrete changes in equilibrium variables. In particular, there is no
intuitive characterization of the behaviour of the equilibria with positive amounts of
information acquisition. We hence focus the analysis on showing that for sufficiently
high opacity, no information is acquired. By contrast, for assets of low or intermediate
opacity, equilibria without private information acquisition are unsustainable.
We prove this by analyzing the investor’s incentives to deviate from a conjectured equi-
librium without information acquisition. We first derive the valuation of an asset sold
by the investor presuming that the market believes no information has been acquired.
Following this we solve for the investor’s gains from deviating by acquiring informa-
tion.
2.E.1 Market Price without Information Acquisition
Suppose that the market believes that no information has been acquired by the investor
(a˜ = 0). In this case information asymmetry is absent and the selling decision of the
investor does not provide any signal to the market.
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Consider the scrapping decision of the market at t = 1.5. At this stage the market
knows the initial signal s′ as well as the actual state s. Optimal scrapping is as follows.
If s is in the transparent region (s ∈ (o, 1]), the market knows whether the asset will
pay off at t = 2. The market will thus scrap if and only if the asset does not pay off.
If s is in the opaque region (s ∈ [0, o]), the market is not certain whether the asset will
pay-off at date 2. Since the likelihood of pay-off is l, it is optimal not to scrap since
γ < l.
Similar to the baseline model, we derive the price conditional on the signal being in the
opaque region (s′ ∈ [0, o]). Given the efficient scrapping decision, the expected value of
an asset to the market, and hence the price, is given by
p(o, a˜ = 0) = σl + (1− σ)[ol + (1− o)(l + (1− l)γ)]. (2.31)
This is derived as follows. With probability σ, the signal is true (s = s′). In this case,
the actual state of the world is in the opaque region. The market then does not scrap
and receives l in expectation. With probability 1 − σ, the signal is not true. In this
case, the state falls in the opaque region with probability o. The market then again
does not scrap and receives an expected value of l. With probability 1 − o, the state
falls in the transparent region and the pay-off is known to the investor. If it is a pay-off
state (occurring with probability l), the investor receives 1. If it is not a pay-off state
(occurring with probability 1− l), the investor scraps and receives γ.
Note that p(o, a˜ = 0) simplifies to l+(1−σ)(1−o)(1− l)γ. We hence have p > l due to
the option value from scrapping. Second, more opaque assets (high o) command lower
prices. This is because for such assets there is a greater chance that a state realizes
for which the investor does not know the date-2 payoff of the asset, in which case she
cannot make efficient scrapping decisions.
2.E.2 Information Acquisition
We next analyze the investor’s incentives to deviate by choosing a positive amount of
information a > 0.
Consider the selling decision of an investor who has acquired information a. Information
acquisition is only relevant in cases where the signal falls in the opaque region (s′ ∈
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[0, o)), so we can restrict attention to this region. Note that if the investor sells, she
obtains p(o, a˜ = 0) as the market believes there is no information acquisition.
If the investor is impatient, it is strictly dominating to sell to the market at p(o, a˜ = 0).
If the investor is patient, there are three cases to consider:
1. The signal s′ falls in the private domain (s′ ∈ [o − a, o]) and s′ is not a pay-off
state. The expected pay-off for the investor is then (1−σ)l, which is smaller than
p(o, a˜ = 0). It is hence optimal to sell.
2. The signal s′ falls in the private domain (s′ ∈ [o− a, o]) and s′ is a pay-off state.
The expected payoff from holding on to the asset is then given by σ · 1 + (1−σ)l.
This is less than p(o, a˜ = 0) by our assumption that γ < 1−σ
σ
. It is hence optimal
not to sell the asset.
3. The signal s′ falls outside the private domain (s′ ∈ [0, o− a)). The investor then
does not know whether the asset pays off if the signal turns out to be true. Her
expected payoff from holding on to the asset is then simply l. Since l < p(o, a˜ = 0),
she strictly prefers to sell.
The selling decision of the patient investor is thus similar to the baseline model: she
continues to hold the asset unless she has negative private information about the real-
ization of the asset at date 2.
It follows that the investor benefits from information acquisition if and only if she has
negative private information (Case 1). The probability of this is a · l. She benefits by
receiving p(o, a˜ = 0) from selling the asset, instead of the getting (1−σ)l in expectation
from holding onto the asset. The gains from acquiring information are thus given by
a(p(o, a˜ = 0)− (1− σ)l)− kIa. Simplifying gives:
u(a, a˜ = 0)− u(0, a˜ = 0) = a · [σl + (1− σ)(1− o)(1− l)γ]− kIa. (2.32)
The marginal benefits from a unit of information are hence
∂u(a, a˜ = 0)
∂a
= σl + (1− σ)(1− o)(1− l)γ − kI , (2.33)
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and are constant. It follows that an equilibrium with no information acquisition can
only arise when ∂u(a,a˜=0)
∂a
≤ 0. Rearranging, this gives a critical opacity level o¯:
o¯ = 1− kI − σl
(1− σ)(1− l)γ , (2.34)
such that for o ≥ o¯ no information is acquired. By contrast, for o < o¯ investors always
have incentives to acquire information when the market believes that no information
has been acquired. In this case there is no equilibrium without information; in any
equilibrium there hence has to be some level of information acquisition.
2.E.3 Alternative Mechanism
There exists a second, independent, reason for why opaque assets may lower information
acquisition. It arises when the informational gain from a given amount of information
depends on opacity. A unit of information is conceivably less informative if an asset
is very opaque as there will then be large uncertainty even after the unit has been
acquired. To demonstrate, consider a situation where an asset is valuable to an agent
only if it meets a criterion in every state of the world. For instance, agents may have a
subsistence requirement c; reaching this level of consumption gives a utility of one, if it
is not reached, utility will be zero. Suppose an agent can acquire information about an
asset (=project) before deciding whether to undertake it (the alternative to investment
being to store funds to meet subsistence requirements). Clearly, the agent will only
choose the asset if the subsistence requirement is fulfilled in every state. This requires
the agent to investigate all states. Suppose that there are a discrete number o of opaque
states and that in all transparent states it is known that the asset pays at least c.24 Let
the probability of a pay-off in an individual state meeting the subsistence requirement
be q ∈ (0, 1) and let payoffs be independent across states. The likelihood of all states
meeting the criterion is then qo. The expected benefit from acquiring full information is
given by qoc ·1−kIo, where kI is the per-state cost of information acquisition. Dividing
by o yields a benefit q
o
o
c−kI of acquiring a unit of information. This value of information
is decreasing in opacity for two reasons: First, for higher opacity o, the likelihood that
the asset will eventually meet the criteria is lower (qo is lower). Second, for higher o
more states have to be inspected, hence the gain per state is lower.
24If the latter is not the case, the asset is known to be worthless and hence there is also no incentive
to acquire information about it.
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Empirical Analysis
Table 2.2: Control factors in the determination of bis-ask spreads
This table summarizes results from an ordinary least squares regression where the
bid-ask spread is the dependent variable. We report coefficients for the indepen-
dent variables logged market capitalization, share price, average trading volume
scaled by market capitalization, the standard deviation of past daily returns, the
standard deviation of scaled past trading volume, and the number of analysts
giving estimates.
Coefficient Spread
Market capitalization -0.00961***
(0.000605)
Share price 0.000417***
(0.000026)
Volume -0.00960
(0.00645)
St.Dev. volume -0.00161
(0.00122)
Volatility 0.11520***
(0.04058)
Number of analysts -0.000263***
(0.00008)
Constant 0.15023***
(0.00874)
Observations 2,067
R-squared 0.344
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Figure 2.8: Lowess Regression for Bid-Ask Spread
Figure 2.9: Lowess Regression of Bid-Ask Spread Residual
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Chapter 3
Loan Sales and Screening with
Two-Dimensional Borrower Types
Abstract
We consider a model of lending with subsequent loan sale opportunities. Market
participants observe a public signal about the creditworthiness of each borrower.
Lenders additionally have the opportunity to privately screen potential borrow-
ers, at a cost. The model rationalizes empirically documented discontinuities in
lending and default rates around a FICO credit rating score of 620, while pro-
viding a foundation for the endogenous emergence of a cutoff rule-of-thumb. We
show that loan sale opportunities have a positive impact on borrowers’ access to
credit contingent on screening revealing positive information whenever the public
information about a borrower’s type is relatively bad. At the same time, average
borrower quality for intermediate borrower types decreases as gains from trade
via loan sales increase the relative profitability of loans to unscreened borrowers
compared to loans to screened borrowers which imply significant risk retention.
Loan sale opportunities can lead to adverse effects on borrower welfare while
strictly increasing lender profitability.
3.1 Introduction
In the wake of the recent financial crisis, policymakers and researchers alike have in-
creasingly focused on the role of lenders’ incentives to screen potential borrowers. The
analysis centers on potential incentives to originate-to-sell : By selling securitized loans
I am indebted to my supervisors Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden and Volker Nocke for their support and
guidance. I thank seminar participants in Mannheim and in particular Raphae¨l Levy, Christian
Michel, Nicolas Schutz, Jan-Peter Siedlarek and Emanuele Tarantino for helpful comments.
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to investors, lenders were not liable when borrowers defaulted and thus may have ab-
stained from screening borrowers before the lending decision or even deliberately in-
cluded bad risks in the securitized pools.
Perceiving this issue to be at the core of the recent crisis, policymakers have acted. The
European Parliament has adopted a proposal requiring originators to retain at least 5%
of securitized portfolios – The hope is that the resulting risk retention and induced
skin-in-the-game leads to better screening practices. However, the need for this type of
regulation is not undisputed. For example, Gorton (2010) argues that concerns about
adverse selection accounted for the collapse of markets for asset backed securities.
This article contributes to the debate by considering a tractable model of screening,
lending and subsequent loan sales aimed at a better understanding of how screen-
ing practices were affected by securitization opportunities. We consider the following
framework: A prospective borrower approaches a lender who has to decide whether to
approve the loan or not. The lending decision can be based on two types of information.
There is a public measure of creditworthiness, such as the FICO score, and a private
signal which may be obtained by the lender, at a cost. Following the screening and
lending decision, the lender has the opportunity to sell the loan to investors. For this,
he decides which fraction of the loan to retain and which to sell.25 Investors observe
the public measure of creditworthiness and the risk retention by the lender and use
this to form beliefs about the value of the offered loan. Retention thus serves as a sig-
nalling device – different levels of retention are associated with different beliefs about
the lender’s private information. This signalling device is essential for sustaining equi-
libria with positive realization of gains from trade as the lender needs to be precluded
from selectively using her private information.
Our main findings are as follows. The outcome of both the screening and lending and
the loan sale stage depend on the ex-ante value of the lending transaction, that is,
on the publicly observable information about the borrower. For low ex-ante values,
screening occurs and loans are approved conditional on screening revealing positive
information. At the same time, incentives to ’originate-to-sell’ negative NPV-loans
need to be prevented, which implies significant risk-retention by lenders in the loan sale
stage. Borrowers with high ex-ante creditworthiness are approved, while the screening
decision and degree of loan sales may take place at varying intensity.26
25We thus abstract from security design considerations and model risk retention as a vertical slice.
By incorporating security design considerations, quantitative predictions would differ while the
qualitative predictions should carry over, see Section 3.7.
26If these borrowers are screened, they obtain a loan irrespective of the screening outcome.
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Comparing a scenario in which loan sales are infeasible with the full model including
loan sales, we show that the advent of securitization and thus introduction of loan sales
has two effects on the screening and lending choice of lenders. In the region of the
publicly observable creditworthiness such that borrowers are screened, loan sales are
strictly positive, which increases lender profitability. This induces the lender to screen
for lower levels of ex-ante creditworthiness; borrowers whose screening yields a positive
signal represent a positive NPV lending opportunity and obtain a loan where they could
not absent loan sale opportunities. This increases both lender and borrower welfare.
Conversely, the threshold above which all borrowers obtain a loan is reduced such
that the average loan quality actually decreases for intermediate FICO scores. The
reasoning is as follows. While equilibria with screening and partial lending, as well
as equilibria without screening and full lending are sustainable, no-screening equilibria
lead to a larger realization of gains from trade as private information is not present
on the equilibrium path. Thus, relative profitability of no-screening equilibria for the
lender is higher than for screening equilibria with partial lending. Bad borrowers are
thus no longer screened out whereas they would be if loan sales were not feasible. This
implies that, while lender profitability increases, loan sales can lead to adverse effects
on borrower welfare if such borrowers are ex-post better off not obtaining a loan. In
particular, this leads to an ambiguous overall welfare effect of the introduction of loan
sales. Finally, at the margin between the screening and no-screening regions, there is an
implied discontinuity in lending rates, average borrower quality and risk retention.
Empirically, discontinuities in lending and default rates around a FICO score of 620
are well-documented. Our model shows that this can be rationalized without imposing
some form of irrationality either on the investors’ or on the lenders’ side – lending rates
discontinuously increase at the screening cutoff, while average per-loan profitability de-
creases due to lack of screening. Average profitability in turn can be interpreted as
average borrower quality, which is inverse to default rates. We show that by accounting
for the interplay between screening incentives and subsequent loan sales, the disconti-
nuities in lending and default rates arise endogenously in a model with rational agents.
The model furthermore predicts that they are associated with a discontinuity in loan
sale rates.
The model thus rationalizes the emergence of an underwriting rule-of-thumb.27 To assess
whether lender incentives are properly aligned, the ex-post risk retention needs to be
27See Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010), Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012) and Bubb and Kaufman
(2014).
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carefully assessed: The model predicts that risk-retention should be partial and in fact
increasing in ex-ante creditworthiness for low FICO scores. In contrast, no risk retention
is necessary for sufficiently high FICO scores. In determining the ex-post retention, it is
important to distinguish between loan sales and securitization – Acharya, Schnabl, and
Suarez (2013), among others, show that securitization often occurs without risk transfer.
Lenders securitize loans via special purpose vehicles but remain liable for the risk of
default. While regulatory arbitrage is typically cited as a driving force for this type
of securitization, we provide an additional motif: signalling via risk-retention. Taking
into account securitization without risk transfer, our results suggest that the prevailing
underwriting standards are not per se indicative of misaligned lender incentives in the
sense that lenders exploit irrational investors. However, as outlined above, the overall
effect on loan quality and welfare may nonetheless be negative when contrasting the
prevailing practice with a world absent loan sales.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 3.1.1 discusses the insti-
tutional setting and discusses the related literature. Section 3.2 presents the model
framework. Section 3.3 derives the equilibrium in a restricted model where loan sales
are infeasible, before Section 3.4 derives all sustainable equilibria of the full model.
Section 3.5 addresses the equilibrium multiplicity before the welfare effect of loan sales
is assessed in Section 3.6. Section 3.7 discusses the robustness of the framework and
discusses potential extensions. Section 3.8 concludes.
3.1.1 Institutional Setting and Related Literature
Institutional Setting Securitization of mortgage-backed loans generally proceeds in
the following form. First, a lender who is approached by a borrower decides on the ex-
tent of the review the prospective borrower faces. Information gleaned from the review
process helps the lender to form an assessment of the borrowers’ creditworthiness. In
determining the extent of the review process, automated underwriting systems play a
crucial role. These systems use information about the borrower, such as the FICO credit
rating score, loan-to-value ratio and debt-to-income-ratio to compute a recommenda-
tion whether to approve the loan or begin a manual underwriting process involving
more intense scrutiny. Following the final lending decision, lenders may sell securitized
loans via either government sponsored enterprises (GSEs), private-label securitizers, or
instead choose to retain the loans on their balance sheet.
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In the mid-1990s, the GSEs adopted guidelines for underwriting credit loans which
explicitly recommended differential screening levels based on the FICO score of an
individual. The FICO score is a backward-looking rating of an individual’s creditwor-
thiness. It is based on an individual’s payment history, amounts owed, length of credit
history, the types of credit used and recently opened credit accounts (new credit).28
In securitization, particularly of mortgage-backed loans, the FICO score is instrumen-
tal in determining a prospective borrower’s likelihood of default. This information is
available to lenders at the initial lending stage and is reported to investors (in terms of
its distribution for loan pools) during subsequently occuring securitization. For exam-
ple, Freddie Mac determined in its industry letter (1995) that for 1-unit single-family
dwellings, borrowers with a FICO score above 660 faced the lowest underwriting stan-
dards. By contrast, borrowers with a FICO credit rating between 620 and 660 should
consider all aspects of the borrower’s credit history, while applicants with a FICO score
below 620 should undergo a particularly detailes review – “Unless there are extenuating
circumstances, a credit score in this range should be viewed as strong indication that
the borrower does not show sufficient willingness to repay as needed.”29 At this point,
GSEs as guarantors of a significant amount of outstanding mortgages had the largest
available dataset on past performance of mortgage-backed loans. It is hence unsur-
prising that the established cutoffs found their way into the automated underwriting
systems (see Bubb and Kaufman (2014)). In particular, lenders were contractually ob-
ligated to follow the GSEs guidelines when selling their loans via GSEs. Nonetheless,
the information gathered from the review process is not necessarily fully verifiable, re-
sulting in private information for the lender which needs to be taken into account when
assessing subsequent loan sales.
Differential, and in particular discontinuous, screening intensities manifest themselves
in discontinuities in default rates. The main focus of empirical analyses which aim
to assess whether lenders’ screening incentives were misaligned prior to the financial
crisis is on eliciting the underlying cause for observed discontinuities in default rates
around a FICO score of 620. Several articles have documented that at a FICO score
of 620, there is a pronounced discontinuity in default rates – observably worse loans to
borrowers with a FICO score of 619- exhibit lower default rates than observably better
loans to borrowers with a FICO score of 620+. This discontinuity is rationalized with
increased screening incentives for loans in the 619- range, resulting in screening out
’bad’ borrowers in that region, while borrowers with a FICO of 620+ face less intense
28Source: www.myfico.com/crediteducation/whatsinyourscore.aspx
29See Freddie Mac (1995).
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screening.
Empirical Analyses of Rules-of-Thumb Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010) and
Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012) attribute the discontinuity to a rule-of-thumb induced by the
prevalent GSE recommendations in the securitization stage. They argue that both the
GSEs themselves and other investors such as hedge funds used the cutoff of 620, which
results in a vast and discontinuous increase in demand for mortgage-backed securities
(MBS) when the underlying loan pool consists of borrowers with a FICO score of at
least 620. Adherence to such a threshold is further corroborated by evidence that rating
agencies employed similar cutoffs when rating MBS, see Temkin, Johnson, and Levy
(2002). Analyzing a vast sample of securitized loans, they document that at a FICO
score of 620, the number of securitized loans jumps by 80%, while it is also associated
with a 20% increase in defaults (see Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010)). At the
same time, the time-to-securitize is significantly lower for loans composed of FICO
620+ loans, see Keys, Seru, and Vig (2012). The authors interpret the difference in the
number of securitized loans and the time-to-securitize as evidence for an exogenous shift
in demand around a FICO of 620. Using this exogenous variation, the discontinuity
in default rates can easily be rationalized by differential screening incentives – as loans
with a FICO of 620+ are less likely to be retained, an originate-to-sell mentality with
a lack of screening of borrowers can be sustained. By contrast, as loans to borrowers
with a FICO score of 619- are more likely to remain on the balance sheet, screening
incentives are stronger. At the threshold, this leads to the observed discontinuity in
default rates despite underlying observables being smoothly distributed.
In contrast, Bubb and Kaufman (2014) argue that the rule-of-thumb is relevant already
at the lending stage. Exploiting a dataset comprising both securitized and unsecuritized
loans, they document that the discontinuities in the securitized number of loans and
default rates can be confirmed. However, they are due to underlying discontinuities in
lending rates – the number of mortgage loans already exhibits a significant discontinuity
at a FICO score of 620; this discontinuity prevails for portfolio (non-securitized) loans
as well as both types of securitized (private-label and GSE) loans. In particular, the
securitization rate is nearly constant at 95% across all observed FICO scores. The lack
of a discontinuity in the FICO score thus calls into question the validity of using only
the number of securitized loans as proxy for ease of securitization (as done in Keys,
Mukherjee, Seru, and Vig (2010)). Bubb and Kaufman (2014) sketch a theoretical
framework which establishes that if differential screening results in private information
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for the lender, risk retention should be high whenever screening occurs to properly align
incentives, while this is not necessary whenever private information is a non-issue. The
near-constant securitization rate is hence interpreted as evidence that lenders used the
cutoff rules already in their lending decision, while the differential screening does not
result in private information as otherwise risk retention should be larger. However, we
argue that the lack of securitization rate discontinuities is not indicative of a lack of
risk retention per se – as Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013), among others, have
documented, securitization often occurs without risk-transfer.
We extend the theoretical analysis in Bubb and Kaufman (2014) by explicitly charac-
terizing the full range of sustainable equilibria in a game where lender screening results
in private information and where loan sales lead to the realization of gains from trade.30
Furthermore, our model allows the lender to selectively use her private information when
trading with the investor – this channel is not present in Bubb and Kaufman (2014).
We confirm the prediction that, in equilibrium, screening requires sizeable retentions to
preclude incentives to originate-to-sell negative NPV loans whenever screening results
in private information. By itself, the result that gains from trade can be partially real-
ized is not innocuous: Dang (2008) shows that bargaining with endogenous information
may lead to nonexistence of equilibria with trade. The key reason why positive levels
of trade can be sustained in our framework is that the trade decision is not zero/one;
instead, partial retention serves as a signalling device by affecting the seller’s (lender’s)
residual payoff.
Theoretical Contributions on Screening and Loan Sales The interaction between
potential screening or effort and the possibility of loan sales has been analyzed in
several theoretical articles. Rajan, Seru, and Vig (2010) present a simple framework
where borrowers have binary soft and hard information types. Banks can engage in
costly screening and in particular can condition the screening decision on the publicly
observable hard information and the fraction of the loan which is sold subsequently –
this fraction is an exogenous parameter of their model. They show that soft information
is acquired whenever the hard information signal is low and the level of securitization
is not too high. Bester, Gehrig, Stenbacka, et al. (2012) aim at determining the effects
of loan sales on costly screening intensity in the lending stage and in particular focus
on variations in how screening intensity affects type-I/type-II-errors respectively. They
30Gains from trade are not present in Bubb and Kaufman (2014), which significantly simplifies the
analysis and in particular implies that screening thresholds are unaffected by loan sale opportunities.
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find that the impact of loan sales on screening intensity depends on the specifics of
the screening technology: Loan sales soften screening whenever the benefit of screening
is mainly to avoid erroneously classifying bad loans as good. Conversely, if the main
benefit of higher screening intensity is to avoid misclassifying good loans as bad, loan
sales induce higher screening intensity.
Fender and Mitchell (2009) and subsequent work by Kiff and Kisser (2014) assess the
impact of different types of forced retention in the loan sale stage on screening prior
to the lending stage in a framework which incorporates systemic risk (proxying for the
economic outlook). It is established that equity tranche retention best incentivizes loan
screening but at the same time has the highest costs in terms of capital requirements.
This generally leads to the issuer preferring mezzanine retention (when it can choose
freely) as it leads to higher profits. While we consider a fixed form of retention in the
form of a vertical slice, we focus on the differential screening and loan sale intensity
given the heterogeneity in prospective borrowers along a publicly verifiable dimension
such as the FICO score.
Chemla and Hennessy (2014) consider a framework with a moral hazard problem with
respect to unobservable improvement of asset quality and determine securitization (loan
sale) levels and the impact of regulation. Moreover, during securitization, originators
can be either transparent or opaque; in case of transparency, some market participants
may exert costly effort to learn the originator’s type (which is binary, as is the state
of the world). The authors fully characterize security design, trading patterns and dis-
closure choices which allows to solve for the optimal effort level. They find that effort
levels are strictly below a framework without asymmetric information and establish
that the optimal regulation consists of mandating opacity and zero retention by the
originator whenever effort can not be induced. Inducing separating securitization by
contrast necessarily mandates junior retention by both types, whereas inducing pool-
ing securitization mandates zero retention in the bad state. However, effort-inducing
regulation is shown to not necessarily be socially desirable.
Finally, Parlour and Plantin (2008) consider a bank’s incentives to monitor a firm it
has lent to. In their setup, monitoring has two effects: It decreases the private benefit
of shirking for the monitored firm (and thus alleviates a moral hazard problem) and
produces private information about its future payoff. In a secondary stage, the bank
may sell loans to investors. The selling decision may be due to either a liquidity shock
or negative private information. They provide conditions under which this secondary
loan market is active, which may only occur whenever banks are relatively more likely
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to sell loans due to liquidity shocks as compared to private information, and contrast
the secondary loan market acitivity with the efficient level, showing that liquidity is
excessive for loans to highly rated firms and too low for loans to risky firms. While we
are similarly concerned with the effects of potential private information acquisition on
secondary market trade, we allow the lender to signal the quality of its loans via risk
retention.
3.2 Model Setup
We consider a simple two-stage game comprising screening at the lending stage and
subsequent loan sales. There is a single lender and a single investor who represents a
competitive market. The lender is approached by a single borrower. The borrower type
may vary along a publicly observable dimension (e.g. the FICO score) which is costlessly
observable by all agents in the economy. Furthermore, it may vary along an unverifiable
dimension which can be elicited via screening. In terms of interpretation, consider
the following: While the FICO score yields an estimate of a prospective borrower’s
creditworthiness, it is by construction a backward-looking score. The rating depends
on past behavior in the use of credit cards and other forms of borrower credit. However,
other factors such as current employment and salary or the current family situation
are of critical importance for forecasts of whether a loan can be repaid and hence
for the profitability of the lending transaction. While these factors can be considered
and analyzed through detailed processing by loan officers, the obtained information is
considerably subjective and generally hard to credibly transmit to prospective investors
who wish to acquire securitized loan pools.
Observing the prospective borrower’s public information type, the lender decides whether
to screen the borrower or not. Screening is costly and yields a signal about the bor-
rower’s soft information type, which we assume to be binary. Contingent on the avail-
able information, the lender decides whether to lend to the borrower or not. In case
lending has taken place, the lender may subsequently sell parts of the loan to the in-
vestor. For this, he chooses the fraction r of the loan which is retained and offers the
remaining (1− r) to the investor. The investor observes the public information about
the borrower and the retention level r and uses this to infer the value of the offered
loan. By assumption, the market is competitive and the investor pays this amount in
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full to the lender.31 Formally, the model is described as follows.
Time Time is discrete and covers 3 periods, t = 0, 1, 2. The screening and lending
decision occur at t = 0. The subsequent loan sale stage covers periods t = 1 and t = 2.
At t = 1, the lender and investor may trade (a fraction) of the loan. At t = 2, loans
mature and the profits from the lending transaction are (verifiably) realized.
Borrower Types and Profitability of the Lending Transaction At t = 0, a prospec-
tive borrower (“she”) arrives at a lender. For now, we treat borrowers as non-strategic:
They always ask for a loan and accept it whenever they are approved. We later on endo-
genize borrower behavior when assessing welfare implications of loan sale opportunities.
Each borrower’s type θ is two-dimensional, θ = (θF , θS). θF is public information to all
agents in the economy. θS is assumed to be binary, θS ∈ ΘS ≡ {
¯
θS, θ¯S}. Each θS-type
is equally likely for a given θF .
Given θ = (θF , θS), the profitability pi of a lending transaction with a borrower of type
θ is given by
pi(θ) = pi(θF , θS) = θF −∆ + 2∆IθS=θ¯S =
{
θF + ∆ if θS = θ¯S
θF −∆ if θS =
¯
θS
, (3.1)
where θF represents the value of a lending transaction absent screening and ∆ the
increase (decrease) in profitability of lending to a (θS = θ¯S)-type (a (θS =
¯
θS)-type).
By assumption, for each θF , half the prospective borrowers are of type (θS =
¯
θS) and
lending to them yields a payoff of θF −∆. Conversely, half are of type (θS = θ¯S) and
lending to them yields θF + ∆. If screening does not take place, we hence have
E[pi(θF , θS)|θF ] = 1
2
(
θF −∆)+ 1
2
(
θF + ∆
)
= θF .
To cover all possible cases, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 3.1 The public type θF is distributed on (−∞,∞) according to some cdf
F (·) with strictly positive density f(·).
31This assumption is easily microfounded, e.g. by two prospective investors engaging in Bertrand price
competition.
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Assumption 3.1 guarantees that θF may take any realization on (−∞,∞), ensuring
that all cases are covered: Some borrowers (low θF ) will never obtain a loan as lending
to them is unprofitable even contingent on screening revealing positive information.
Similarly, some borrowers (high θF ) are profitable to lend to even if screening reveals
negative information.
Lender The lender L (“he”) cares about consumption at t = 1 and t = 2. Further-
more, he has a strict preference for consumption at t = 1 which reflects e.g. further
lending opportunities for which cash is needed. His expected utility is given by
UL = CL1 + δ · CL2 − cs · Is=1,
where Cti denotes the consumption of agent i in period t and δ ∈ (0, 1) parametrizes
the preference for cash at t = 1 (the lower δ, the higher the preference for consumption
at t = 1). At t = 0, the lender has to decide whether to screen (s = 1) or not (s = 0); if
screening occurs, his overall utility is lowered by cs. The lender holds no endowments
besides the rights to the profits of the lending transaction if it occured at t = 0. We
assume that screening is not too costly.
Assumption 3.2 The screening cost is strictly bounded from above by
cs <
1
2
δ∆.
Assumption 3.2 ensures that even in the absence of loan sale opportunities, screening
is sufficiently cheap such that it may be sustained in equilibrium.32
Investor The investor I cares about consumption at t = 1 and t = 2. I is indifferent
between consuming at these periods, i.e.
U I = CI1 + C
I
2 .
32When screening and lending to θS = θ¯S-types only, half of the applicants obtain a loan after screening
reveals positive information. The value of the lending transaction is θF + ∆, that is, compared to
not lending, the gain in value of an approved lending transaction is ∆, which is discounted by δ in
the absence of loan sales as loans are fully retained.
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The investor is assumed to be deep-pocketed in the sense that the investor’s funds are
sufficient for acquiring any amount of securitized assets.
Loan Sales From the setup, it is straightforward that gains from trade may be realized
by letting lender and investor trade at t = 1. We consider the following trading protocol:
If the lender owns a loan to a θF -type, he decides on a risk retention level r ∈ [0, 1] and
offers the remaining fraction (1 − r) to the investor. The investor observes θF and r
and uses this to update the beliefs about the θS-type of the borrower. I then pays this
expected value in full.33
3.3 Equilibrium without Loan Sales
Suppose first that loan sales are not feasible and hence that full retention r(θF , θS) =
1⇔ (1− r(θF , θS)) = 0 is required for all θ = (θF , θS). Consider a given θF -type who
approaches the lender. In that case, the lender has three possible strategies:
(a) Do not lend. This directly implies not to screen to save the cost cs. The lender’s
expected utility is then given by
E[UL(θF )] = 0.
(b) Do not screen and approve all borrowers. The lender’s expected utility is then
given by
E[UL(θF )] = δθF .
(c) Screen the borrowers and approve only θ¯S-types.34 The lender’s expected utility
is then given by
E[UL(θF )] =
1
2
δ
[
θF + ∆
]− cs.
33This implicitly assumes a perfectly competitive market for investing in securitized loans. A micro-
foundation for this assumption is given by considering two (or more) investors engaging in Bertrand
competition in a limit order market. As long as investors do not hold the full bargaining power,
results are qualitatively unchanged.
34Screening and lending to all borrowers is strictly dominated by not screening and lending to all
borrowers as it saves cs.
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Let cutoffs κa and κf be characterized as follows:
κa =
2cs
δ
−∆ Ass. 3.2< 0
κf = ∆− 2cs
δ
Ass. 3.2
> 0.
Given Assumption 3.1.(ii), it follows immediately from comparing the expected utilities
of each action that the optimal screening and lending behavior by L is characterized as
follows.
Proposition 3.1 (Equilibrium without Loan Sales) Let κa and κf be uniquely de-
fined as above with κa < 0 < κf . The lender’s screening and lending decision depends
on the public type θF and is characterized as follows:
(i) If θF < κa, the lender is not screened and lending does not take place. For θ
F =
κa, the lender is indifferent between screening the borrower and approving θ
S = θ¯S-
types only, and not approving the borrower without screening. His expected profit
is 0.
(ii) If θF ∈ (κa, κf ), the lender screens the borrower and approves θS = θ¯S-types only.
His expected profit is 1
2
δ(θF + ∆)− cs > 0. For θF = κf , the lender is indifferent
between screening the borrower and approving θS = θ¯S-types only, and approving
the borrower without screening.
(iii) If θF > κf , the lender approves the borrower without screening. His expected profit
is δθF .
We next assess how the equilibrium is affected whenever loan sale opportunities ex-
ist. In particular, we aim to assess whether the threshold levels κa for approval of
some borrowers and κf for full lending to all borrowers are affected by the advent of
securitization, that is, by loan sales.
3.4 Equilibrium with Loan Sales
Consider the full model with loan sale opportunities. The initial focus of the analysis
is to characterize the maximal range of sustainable equilibrium behaviors comprising
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the screening and lending decision along with the subsequent retention choice during
the loan sale stage. To facilitate this, we consider the most pessimistic off-path beliefs.
Formally, let µ(θF , r) denote the investor’s belief that the θS-type underlying the offered
loan is θ¯S (for a given θF and observed retention level r). Given µ(θF , r), the investor
values the offered security characterized by the implied retention r
(1− r) · [θF −∆ + 2µ(θF , r)∆] = (1− r) · [θF + ∆(2µ(θF , r)− 1)] ,
where (1− r) is the offered fraction of the loan (i.e. what is not retained by the lender)
and θF + ∆(2µ(θF , r) − 1) is the expected value of the loan. The most pessimistic
off-path beliefs imply that for any pair (θF , r) such that r(θF , θS) is not played with
positive probability by the lender for any θS, it holds that µ(θF , r) = 0, i.e. that the
investor believes this loan to be to a θS =
¯
θS-type with probability 1.35
We look for sustainability of all possible types of equilibria: Equilibria where neither
screening nor lending takes place, equilibria where borrowers are screened and are ap-
proved iff screening reveals positive information, equilibria where borrowers are not
screened and approved, and equilibria where borrowers are screened but obtain a loan
irrespective of the information revealed by screening. Whether a given equilibrium type
is sustainable depends crucially on the value of the public information θF .
3.4.1 No Screening, no Lending
Suppose first that the lender chooses not to screen and not to lend to any borrowers.
This yields an expected payoff of 0. Proposition 3.1 implies that a profitable deviation
exists iff the public type θF is such that θF > κa =
2cs
δ
−∆: At this stage, even if all
loans are retained, profits are strictly positive (either by screening out θS =
¯
θS-types or
by approving all borrowers without screening). Conversely, for θF ≤ κa, not screening
and not lending can be sustained given the most pessimistic off-path beliefs as any
non-retained loans would yield a negative price θF −∆ < 0 and absent loan sales, there
exists no profitable deviation.
Lemma 3.1 If loan sales are possible, not screening and not lending can be sustained
for the public type θF such that θF ≤ κa.
35In the interior of sustainable equilibrium ranges, there will typically less pessimistic beliefs which
are also able to sustain the equilibrium. As we are interested in characterizing the maximal range
of sustainable equilibria, we assume most pessimistic beliefs off-path throughout the analysis.
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3.4.2 Screening and Partial Lending
Suppose next that the lender chooses to screen and lend to θS = θ¯S-type borrowers
only, that is, after screening has revealed positive information about the prospective
borrower. Denote the equilibrium retention level by r¯∗. We consider whether such an
equilibrium is sustainable for a given public type θF . From here on out, we relegate
exact derivations and proofs to the appendix and present the intuition in the main
text.
For an equilibrium with screening and lending to θS = θ¯S-type borrowers only, there
are two constraints which arise on the equilibrium retention rate. On the one hand,
the equilibrium candidate needs to be profitable, which implies an upper bound on the
retention rate r¯∗ – the less is retained, the more gains from trade are realized, which
increases profitability.
At the same time, there also is a lower bound on r¯∗. This lower bound arises because
incentives for the lender to deviate to not screening borrowers need to be precluded. By
deviating, the lender would gain by saving the screening cost cs and by – in expectation
– selling more loans to the investor at an inflated price θF + ∆ instead of the actual
value θF . However, the lender also loses because the retained fraction (1− r¯∗) includes
loans with a negative value θF −∆. As such, a sufficiently high equilibrium retention
level r¯∗ is necessary to preclude this deviation.
Equilibrium existence and constraints on r¯∗ are summarized in the following proposi-
tion. Note that in this equilibrium type, the lower bound of required retention levels
r¯∗(θF ) sustainable in equilibrium increases in the public type θF : This is because the
implied punishment by retaining a given fraction r of the loan decreases due to the
increase in value. At the threshold θF such that θF = κf such that an equilibrium with
screening and partial lending can be sustained, the required retention r¯∗(κf ) = 1 is full
– the range of sustainable equilibrium retentions is a singleton.
Lemma 3.2 When loan sales are possible, an equilibrium where a borrower of public
type θF is screened and obtains a loan conditional on screening revealing θS = θ¯S exists
if and only if θF is such that θF ∈ [κLSa , κf], where κLSa < κa is characterized by (3.3).
The equilibrium retention level r¯∗(θF ) is constrained from above and below and depends
on θF according to (3.2).
Proof. See Appendix 3.A.
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Remark 3.1 Availability of loan sales decreases the threshold-level for the public type
θF such that lending contingent on screening revealing θS = θ¯S can be sustained from
κa to κ
LS
a . The gains from trade which are partially realized increase lender profitability
for θF ∈ [κLSa , κa), rendering screening and partial lending profitable.
Figure 3.1 illustrates the sustainable equilibrium r¯∗ as a function of the public type
θF . As discussed above, the lower bound on possible equilibrium retentions (which
maximizes gains from trade) is increasing in θF and in particular equal to 1 at θF =
κf .
θF
r¯∗(θF )
κLSa
κa κf
1
sustainable equilibrium r¯(θF )
Figure 3.1: Sustainable equilibria with screening & partial lending
3.4.3 Screening and Full Lending
We next check whether screening and full lending can occur on the equilibrium path.
First note that it is straightforward that this is sustainable only for public types θF
such that θF ≥ ∆, as profitability of lending to
¯
θS-types would be violated otherwise.
To see this, note that separating loan sales are necessary for this type of equilibrium as
otherwise not screening and offering the same retention level would save the screening
cost (yielding a profitable deviation). With separating loan sales, however, profitability
of lending to θS =
¯
θS-types is necessary and only given for θF sufficiently large such that
θF ≥ ∆ – otherwise, a profitable deviation would be to simply not lend to borrowers
where screening yields negative information about the borrower.
Two constraints arise in that case: First note that loan sales have to be separating in
that the equilibrium retention of
¯
θS-type loans,
¯
r∗, is different than the retention level
of θ¯S-type loans, r¯∗. Otherwise, a natural deviation would be to not screen. Second,
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this implies that
¯
r∗ = 0 as, even given the most pessimistic off-path beliefs, selling all
of the
¯
θS-type loans yields the fair value and thus would increase lender profitability if
it were a deviation. Thus, we only need to worry about two types of deviations.
The lender may choose to not screen and mimic the θ¯S-type loans by retaining r¯∗.
This introduces a lower bound on r¯∗ – to make the deviation unattractive, a larger
part of the loan needs to be retained so that the implied punishment of losing out on
gains from trade is high enough. Note that this lower bound is decreasing in θF as a
larger ex-ante value implies a larger punishment from deviating given the same level of
retention. Finally, the lender may also choose to deviate by not screening and selling
all loans at the (less than fair) value θF −∆. This yields an upper bound on r¯∗ – if r¯∗ is
too high, the lender would prefer to incur the discount on the issued loans as she saves
the screening cost and receives more gains from trade. As θF increases, the relative
attractiveness of the deviation increases as gains from trade are more relevant, and the
upper bound on r¯∗ becomes tighter.
We show that both constraints can be satisfied for an intermediate range of θF -values.
Given that both constraints are decreasing in the public type θF , the minimum retention
required to sustain this equilibrium type is decreasing in θF .
Lemma 3.3 When loan sales are possible, equilibria such that borrowers of a given
public type θF are screened, but obtain a loan irrespective of θS, exist if and only if
θF ∈ (
¯
κsf , κ¯sf ] with
¯
κsf , κ¯sf defined by (3.7) and κ¯sf >
¯
κsf > κf .
In that case, loans to θS =
¯
θS-types are fully sold, i.e.
¯
r∗(θF ) = 0, while loans to
θS = θ¯S-types are partially retained with the equilibrium r¯∗(θF ) constrained from above
and below according to (3.8).
Proof. See Appendix 3.B.
3.4.4 No Screening and Full Lending
Finally, we check for sustainablity of equilibria which involve no screening and approval
of all borrower types. It is clear that this is unsustainable for public types θF such
that θF ≤ 0 due to lack of profitability (for θF = 0, Proposition 3.1 establishes that
screening and lending to θS = θ¯S-types only is more profitable even if these loans are
fully retained). We thus consider θF such that θF > 0.
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When assessing sustainability of equilibria without screening and full lending, it is
important to note that most deviations can be precluded by limiting the retention
level r∗ in equilibrium: With high equilibrium loan sales, deviations necessarily involve
retention of loans off-equilibrium and the implicit punishment through lack of realization
of gains from trade is sufficiently strong. The one exception which induces a lower bound
on the equilibrium retention is the lender deviation involving screening, full lending and
retaining the equilibrium r∗ for
¯
θS-type loans while fully retaining θ¯S-type loans. In
this case, the lender would profit by selling
¯
θS-type loans above their value, as well as
retaining θ¯S-type loans instead of selling them below value, while losing – in expectation
– from holding on to θ¯S-type loans instead of realizing gains from trade, as well as from
retaining a fraction (1− r∗) of
¯
θS-type loans.
This potential deviation needs to be precluded unless θF is sufficiently large, and in
particular is rendered unprofitable whenever the equilibrium retention r∗ is sufficiently
high. For low θF , we thus need to assess whether r∗ exists such that this lower bound is
satisfied, as well as an upper bound on r∗ such that deviations to screening and partial
lending are precluded – these deviations are unprofitable due to the realization of gains
from trade whenever r∗ is sufficiently low as the lender would lose out on lending to
¯
θS-
types and transferring the risk to the investor. It turns out that for sufficiently large θF
and corresponding θF , r∗ exists such that this is facilitated. In particular, the threshold
level κLSf such that a no-screening equilibrium can be sustained for θ
F ≥ κLSf (but not
too large, see below) lies below the threshold κf in the case without loan sales.
Existence of an equilibrium without screening and full lending may nonetheless fail for
some public types θF such that θF > κLSf . If θ
F is large, but not too large, the investor
could also screen selectively, fully sell
¯
θS-type loans to realize gains from trade, and
retain θ¯S-type loans to gain from the value increase by ∆ relative to selling these loans
at value θF . By doing this, the investor gains from fully realizing gains from trade on
¯
θS-type loans (even given pessimistic off-path beliefs, the lender obtains the fair value
for these loan types), but loses from discounting the θ¯S-type loans. Sufficiently low
retention r∗ is able to preclude this deviation as then, realization of gains from trade in
equilibrium would be large enough. It turns out that it is – depending on fundamentals
– not always possible to simultaneously preclude both types of potential deviations for
intermediate values of θF . In particular, whenever gains from trade and screening costs
cs are relatively low ((δ close to 1, cs close to 0), equilibria without screening but full
lending are unsustainable for an intermediate range of θF .
The following Lemma summarizes the constraints on equilibrium r∗(θF ) whenever a no-
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screening equilibrium exists. Corollary 3.3 then shows that, whenever existence fails for
some θF above κLSf , an equilibrium with screening and full lending necessarily exists.
Lemma 3.4 If loan sales are feasible, existence of an equilibrium where borrowers are
not screened and approved depends on fundamentals and the public type θF . Let κLSf <
κf be characterized by (3.10).
(i) If gains from trade or the screening cost cs are sufficiently large (δ ≤ 12 + 2cs∆ ,
(2δ − 1)∆ ≤ 6cs, or (∆−2cs)24 ≥ δ∆ [(1− δ)∆ + 2cs]), existence is guaranteed for
all θF ≥ κLSf and constraints on the equilibrium retention rate r∗(θF ) are given in
Table 3.1.
(ii) Otherwise, there exists an interval ΘFne ⊂
[
∆ + 2cs
1−δ ,
δ∆−2cs
1−δ
]
such that a no-
screening equilibrium fails to exist. For θF ≥ κLSf , θF /∈ ΘFne, restrictions on
r∗(θF ) are given in Table 3.2.
Proof. See Appendix 3.C.
Corollary 3.1 For any public type θF ≥ κLSf such that a no-screening equilibrium
exists, the equilibrium where borrowers are not screened and approved which involves
the lowest equilibrium retention rate r∗min(θF ) is characterized by
r∗min(θF ) =
{
1− 2cs
δ∆−(1−δ)θF if θ
F ≤ δ∆−2cs
1−δ
0 if θF > δ∆−2cs
1−δ
.
Corollary 3.2 An equilibrium with no screening and full lending exists for all θF ∈[
κLSf , κf
]
.
Corollary 3.3 For any θF ≥ κLSf such that no no-screening equilibrium exists, there
necessarily exists an equilibrium where borrowers are screened and obtain a loan irre-
spective of the screening outcome.
Proof. See Appendix 3.D.
Figure 3.2 depicts the two possible cases and characterizes the range of r∗(θF ) sustain-
able in a no-screening equilibrium with full lending conditional on θF . If both gains
from trade are small (δ close to 1) and the screening cost is low (cs close to 0), the
75
Chapter 3: Loan Sales and Screening with Two-Dimensional Borrower Types
conditions in Proposition 3.4.(i) are violated and existence of a no-screening equilib-
rium fails for some θF ≥ κLSf (Panel (b)). Otherwise, no-screening equilibria with full
lending exist for all θF ≥ κLSf (Panel (a)).
(a) Existence for all θF > κLSf
θF
r∗(θF )
κfκLSf
1
(b) Existence for some θF > κLSf
θF
r∗(θF )
κfκLSf Θ
F
ne
1
upper bound on r∗(θF )
lower bound on r∗(θF )
sustainable equilibrium r∗(θF )
Figure 3.2: Sustainable equilibria with no screening & full lending
3.5 Equilibrium Selection
The multiplicity of sustainable equilibria, both in terms of equilibrium types and in
terms of retention rates given an equilibrium type, does not allow for a straightforward
welfare analysis without some form of equilibrium selection. In fact, it is straightforward
from Lemmas 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 that there exists an equilibrium of the full game such
that welfare unambiguously increases (even if borrowers’ utility is explicitly modelled
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and taken into account): There exists an equilibrium in which (i) the lending decision
is identical to the no loan sale case outlined in Proposition 3.1 and (ii) retention is
bounded away from full retention for almost all θF , which means gains from trade are
realized, increasing lender profitability.36
A natural selection criterion in the present setup is to focus on the lender-preferred
equilibria. These maximize welfare as they maximize gains from trade (in fact, borrow-
ers so far are considered as non-strategic, while the lender extracts the full rent from
investors). It is straightforward that for a given equilibrium type, where type refers to
the screening and approval decision), the equilibrium with the lowest retention maxi-
mizes expected lender utility. Moreover, even when borrower behavior is endogenized
in Section 3.6, using the lender-preferred equilibrium as a selection criterion is sensible
with respect to the application: As lenders are the ones who set and adhere to lending
standards and guidelines, they choose them to maximize their profits.
To find the lender-preferred equilibrium, we need to account for the multiplicity in
equilibrium types given loan sale opportunities. For the public type θF such that
θF ∈ [κLSf , κf), screening equilibria with partial lending and no-screening equilibria
with full lending co-exist (see Lemmas 3.2 and 3.4). Similarly, for θF such that a
screening equilibrium with full lending exists, no-screening equilibria with full lending
may exist as well (Lemmas 3.3 and 3.4). Finally, while an equilibrium without screening
and lending may coexist with an equilibrium with screening and partial lending (for
θF ∈ [κLSa , κa]), it is straightforward that the equilibrium involving actual lending is
weakly preferred as profits are nonnegative.
Focus first on θF ∈ [κLSf , κf). We know that a no-screening equilibrium exists in that
region, where the lowest sustainable equilibrium retention rate r∗min(θF ) is given by
Corollary 3.1:
r∗min(θF ) =
{
1− 2cs
δ∆−(1−δ)θF if θ
F ≤ δ∆−2cs
1−δ
0 if θF > δ∆−2cs
1−δ
.
Consider next the equilibrium with screening and partial lending. We know that the
minimum sustainable retention rate is given by
36The realization of gains from trade in the screening equilibrium with full lending due to
¯
r∗(θF ) = 0
is by itself sufficient to overcome the screening cost cs and increase profitability.
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r¯∗min(θ
F ) =
2cs + θ
F + ∆
(1− δ)θF + (1 + δ)∆ .
Note that as θF → κf = δ∆−2csδ , we have that
r¯∗min(θ
F )
θF→κf→ 2cs +
δ∆−2cs
δ
+ ∆
(1− δ) δ∆−2cs
δ
+ (1 + δ)∆
=
2∆− 1−δ
δ
2cs
2∆− 1−δ
δ
2cs
= 1,
that is, the required retention level r¯∗min(θ
F ) approaches full retention as θF goes to κf .
For r∗min(θF ), we have that
r∗min(θF )
θF→κf→
{
0 if δ < 1
2
(2δ−1)(δ∆−2cs)
(2δ−1)∆+2(1−δ)cs if δ ≥ 12
,
where for δ < 1
2
we have that
κf =
δ∆− 2cs
δ
>
δ∆− 2cs
1− δ ⇒ r
∗
min(κf ) = 0
while for δ ≥ 1
2
we have that
r∗min(κf ) =
(2δ − 1)(δ∆− 2cs)
(2δ − 1)∆ + 2(1− δ)cs
Ass. 3.2∈ (0, 1).
However, we know from Proposition 3.1 that at θF = κf , a no-screening equilibrium with
full retention and a screening equilibrium with partial lending and full retention lead to
the same lender expected utility. It follows that at θF = κf , the no-screening equilibrium
characterized by r∗min(κf ) yields a strictly higher expected utility to the lender than
the screening equilibrium with partial lending characterized by r¯∗min(κf ) = 1. Thus, we
can conclude that there exists a unique κ˜LSf < κf such that for θ
F ∈ [κ˜LSf , κf], the no-
screening equilibrium with full lending and retention level r∗(θF ) = r∗min(θF ) is strictly
preferred to any equilibrium with screening and partial lending (and in particular the
screening equilibrium with partial lending and equilibrium retention r¯∗(θF ) = r¯∗min(θ
F )).
In particular, κ˜LSf is such that the lender is indifferent between the two most favorable
equilibria, i.e. we have that
1
2
[
(1− r¯∗min(κ˜LSf )) · (κ˜LSf + ∆) + r¯∗min(κ˜LSf )δ(κ˜LSf + ∆)
]− cs
= (1− r∗min(κ˜LSf )) · κ˜LSf + δr∗min(κ˜LSf )κ˜LSf
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where r¯∗min(κ˜
LS
f ) and r
∗
min(κ˜
LS
f ) are as above.
The final multiplicity in equilibrium types which needs to be considered is the case
where a screening equilibrium with full lending exists. Consider two possible cases. If
δ ≤ 1
2
+ 2cs
∆
, we know that
δ∆− 2cs
1− δ ≤ ∆ +
2cs
1− δ
and thus that whenever an equilibrium with screening and full lending exists (θF ≥
∆ + 2cs
1−δ ), there also exists a no-screening equilibrium with retention r
∗ = 0. Thus,
for δ ≤ 1
2
+ 2cs
∆
, the lender-preferred equilibrium in the θF -range where a screening
equilibrium with full lending exists is necessarily the no-screening equilibrium with full
loan sales: Gains from trade are maximal and the screening cost is saved.
However, it may be the case that gains from trade are small, i.e. δ > 1
2
+ 2cs
∆
. In this
case, it may be the case that a no-screening equilibrium fails to exist (see Lemma 3.4) or,
if the two equilibrium types co-exist, that the equilibrium with screening, full lending
and minimal retention is preferred to the equilibrium without screening and minimal
retention. Irrespective of the fundamentals, however, the lender-preferred equilibrium
involves approving all borrowers. We summarize these observations as follows.
Proposition 3.2 (Lender-Preferred Equilibrium) In the lender-preferred equilib-
rium (which maximizes welfare given non-strategic borrowers), there exist threshold
levels κLSa < κa and κ˜
LS
f < κf such that
(i) If the public type θF is such that θF ∈ [κLSa , κ˜LSf ), borrowers are screened, ob-
tain a loan if and only if screening reveals θS = θ¯S and equilibrium retention is
characterized by
r¯∗(θF ) =
2cs + θ
F + ∆
(1− δ)θF + (1 + δ)∆ .
(ii) If the public type θF is such that θF ∈ [κ˜LSf ,∆ + 2cs1−δ), borrowers are not screened,
approved and equilibrium retention is characterized by
r∗(θF ) =
{
1− 2cs
δ∆−(1−δ)θF if θ
F ≤ δ∆−2cs
1−δ
0 if θF > δ∆−2cs
1−δ
.
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(iii) If the public type θF is such that θF ≥ ∆ + 2cs
1−δ , all borrowers obtain a loan.
Whether screening takes place or not, as well as the subsequent equilibrium reten-
tion level, depends on fundamentals δ,∆ and cs.
Proposition 3.2 is important as it highlights a potentially adverse effect of the advent
of securitization: By allowing lenders to realize gains from trade by selling loans to
investors, the relative profitability of not screening borrowers and selling a large fraction
of the raised loans increases compared to carefully screening borrowers which would
imply significant risk-retention to preclude deviations. Crucially, this effect materializes
when all agents are fully cognizant of the equilibrium screening and retention rates,
and for intermediate values of the public type θF – while access to credit for very low
θF -types, corresponding to low FICO-scores, improves, this occurs only contingent on
screening revealing positive information. Screening intensity decreases, however, for
intermediate FICO-scores. This is depicted graphically in Figure 3.3.
no lending screening & partial lending no screening & full lending
Without Loan Sales
no lending screening & partial lending full lending
With Loan Sales
θF
κa κf
κLSa
κ˜LSf
improved access to credit
decreased screening intensity, full instead of partial lending
Figure 3.3: Comparison loan sales & no loan sales
To fully assess the welfare implications and to show that this may harm borrower
welfare, we subsequently endogenize the so far non-strategic borrower behavior with a
simple microfoundation.
3.6 Welfare Implications of Loan Sales
So far, we have not taken into account borrowers’ utilities. As lender utility strictly
increases with loan sales, one may think that welfare is increased. This section en-
dogenizes borrower behavior by providing a simple microfoundation and shows that
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borrower welfare may be negatively affected by the advent of securitization, implying
that overall welfare effects are ambiguous.
Consider the following setup. Let borrowers obtain a private benefit B from being
approved for a loan. B represents the increase in utility from owning a house in the
case of financing of house-ownership via a (mortgage-backed) loan. At the same time,
borrowers may face distress costs D if they are unable to repay the loan. D covers
both the real financial costs of defaulting, that is the seizing of assets and loss of future
access to credit, as well as the psychological cost of declaring bankruptcy. Given that θF
and θS carry information about a borrower’s creditworthiness, we can write borrowers’
expected utility contingent on obtaining a loan as
UB = B − η(θF , θS) ·D,
where η(θF , θS) is the probability of default. It is natural to assume ∂η(·,·)
∂θF
< 0 – the
probability of default decreases in creditworthiness as measured by θF . Furthermore,
η(θF , θ¯S) < η(θF ,
¯
θS), i.e. (θS = θ¯S)-types have a lower probability of default than
(θS =
¯
θS)-types. In this reduced form notation, B implicitly contains the cash flow
(initial loan payment and subsequent repayments) of the loan.
Suppose that borrowers are uninformed about θS, but only apply if their expected
utility conditional on being approved is weakly larger than their outside option, which
we normalize to 0.37 Thus, they take into account the strategic lender behavior to infer
information about θS from the lending decision. We will show that despite the strategic
borrower behavior, loan sales can lead to decreases in borrower welfare (and potentially
thus decrease overall welfare). To do this, we restrict attention to the case where absent
loan sale opportunities, all borrowers who are approved in the equilibrium outlined in
Proposition 3.1 ask for a loan, i.e. the expected borrower utility conditional on the
screening and lending behavior is weakly positive.
In this setup, borrower welfare may be adversely affected by loan sales despite strategic
behavior by borrowers. The reasoning is as follows: For the public type θF ∈ [κ˜LSf , κf),
borrowers would be screened when loan sales are not feasible (Proposition 3.1), but
would no longer be screened in the lender preferred equilibrium with loan sales (Propo-
sition 3.2). If these borrowers (i) prefer a loan when they are uninformed about their
37Qualitative results of this section carry over as long as the borrowers’ information about θS is less
precise than that obtained by the lender via screening. This is easily explained through the lenders’
experience and sophistication.
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θS-type, but (ii) prefer not to obtain a loan whenever they know that their private type
θS is such that θS =
¯
θS, borrower welfare decreases with the introduction of loan sales.
This is because, comparing the two scenarios, only those borrower-types with θS =
¯
θS
additionally obtain a loan, but never infer that they are of the bad private type due to
lack of lender screening. This is summarized by the following Proposition.
Proposition 3.3 (Welfare Impact of Loan Sales) Compared to the case without
loan sale opportunities, lender profitability strictly increases in the case of loan sale
opportunities. The change in borrower welfare depends on the ex-ante expected utility
of borrowers with type θ such that θF ∈ [κ˜LSf , κf ) and (θS = ¯θ
S).
(i) The change in borrower welfare is ambiguous and may be potentially negative if
and only if some borrowers in this θF -region receive nonnegative expected utility
from obtaining a loan without being screened, but negative expected utility condi-
tional on knowing that θS =
¯
θS. In this case, the change in borrower and total
welfare depends on the fundamentals, in particular benefits B, distress costs D,
probability of default η and the θF -distribution of borrowers F (·).
(ii) In all other cases, the introduction of loan sale opportunities weakly increases
borrower welfare (and thus total welfare strictly increases).
Proof. See Appendix 3.E.
Proposition 3.3 highlights the potential adverse effect of loan sale opportunities on
borrower welfare: It can be rational for intermediate θF -borrowers to apply for a loan
given that they are not screened in equilibrium. At the same time, this implies that
loan sales lead to lending to (θS =
¯
θS)-type borrowers who have a negative expected
utility.
3.7 Robustness
Security Design Our framework abstracts from security design considerations by
modelling lender risk retention as a vertical slice. It is well established in the economic
literature that by considering alternative retention schemes such as retention of senior
tranches yields a larger exposure to default risk for the issuer and best incentivizes
lender effort (see e.g. Kiff and Kisser (2014), Chemla and Hennessy (2014)). More
generally, DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) characterize the optimal security design given
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that an issuer holds private information. Explicit inclusion of security design consider-
ations could thus quantitatively alter the results by relaxing incentive constraints and
in particular allow for larger realization of gains from trade in the region where screen-
ing, partial lending and sizeable risk retention prevails in equilibrium. Intuitively, the
lender could sell a larger total claim on the loan and still retain the same risk exposure,
which is necessary to preclude incentives to originate-to-sell to negative NPV borrow-
ers. The qualitative nature of the resulting risk retention, however, is unchanged: When
screening, risk retention is necessary to align incentives.
Independence Assumption We have assumed that the public (θF ) and private (θS)
information component of a borrower’s type are independent; in particular, the two
possible θS-types are equally likely independent of θF . This could be relaxed in two
dimensions without altering the qualitative results. First, the assumption of equally
distributed θS-types implies that the variance of the screening outcome is maximized
compared to other possible distributions. Considering alternative distributions would
decrease the benefits from screening. The relative qualitative tradeoff between screen-
ing and not screening would however be unaffected. Similarly, it could reasonably be
assumed that θS is not independent of θF and in particular exhibits a variance which
is decreasing in θF – the idea would be that borrowers with a low θF -type exhibit a
higher ex-post heterogeneity (including the private type) than those with a high θF -
type, where default is unlikely to occur in any case. Such a specification may for
example be incorporated by letting the increase/decrease in profitability conditional
on screening revealing positive/negative information, i.e. ∆, be itself a function of θF :
∆(θF ) with ∆′(θF ) < 0. In that case, the qualitative nature of the results carries over:
Incentives to screen are larger for low θF -types and lower for high θF -types. While the
exact ranges of the equilibrium types would be affected, screening with partial lending
and high retention would still prevail for low θF , while not screening, full lending and
full loan sales could be sustained for high θF .
Endogenous Screening Intensity Another avenue to explore would be to consider a
strategic choice of screening intensity as in Bester, Gehrig, Stenbacka, et al. (2012). This
could in principle lead to a slow phasing out of screening in equilibrium, i.e. to screening
intensity going to 0 as θF approaches the switching point between the equilibrium type
regions, which would imply that a discontinuity in average borrower quality no longer
persists. This is unlikely to occur for two reasons: On the one hand, no-screening
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equilibria have been shown to be sustainable already when negative NPV borrowers are
still present, i.e. whenever θF −∆ < 0. At the margin between the screening and no-
screening equilibrium ranges, a strictly positive level of screening intensity would thus
have to prevail to screen out bad types. Furthermore, we have established that given
private information for the borrower, i.e. given screening, risk retention is necessary for
the lender to preclude deviation incentives. Risk retention, however, also implies that
the marginal gain from screening increases compared to a no-loan-sale framework (or
equilibrium candidate). This yields a rationale for screening intensities bounded away
from 0.
Continuous Soft Information Type Our model considers a binary soft information
type θS. Alternatively, a specification with θS distributed continuously, e.g. θS ∼
U [−∆,∆] could be considered. This would greatly complicate the model. Intuitively,
the presented results should carry over. Conditional on screening, a cutoff type such
that lending takes place would be chosen. Risk retention would in turn need to follow
a continuous q(θS) schedule (contingent on θF ) to preclude deviation incentives, with
risk retention still necessary whenever screening takes place in equilibrium. We hope
to explore this issue in detail in future research.
Retention as exclusive Signaling Device In the current framework, the lender is only
able to use the retention as a signaling device for the quality of the underlying loan.
This is modelled by assuming that a single borrower of known θF -type approaches the
lender for a loan. In practice, securitization and subsequent loan sales take place not
for each loan individually, but for loan pools. Thus, there is a second component which
may be useful for the investor to infer the underlying quality: The size of the pool
itself. If the investor has a (perfectly) accurate forecast of the number of borrowers
of a given FICO score (θF -type in our model) who approach a particular lender, the
size of the pool of loans underlying a security, as well as the implied retention level,
carry information. In particular, this may lead to a higher sustainability of equilibria,
mostly relevant for the sustainability of no-screening equilibria: Any deviation which
implies restrictions on the equilibrium retention level necessarily involves a deviation
in the size of the underlying loan pool which is sold. If the market for securities for a
given lender is concentrated in that he mainly deals with a particular set of investors,
these deviations may not be feasible as they would be detected by the investor upon
noticing that, while the retention level is as expected, the size of the loan pool differs
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sharply. Extending the model in this direction, however, complicates the analysis. It is
nonetheless an interesting avenue to pursue, mainly because it may reduce the lender-
preferred equilibrium to a simple cutoff rule: Screen borrowers of sufficiently low θF -type
(low FICO score) and do not screen them whenever θF is high enough (high FICO score,
e.g. above 620). The non-existence of no-screening equilibria for intermediate values of
the lending transaction (intermediate FICO scores) should intuitively be resolved. We
hope to pursue this avenue in the future.
3.7.1 Relation to Empirical Findings
Our model predicts that risk retention should be large in the region where lending rates
are low as ’screening out’ of bad borrowers prevails. This is seemingly at odds to the
finding by Bubb and Kaufman (2014) that securitization rates are near constant at a
level of roughly 95% across the whole range of FICO scores such that lending occurs.
There are several explanations for this. On the one hand, the model-predicted retention
rates could be relaxed (i.e. decreased) by taking into account several unmodelled con-
siderations. First of all, it is well documented that retention of senior tranches yields
a larger exposure to default risk for the issuer than e.g. retention of a vertical slice
or even a junior tranche (see Kiff and Kisser (2014), Chemla and Hennessy (2014)).
By explicitly incorporating security design considerations, incentive constraints could
hence be relaxed and larger levels of loan sales could be sustained.
In a similar fashion, reputational concerns may alleviate incentive issues: Because se-
curitization is a repeated interaction where lenders and investors bargain repeatedly
over new loan (security) issues, there is an unmodelled cost of deviating. If a par-
ticular batch of securitized loans performs badly (and differences in default rates are
appearent already in the first 24 months after issuance, see Keys, Mukherjee, Seru, and
Vig (2010)), investors will be less likely to purchase loans from a given lender in the
future.
Lastly, we have assumed that screening is fully unverifiable with outcomes of the screen-
ing process being private information to the lender. In practice, this need not necessarily
be the case: Screening may stochastically yield verifiable information which can in fact
be credibly communicated to investors. For example, this can be seen in the different
levels of documentation associated with different loan pools as in Keys, Mukherjee,
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Seru, and Vig (2010). In particular, the standards adopted by the GSEs, such as docu-
mented in Freddie Mac (1995), require a certain provenance as to the screening outcome
by lenders.
Nonetheless, even by incorporating the above considerations, the predicted discontinuity
in loan sale rates is unlikely to disappear. Considering the empirical findings, it is
however essential to distinguish between our notion of loan sales and the notion of
securitization in Bubb and Kaufman (2014). Several articles, such as Acharya, Schnabl,
and Suarez (2013), Arteta, Carey, Correa, and Kotter (2013) and Covitz, Liang, and
Suarez (2009), have documented that securitization does not necessarily involve risk
transfer. Instead, a sizeable portion of loans was securitized via asset-backed commercial
paper (ABCP) conduits whereby the sponsor of the conduit retains the risk through
explicit or implicit guarantees. This type of securitization would show up in Bubb and
Kaufman (2014) as private-label securitization but is consistent with risk retention in
our model.
Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) argue that securitization without risk transfer was
mainly due to regulatory arbitrage: Securitization via conduits allowed the sponsor of
the conduit to hold less risk-capital than would be required whenever the loans would
be explicitly held in the portfolio of the issuer. However, Arteta, Carey, Correa, and
Kotter (2013) “find [...] no evidence that banks sponsored vehicles differentially in
Europe and the United States due to regulatory capital requirements.” Instead, they
argue that agency issues, safety nets and economies of scale and scope motiveated banks
to systematically take bad-tail risk in the form of ABCP vehicles.
In light of our model, a different motif for securitization via conduit arises: Despite
their low profitability, conduits may serve as a signalling device. By securitizing a large
fraction of subprime loans via conduits, the risk is retained by the lender/issuer which
allows investors to infer that incentives not to ’originate-to-sell’ negative NPV loans
are met. Our model thus helps to explain the prevalence of securitization without risk-
transfer; in particular, we offer a signalling motif that is fully independent of regulatory
arbitrage considerations.
This is of particular relevance as a key assumption of the model is that retention
levels are observable to the investor. Without this observability (implying that the
lender could sell different parts of the loan pool to different investors without allowing
for inference about the quality), positive loan sales would be a lot harder to sustain
as deviations are less detectable and hence more profitable to the lender. However,
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securitization via conduit solves this issue: By setting up a conduit and endowing it
with guarantees, the lender signals to all investors that part of its asset are implicitly
retained. Whether the remaining assets are sold to a single investor (as in the model)
or separately to multiple agents is irrelevant for the signalling effect to take place.
Empirical Assessment of Moral Hazard An empirical assessment of whether moral
hazard existed in the sense that lender’s incentives were distorted to deliberately originate-
to-sell negative NPV loans thus would need to take this implicit risk retention into
account. Our model suggests that absent significant risk retention for loans to borrow-
ers whose observable creditworthiness falls below certain thresholds, a moral hazard
problem would in fact prevail. We have argued above that this is not necessarily at
odds with the finding of near-constant securitization rates, as documented by Bubb and
Kaufman (2014). A rigorous analysis should take into account implicit risk retention to
elicit ex-post exposure to defaults. We predict that this exposure is strictly positive and
increasing in a measure of creditworthiness such as a FICO score. Subsequently, after
the ’regime-switch’ to no-screening, this exposure should ideally be zero to maximize
gains from trade. Crucially, the Bubb and Kaufman (2014) finding does hence not rule
out the presence of private information following screening by the lenders, which is a
key ingredient of our model.
3.8 Conclusion
We present a model where lenders may screen potential borrowers to obtain private
information about their type prior to the lending decision. We consider how the incen-
tives to screen vary across ex-ante differences in borrower creditworthiness and analyze
the interaction with subsequent loan sale opportunities. We find that in equilibrium,
borrowers with sufficiently bad creditworthiness are screened and only obtain a loan
upon being discovered to be of a good type. To avoid originate-to-sell incentives, loans
to these borrowers come with sizeable risk retention by the lender. If the borrowers’
creditworthiness is sufficiently high, in contrast, all borrowers obtain a loan. At the
margin between the two regions, there are implied discontinuities in lending, default
and loan sale rates as borrowers are no longer screened, which increases both lending
and default rates, while retention drops, which increases loan sale rates.
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We document that the advent of loan sales improves profitability for lenders in the
region where screening takes place. This allows positive NPV borrowers access to loans
which they would not obtain if loan sales were disallowed. However, for borrowers with
intermediate ex-ante creditworthiness, screening no longer occurs and the average loan
quality worsens compared to the no-loan-sale case. This may lead to adverse welfare
effects if these borrowers would ex-post prefer not to have obtained a loan. If present,
these negative effects are only partially mitigated by the policy reforms mandating risk-
retention for all securitized loans. Furthermore, these reforms preclude full realization
of gains from trade in a large part of the no-screening reagion and are typically welfare-
decreasing.
We relate our model to the literature on securitization without risk transfer and argue
that the unprofitable securitization via conduits served not only as a means for regu-
latory arbitrage but also as a signalling device – investors observe that lenders retain
the risk via implicit or explicit guarantees to their conduits and as such infer that the
lender’s incentives preclude originating and selling of negative NPV loans.
The present article may serve as a starting point for two directions of further research:
One the one hand, it informs the theoretical analysis of the interplay between securi-
tization and lenders’ screening incentives and may be extended in several directions,
most interestingly by accounting for uncertain numbers of borrowers of a given public
type, i.e. a given FICO score. On the other hand, the paper argues that the empirical
literature has so far not taken into account that risk retention may implicitly occur
when securitizing via conduits. To properly assess ex-post retention, and hence the
validity of the proposed theories, this needs be incorporated. Once this is done, the
tested theories can be used to assess the welfare implications of policy interventions
which have either already taken place or are currently being discussed.
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Appendix
3.A Proof of Lemma 3.2
Note that given an equilibrium retention level r¯∗, the expected utility of the lender can
be expressed as
E[UL] =
1
2
[
(1− r¯∗) · (θF + ∆) + r¯∗δ(θF + ∆)]− cs
The first restriction on r¯∗ and θF comes from the fact that profitability is required
(otherwise, not approving any borrower without screening would be a deviation). This
yields
E[UL] ≥ 0⇔ r¯∗ ≤ θ
F + ∆− 2cs
(1− δ)(θF + ∆) .
Thus, unless θF + ∆ ≥ 2cs > 0 ⇔ θF ≥ 2cs − ∆, the strategy is unprofitable (no
r¯∗ ∈ [0, 1] exists such that deviating can be precluded). For θF ∈ [2cs −∆, 2csδ −∆),
profitability implies an upper bound on the retention level r¯∗; for θF ≥ 2cs
δ
− ∆, this
upper bound is irrelevant. Note that by Assumption 3.2, 2cs
δ
−∆ < 0.
Consider next the possible deviations of the lender which involve approving at least
some borrowers. For θF ≥ ∆⇔ θF −∆ ≥ 0, a deviation necessarily exists as θS =
¯
θS-
borrowers can be approved and profits increased. Thus, restrict attention to θF ∈
[2cs − ∆,∆]. First note that any positive loan sale quantity (in any most profitable
deviation) necessarily requires r = r¯∗ as otherwise the pessimistic off-path beliefs imply
a negative price. Given this, the only relevant deviation is to not screen and retain
r = r¯∗: This deviation implies that the lender gains by saving the screening cost and
– in expectation – selling more loans to the investor at an inflated price, but loses by
being liable for the retained fraction (1−r) of loans, which include loans with a negative
value θF −∆. For this deviation not to be profitable, we require
E[UL] ≥ (1− r¯∗)(θF + ∆) + r¯∗δθF ⇔ r¯∗ ≥ 2cs + θ
F + ∆
(1− δ)θF + (1 + δ)∆ ,
which implies a lower bound on the retention level r¯∗. Note that for θF > ∆− 2cs
δ
, this
lower bound becomes greater than 1 and no such equilibrium is sustainable. Whenever
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both upper and lower bound are applicable, that is, for θF < 2cs
δ
− ∆, sustainability
requires
2cs + θ
F + ∆
(1− δ)θF + (1 + δ)∆ ≤
θF + ∆− 2cs
(1− δ)(θF + ∆)
⇔ θF ≥ −∆ δ∆− 2cs
δ∆− 2(1− δ)cs ≡ κ
LS
a .
which gives a condition on θF . For θF sufficiently high but not too high, screening and
partial lending is profitable given a sufficiently high level of loan sales (1 − r¯∗) while
r¯∗ is sufficiently high such that the risk retention prevents the lender from deviating
(note that for θF too high, the lower bound on r¯∗ becomes too tight such that no such
equilibria can be sustained). The range of equilibrium r¯∗(θF ) which can be sustained
is given by
r¯∗(θF ) ∈
[
2cs + θ
F + ∆
(1− δ)θF + (1 + δ)∆ ,min
{
θF + ∆− 2cs
(1− δ)(θF + ∆) , 1
}]
. (3.2)
Note that
κLSa = −∆
δ∆− 2cs
δ∆− 2(1− δ)cs︸ ︷︷ ︸
<1
> −∆ (3.3)
and in particular (by Assumption 3.2)38
2cs
δ
−∆ > κLSa > 2cs −∆.
This concludes the proof.
38Note that
κLSa > 2cs −∆⇔
(1− δ)
δ∆− 2(1− δ)cs > 0,
where both numerator and denominator are strictly positive, while
κLSa <
2cs
δ
−∆⇔ 2cs < δ∆.
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3.B Proof of Lemma 3.3
Restrict attention to θF such that θF ≥ ∆, let θF be fixed and denote by
¯
r∗ the equi-
librium retention when lending to θS =
¯
θS-types and by r¯∗ the equilibrium retention
when lending to θS = θ¯S-types. When looking at possible deviations, we denote reten-
tion rates by
¯
r and r¯ respectively. It follows immediately that to preclude deviations,
r¯∗ >
¯
r∗ is necessary, as for r¯∗ =
¯
r∗, not screening would be profitable, while for r¯∗ >
¯
r∗,
mimicking the high-type loan when holding a low-type loan would be profitable. Sub-
sequently, it follows that
¯
r∗ = 0, as otherwise, decreasing
¯
r would increase profits (same
price but less held to maturity).
Equilibrium profits can be expressed as
E[UL] =
1
2
[
(1− r¯∗)(θF + ∆) + r¯∗δ(θF + ∆) + (θF −∆)]− cs.
Bounds on r¯∗ follow from considering the full set of possible deviations:
• Don’t screen, lend to both θS-types, r = r¯∗. To preclude this, we need
E[UL] ≥ (1− r¯∗)(θF + ∆) + r¯∗δθF
⇔ θF −∆− 2cs ≥ (1− r¯∗)(θF + ∆) + r¯∗δ(θF −∆)
⇔ −2∆− 2cs ≥ r¯∗
[
δθF − δ∆− θF −∆]
⇔ r¯∗ ≥ 2∆ + 2cs
(1− δ)θF + (1 + δ)∆
This bound behaves intuitively: Gains from this type of deviation stem from
(i) saving the screening cost and (ii) selling θS =
¯
θS-type loans at a higher value
(θF ) than they are actually worth (θF −∆), while losses are incurred from holding
the ’bad’ loans to maturity (and discounting them) instead of fully selling them.
Hence, the lower bound on r¯∗ is increasing in the screening cost cs and decreasing
in θF : A higher screening cost increases the relative profitability of the deviation,
so the punishment needs to increase by increasing the retention. By contrast,
a high θF implies that the relative cost incurred from discounting is higher and
there is more leeway in terms of the equilibrium retention level r¯∗ which can be
sustained.
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• Don’t screen, lend to both θS-types, r =
¯
r∗ = 0. To preclude this, we require
E[UL] ≥ θF −∆
⇔ θF + ∆ + θF −∆− r¯∗(1− δ)(θF + ∆)− 2cs ≥ 2(θF −∆)
⇔ r¯∗ ≤ 2∆− 2cs
(1− δ)(θF + ∆) .
Note that the behavior of this bound as well is intuitive: Gains from deviating
stem from the fact that (i) the screening cost is saved and (ii) no loans are held to
maturity (and discounted) as everything is sold, while losses are incurred due to
not selling θS = θ¯S-type loans at face value (θF + ∆) but at a discount (θF −∆).
The upper bound on r¯∗ is hence decreasing in θF and cs: If θF is large, the gains
from not holding on to the loan to maturity are large (compared to the loss from
not selling at face value) and retention needs to be low for θS = θ¯S-type loans.
Similarly, a high screening cost increases the relative profitability of deviating.
Finally, the bound is increasing in ∆ as a large ∆ increases the relative loss from
deviating, giving more leeway in terms of retention.
To check whether an equilibrium range of r¯∗ exists such that both upper and
lower bound are satisfied, we require
2∆− 2cs
(1− δ)(θF + ∆) ≥
2∆ + 2cs
(1− δ)θF + (1 + δ)∆
⇔ θF ≤ δ∆
2 − cs∆
(1− δ)cs = ∆
δ∆− cs
(1− δ)cs . (3.4)
Note that
δ∆− cs
(1− δ)cs > 1⇔ δ∆− cs > cs − δcs ⇔ δ∆− 2cs > −δcs
which is true by Assumption 3.2 as δ∆ − 2cs > 0 > −δcs. Thus, we know that
(3.4) can be consistent θF ≥ ∆. However, we also require that r¯∗ ∈ [0, 1), i.e. in
particular that
2∆ + 2cs
(1− δ)θF + (1 + δ)∆ < 1⇔ θ
F > ∆ +
2cs
1− δ . (3.5)
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Note that (3.4) gives
θF ≤ ∆ δ∆− cs
(1− δ)cs = ∆ +
δ∆− (2− δ)cs
(1− δ)cs ∆.
Thus, for (3.4) and (3.5) to both be satisfied, we need
δ∆− (2− δ)cs
(1− δ)cs ∆ ≥
2cs
1− δ ⇔ δ∆
2 ≥ 2c2s + (2− δ)cs∆. (3.6)
Assumption 3.2 is sufficient to guarantee this, as
cs <
δ∆
2
⇒ 2c2s + (2− δ)cs∆ <
δ2∆2
2
+ (2− δ)δ∆
2
2
⇒ 2c2s + (2− δ)cs∆ < δ∆2.
Finally, θF needs to be such that the lower bound is at least 0, which is trivially
satisfied.
• The above deviations are all that need to be considered aside from profitability.
The reasoning is as follows: Any non-screening deviation is dominated by one of
the above deviations as (i) choosing r =
¯
r∗ = 0 maximizes what can be sold for any
off-path r 6= r¯∗ while prices are identical, while (ii) r = r¯∗ is the deviation which
maximizes the price which can be obtained. Finally, when screening, r¯ = r¯∗ =
¯
r
or r¯ =
¯
r∗ =
¯
r = 0 maximize the lender’s utility when deviating by the same
arguments; in this case, however, not screening saves cs and we are back to the
considered deviation.
• Profitability nonetheless needs to be ensured. We require
E[UL] =
1
2
[
(1− r¯∗)(θF + ∆) + r¯∗δ(θF + ∆) + (θF −∆)]− cs ≥ 0.
As θF ≥ ∆, we have
E[UL] ≥ 1
2
[(1− r¯∗)2∆ + r¯∗δ2∆]− cs
r¯∗≤1≥ δ∆− cs
Ass.3.2
> 0.
Thus, as long as θF is such that a range of sustainable equilibrium r¯∗ exist which
preclude deviations, profitability is ensured.
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Summarizing these observations yields that an equilibrium with screening and full lend-
ing can be sustained iff
(i) θF ∈ (
¯
κsf , κ¯sf ] where
¯
κsf = ∆ +
2cs
1− δ <
δ∆2 − cs∆
(1− δ)cs = κ¯sf . (3.7)
(ii)
¯
r∗(θF ) = 0 ,∀θF ∈ (
¯
κsf , κ¯sf ].
(iii) r¯∗(θF ) is such that
r¯∗(θF ) ∈
[
2∆ + 2cs
(1− δ)θF + (1 + δ)∆ ,min
{
2∆− 2cs
(1− δ)(θF + ∆) , 1
})
(3.8)
for all θF ∈ (
¯
κsf , κ¯sf ].
3.C Proof of Lemma 3.4
Fix θF > 0 and denote by r∗ the equilibrium retention rate. Equilibrium profits can be
expressed as
E[UL] = (1− r∗)θF + δr∗v.
We again need to check all possible deviations.
1. don’t screen, lend to all borrowers, retain r 6= r∗
Note that if r 6= r∗, the pessimistic off-path beliefs lead to an expected utility
for the lender of (1− r)(θF −∆) + δrθF . It is thus clear that, depending on
the sign of (θF −∆), r = 0 or r = 1 maximize this expression conditional on
deviating.
a) r = 0: Expected utility upon deviating is then θF −∆ and we require
E[UL] = (1− r∗)θF + δr∗θF ≥ θF −∆
⇔ r∗ ≤ ∆
(1− δ)θF ,
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i.e. retention needs to be not too high to preclude this deviation. Note
that the right-hand side is strictly below one only for large θF , that is, for
θF > ∆
1−δ .
b) r = 1: Expected utility upon deviating is then δθF . This is straightforwardly
dominated by selling r∗ for r∗ < 1 and not a deviation otherwise.
2. screen, lend to all borrowers
Note that this can be the most profitable deviation iff θF−∆ > 0 as otherwise
not lending to θS =
¯
θS-types is better (which will be addressed subsequently).
Conditional on screening and lending, denote
¯
r and r¯ the retention for
¯
θS-
type loans and θ¯S-type loans respectively. Clearly, only
¯
r = r∗ and
¯
r = 0
need to be considered: Either the loans are sold above their value as retention
mimicks the presumed equilibrium play or any retention leads to a price as if
the loans were to
¯
θS-types. In this case, however, minimal retention (
¯
r = 0)
maximizes expected utility upon deviating. A similar argument applies to
r¯: Either r¯ = r∗ is chosen to mimick the equilibrium retention or r¯ = 1 and
loans are fully retained. In principle, r¯ = 0 would also be a possible retention
choice upon deviation. However, if r¯ = 0 represents the most profitable
retention choice conditional on deviating,
¯
r = 0 would immediately follow.
In this case, however, not screening, lending to all borrowers and setting
r = 0 for all loans would save the screening cost – this deviation has been
covered above. We thus need to check three possible combinations of r¯,
¯
r
upon deviating as r¯ =
¯
r = r∗ is straightforwardly not a profitable deviation
(the screening cost is incurred, otherwise expected utility is unchanged).
a)
¯
r = 0, r¯ = r∗. For this not to be profitable, we require
E[UL] = (1−r∗)θF +δr∗θF ≥ 1
2
(θF −∆)+ 1
2
[
(1− r∗)θF + δr∗(θF + ∆)]−cs
⇔ r∗ ≤ ∆ + 2cs
(1− δ)θF + δ∆ .
We thus obtain an upper bound on the equilibrium retention r∗ which in
particular is decreasing in θF : The more valuable the loan absent screening
(large θF ), the more profitable it is to sell off bad loans at face value to not
incur the discounting.
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b)
¯
r = 0, r¯ = 1. For this not to be profitable, we require
E[UL] = (1− r∗)θF + δr∗θF ≥ 1
2
(θF −∆) + 1
2
δ(θF + ∆)− cs
⇔ r∗ ≤ (1− δ)θ
F + (1− δ)∆ + 2cs
2θF (1− δ) .
We thus obtain a second upper bound on the equilibrium retention r∗ which
again is decreasing in θF (for similar arguments as before).
c)
¯
r = r∗, r¯ = 1. For this not to be profitable, we require
E[UL] = (1−r∗)θF +δr∗θF ≥ 1
2
[
(1− r∗)θF + δr∗(θF −∆) + δ(θF + ∆)]−cs
⇔ r∗ [(1− δ)θF − δ∆] ≤ (1− δ)θF − δ∆ + 2cs.
It is straightforward that any r∗ ∈ [0, 1] satisfies this for (1 − δ)θF − δ∆ ≥
0⇔ θF ≥ δ∆
1−δ . For θ
F < δ∆
1−δ , we obtain the constraint
r∗ ≥ 1− 2cs
δ∆− (1− δ)θF ,
that is, a lower bound on the retention level r∗ which decreases (becomes less
binding) the larger θF . This is intuitive as the main gain from this deviation
stems from the fact that
¯
θS-type loans are sold above their expected value,
which is relatively more appealing the lower r∗ and the lower θF . Note that
the constraint is relevant iff the right-hand side is larger than 0, that is,
whenever
θF <
δ∆− 2cs
1− δ .
3. screen, lend to θS = θ¯S-types only
Note that this can be the most profitable deviation iff θF−∆ ≤ 0 as otherwise
lending to θS =
¯
θS-types would be profitable. Furthermore, note that given
θF − ∆ ≤ 0, we only need to consider two possible deviations: r¯ = r∗ and
r¯ = 1 – any r¯ 6= r∗, r¯ < 1 implies that a negative per-loan price is obtained
for the sold issue.
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a) r¯ = 1. For this not to be profitable, we require
E[UL] = (1− r∗)θF + δr∗θF ≥ 1
2
δ(θF + ∆)− cs
⇔ r∗ ≤ (2− δ)θ
F − δ∆ + 2cs
2(1− δ)θF ,
i.e. we obtain an upper bound on the retention r∗ which is increasing in θF .
Note that the right hand side becomes small (more strict) the lower θF and
is relevant whenever
(2− δ)θF − δ∆ + 2cs
2(1− δ)θF < 1⇔ θ
F <
δ∆− 2cs
δ
.
Finally, for (2− δ)θF − δ∆ + 2cs ≤ 0⇔ θF < δ∆−2cs2−δ , no r∗ exists such that
this is not a profitable deviation.
b) r¯ = r∗. For this not to be profitable, we require
E[UL] = (1− r∗)θF + δr∗θF ≥ 1
2
[
(1− r∗)θF + δr∗(θF + ∆)]− cs
⇔ r∗ ≤ θ
F + 2cs
(1− δ)θF + δ∆ ,
which again is an upper bound on the retention r∗ which is increasing in θF ,
relevant whenever
θF + 2cs
(1− δ)θF + δ∆ < 1⇔ θ
F <
δ∆− 2cs
δ
,
and which is not possible to satisfy for θF < −2cs.
Too facilitate the analysis, the following table summarizes the constraints on r∗ as a
function of θF for an equilibrium with no screening and full lending to be sustainable.
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Constraint Value relevant iff
(C1) θF ≥ δ∆−2cs2−δ
(C2) r∗ ≤ ∆
(1−δ)θF θ
F > ∆1−δ
(C3) r∗ ≤ ∆+2cs
(1−δ)θF+δ∆ θ
F > ∆ + 2cs1−δ
(C4) r∗ ≤ (1−δ)θF+(1−δ)∆+2cs
2θF (1−δ) θ
F > ∆ + 2cs1−δ
(C5) r∗ ≤ (2−δ)θF−δ∆+2cs
2(1−δ)θF θ
F < δ∆−2csδ
(C6) r∗ ≤ θF+2cs
(1−δ)θF+δ∆ θ
F < δ∆−2csδ
(C7) r∗ ≥ 1− 2cs
δ∆−(1−δ)θF θ
F < δ∆−2cs1−δ
Note that (C1) stems from the fact that a certain deviation exists from constraint
(C5) whenever θF is below this threshold. The lower bound on r∗ is relevant only for
θF ∈ [ δ∆−2cs
2−δ ,
δ∆−2cs
1−δ
]
. For such θF , constraints (C5) and (C6) potentially yield an
upper bound on r∗.
Restrict attention to θF < δ∆−2cs
1−δ . For a no-screening equilibrium to be sustainable, we
require
1− 2cs
δ∆− (1− δ)θF︸ ︷︷ ︸
L
≤ min

θF + 2cs
(1− δ)θF + δ∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
R1
,
(2− δ)θF − δ∆ + 2cs
2(1− δ)θF︸ ︷︷ ︸
R2
 . (3.9)
Note that both R1 and R2 are increasing in θF while L is decreasing in θF . At θF =
δ∆−2cs
2−δ , we have that
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L =
δ∆− 2cs
δ∆ + (1− δ)2cs > 0 = R2
and hence that (3.9) is violated. By contrast, for θF = δ∆−2cs
1−δ , we have that
L = 0 < min

δ∆− 2δcs
(1− δ)(2δ∆− 2cs)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R1>0
,
1
2(1− δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
R2>0

and hence that (3.9) is strictly satisfied. Thus, there exists a unique cutoff κLSf charac-
terized by
1− 2cs
δ∆− (1− δ)κLSf
= min
{
κLSf + 2cs
(1− δ)κLSf + δ∆
,
(2− δ)κLSf − δ∆ + 2cs
2(1− δ)κLSf
}
. (3.10)
For θF > κLSf , a no-screening equilibrium with approval of all θ
F -type borrowers can be
supported when taking into account the lower bound on r∗(θF ) and constraints (C5)
and (C6). We still need to assess whether equilibrium existence fails whenever the lower
bound constraint (C7) is relevant along with (C3) and (C4). Note that (C2) and (C7)
can never both be relevant as ∆
1−δ >
δ∆
1−δ >
δ∆−2cs
1−δ . Suppose, however, that
∆ +
2cs
1− δ <
δ∆− 2cs
1− δ ⇔ δ >
1
2
+
2cs
∆
. (3.11)
In that case, we have to worry that equilibrium existence might fail for θF ∈ (∆ + 2cs
1−δ ,
δ∆−2cs
1−δ
)
if (C7) and the tighter constraint between (C3) and (C4) contradict each other. To as-
sess this potential issue, restrict attention to such θF and note that we can write
min

∆ + 2cs
(1− δ)θF + δ∆︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C3)
,
(1− δ)θF + (1− δ)∆ + 2cs
2v(1− δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(C4)

= min
{
∆ + 2cs
(1− δ)θF + δ∆ ,
∆ + 2cs + (1− δ)θF − δ∆
2(1− δ)θF
}
.
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Note that
∆ + 2cs
(1− δ)θF + δ∆ >
∆ + 2cs + (1− δ)θF − δ∆
2(1− δ)θF
⇔ 2(∆ + 2cs)(1− δ)θF > (∆ + 2cs + (1− δ)θF − δ∆)((1− δ)θF + δ∆)
⇔ 2(∆ + 2cs)(1− δ)θF > (∆ + 2cs)(1− δ)θF + (∆ + 2cs)δ∆ + (1− δ)2(θF )2 − δ2∆2
⇔ δ∆(δ∆−∆− 2cs) > (1− δ)θF
[
(1− δ)θF − (∆ + 2cs)
]
⇔ −δ∆((1− δ)∆ + 2cs) > (1− δ)θF
[
(1− δ)θF − (∆ + 2cs)
]
.
As we are in a range of positive θF , the right-hand side increases in θF , while the left-
hand side remains constant. At θF = δ
1−δ∆ >
δ∆−2cs
1−δ , the two sides are equal. We can
thus conclude that for θF ∈ (∆ + 2cs
1−δ ,
δ∆−2cs
1−δ
)
, (C4) is the stricter constraint (compared
to (C3)). For existence of a no-screening equilibrium in this range, we thus need to
compare (C4) and (C7) and assess whether they can simultaneously be satisfied.
To establish that an r∗ satisfying both (C4) and (C7) exists for θF ∈ (∆ + 2cs
1−δ ,
δ∆−2cs
1−δ
)
,
note that we require
(1− δ)θF + (1− δ)∆ + 2cs
2θF (1− δ) ≥ 1−
2cs
δ∆− (1− δ)θF
⇔ −(1− δ)2(θF )2 + (1− δ)θF (∆− 2cs) ≤ δ∆ [(1− δ)∆ + 2cs] (3.12)
The right-hand side is constant in θF , while the left-hand side is decreasing in θF for
θF > ∆−2cs
2(1−δ) and increasing in θ
F for θF < ∆−2cs
2(1−δ) :
∂
(−(1− δ)2(θF )2 + (1− δ)θF (∆− 2cs)) /∂θF = (1− δ) [∆− 2cs − 2(1− δ)θF ] < 0
⇔ ∆− 2cs − 2(1− δ)θF < 0⇔ θF > ∆− 2cs
2(1− δ) .
Thus, the left-hand side is maximized at θF = ∆−2cs
2(1−δ) . However, note the following:
(i) It may be the case that ∆−2cs
2(1−δ) > ∆ +
2cs
1−δ . In particular, this holds whenever
∆− 2cs
2(1− δ) > ∆ +
2cs
1− δ ⇔ (2δ − 1)∆ > 6cs.
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(ii) Suppose that (2δ − 1)∆ > 6cs. Then it follows that
∆− 2cs
2(1− δ) <
δ∆− 2cs
1− δ ⇔ 2cs < (2δ − 1)∆
also holds.39
(iii) At θF = ∆−2cs
2(1−δ) , the inequality (3.12) reduces to
(∆− 2cs)2
4
≤ δ∆ [(1− δ)∆ + 2cs] .
This may be violated. To see this, note that for cs → 0, the above inequality goes
to
∆2
4
≤ δ(1− δ)∆2 ⇔ 1
4
≤ δ(1− δ)
which is clearly violated for δ > 1
2
.
Note that if (2δ − 1)∆ ≤ 6cs, we have that ∆−2cs2(1−δ) ≤ ∆ + 2cs1−δ . As such, the left-hand
side in (3.12) is decreasing for all considered θF . Furthermore, at θF = ∆ + 2cs
1−δ , the
inequality is satisfied irrespective of δ,∆ and cs as
−(1−δ)2(θF )2+(1−δ)θF (∆−2cs) = [(1− δ)∆ + 2cs] (δ∆−4cs) < [(1− δ)∆ + 2cs]·δ∆.
As such, we can not generically establish that a no-screening equilibrium exists for
θF ∈ (∆ + 2cs
1−δ ,
δ∆−2cs
1−δ
)
. For sufficiently low screening costs, the above conditions
for non-sustainability are all satisfied. In that case, there exists an interval ΘFne ⊂(
∆ + 2cs
1−δ ,
δ∆−2cs
1−δ
)
where ∆−2cs
2(1−δ) ∈ ΘFne where no no-screening equilibrium with full ap-
proval can be supported.
Summarizing yields the following observation:
(i).(a) If δ ≤ 1
2
+ 2cs
∆
, an equilibrium with no screening exists for all θF ≥ κLSf and r∗(θF )
is constrained to be
Table 3.1: Constraints on r∗(θF ) I/II
39In fact, it holds generically for δ > 12 +
cs
∆ .
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θF r∗
θF ∈
[
θFf,LS ,
δ∆−2cs
1−δ
]
r∗ ∈
[
1− 2cs
δ∆−(1−δ)θF ,min
{
(2−δ)θF−δ∆+2cs
2(1−δ)θF ,
θF+2cs
(1−δ)θF+δ∆
}]
θF > δ∆−2cs1−δ r
∗ ∈
[
0,min
{
(1−δ)θF+(1−δ)∆+2cs
2θF (1−δ) ,
(2−δ)θF−δ∆+2cs
2(1−δ)θF ,
∆
(1−δ)θF
}]
(i).(b) If δ > 1
2
+ 2cs
∆
, but (2δ − 1)∆ ≤ 6cs or (∆−2cs)24 ≥ δ∆ [(1− δ)∆ + 2cs], an equi-
librium with no screening exists for all θF ≥ κLSf and r∗(θF ) is constrained to
be
θF r∗
θF ∈
[
θFf,LS ,
δ∆−2cs
δ
]
r∗ ∈
[
1− 2cs
δ∆−(1−δ)θF ,min
{
(2−δ)θF−δ∆+2cs
2(1−δ)θF ,
θF+2cs
(1−δ)θF+δ∆
}]
θF ∈
[
δ∆−2cs
δ ,∆ +
2cs
1−δ
]
r∗ ∈
[
1− 2cs
δ∆−(1−δ)θF , 1
]
θF ∈
[
∆ + 2cs1−δ ,
δ∆−2cs
1−δ
]
r∗ ∈
[
1− 2cs
δ∆−(1−δ)θF ,
(1−δ)θF+(1−δ)∆+2cs
2θF (1−δ)
]
θF > δ∆−2cs1−δ r
∗ ∈
[
0,min
{
(1−δ)θF+(1−δ)∆+2cs
2θF (1−δ) ,
(2−δ)θF−δ∆+2cs
2(1−δ)θF ,
∆
(1−δ)θF
}]
(ii) If (2δ − 1)∆ > 6cs and (∆−2cs)24 < δ∆ [(1− δ)∆ + 2cs], there exists an interval
ΘFne ⊂
[
∆ + 2cs
1−δ ,
δ∆−2cs
1−δ
]
such that a no-screening equilibrium fails to exist. For
other ranges of θF , restrictions on r∗(θF ) are as follows:
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θF r∗
θF ∈
[
θFf,LS ,
δ∆−2cs
δ
]
r∗ ∈
[
1− 2cs
δ∆−(1−δ)θF ,min
{
(2−δ)θF−δ∆+2cs
2(1−δ)θF ,
θF+2cs
(1−δ)θF+δ∆
}]
θF ∈
[
δ∆−2cs
δ ,∆ +
2cs
1−δ
]
r∗ ∈
[
1− 2cs
δ∆−(1−δ)θF , 1
]
θF ∈
[
∆ + 2cs1−δ ,
δ∆−2cs
1−δ
]
\ΘFne r∗ ∈
[
1− 2cs
δ∆−(1−δ)θF ,
(1−δ)θF+(1−δ)∆+2cs
2θF (1−δ)
]
θF > δ∆−2cs1−δ r
∗ ∈
[
0,min
{
(1−δ)θF+(1−δ)∆+2cs
2θF (1−δ) ,
(2−δ)θF−δ∆+2cs
2(1−δ)θF ,
∆
(1−δ)θF
}]
Table 3.2: Constraints on r∗(θF ) II/II
3.D Proof of Corollary 3.3
The range for non-existence is characterized by ΘFne ⊂
[
∆ + 2cs
1−δ ,
δ∆−2cs
1−δ
]
. An equi-
librium with screening and full approval exists on (
¯
κsf , κ¯sf ] =
(
∆ + 2cs
1−δ ,
δ∆2−cs∆
(1−δ)cs
]
by
Lemma 3.3. As
δ∆− 2cs
1− δ <
δ∆2 − cs∆
(1− δ)cs =
∆
cs
· δ∆− cs
1− δ ,
which holds as δ∆−cs
1−δ >
δ∆−2cs
1−δ and
∆
cs
> 1 given that 2cs < δ∆ ⇔ ∆cs > 2δ > 1. Thus,
if ΘFne exists such that a no-screening equilibrium can not be supported, we necessarily
have
ΘFne ⊂
(
∆ +
2cs
1− δ ,
δ∆2 − cs∆
(1− δ)cs
]
= (
¯
κsf , κ¯sf ] .
3.E Proof of Proposition 3.3
Consider first borrowers with θF such that θF ∈ [κ˜LSa , κa). These borrowers could
obtain a loan when loan sales are possible conditional on screening revealing positive
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information about θS, but not without loan sales. For these borrowers, borrower welfare
is weakly larger when loan sales are possible compared to the autarky case. To see
this, first note that a borrower’s expected utility conditional on being approved can be
expressed as
E[UB] = B − η(θF , θ¯S) ·D
and let κa and κ
LS
a be defined as before. Note that the expected utility is increasing in
θF . Furthermore, by the above restriction to the case where without loan sales, lender
behavior is such that all borrowers ask for a loan, we know that B − η(κa, θ¯S) ·D ≥ 0.
The marginal borrower who obtains a loan in the no loan sale case does in fact prefer
to obtain it conditional on screening revealing positive information. There are hence
three cases:
(i) B − η(κa, θ¯S) ·D = 0.
In this case, the marginal approved borrower with θF = κa in the no-loan sale case
is exactly indifferent between applying (and being approved) and not applying.
This implies that B − η(θF , θ¯S) · D < 0 for all borrowers with θF < κa. Even
given the introduction of loan sales, those θF -type borrowers will not apply – they
would be approved by the lender conditional on applying and screening revealing
positive information, but their expected utility would be negative. Borrower
welfare is thus unaffected by the introduction of loan sale opportunities.
(ii) B − η(κLSa , θ¯S) ·D ≥ 0
In this case, the marginal borrower with θF = κ˜LSf weakly prefers to apply – the
borrower obtains a loan conditional on screening revealing positive information,
which yields a positive expected utility for the borrower. However, this implies
that all borrowers with θF such that θF ∈ (θFa,ls, κa) strictly prefer to apply and
be approved conditional on screening revealing positive information. Borrower
welfare thus strictly increases for such borrowers.
(iii) B − η(κLSa , θ¯S) ·D < 0, but B − η(κa, θ¯S) ·D > 0
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In this case, by the same arguments as in (i) and (ii), there will be a unique
cutoff κ̂a such that borrowers with θ
F ≥ κ̂a apply and are approved conditional
on screening revealing positive information, while borrowers with θF < κ̂a refrain
from applying. Borrower welfare thus strictly increases.
Next, consider θF such that θF ∈ [κ˜LSf , κf). These borrowers may be affected as, in the
lender-preferred equilibrium, they would always obtain a loan in the presence of loan
sale opportunities, whereas they would receive a loan only conditional on screening
revealing positive information without. We have assumed that without loan sales,
the equilibrium is sustainable and borrowers ask for a loan. This implies that given
θF ∈ [κ˜LSf , κf ), we have that
E[UB] = B − η(θF , θ¯S) ·D > 0.
For each θF in this region, we have the following cases.
(i) B − (1
2
η(θF ,
¯
θS) + 1
2
η(θF , θ¯S)
) ·D < 0.
In this case, the borrowers have negative expected utility before screening. An
equilibrium with no screening is hence unsustainable as anticipating this, bor-
rowers would not ask for a loan. However, even though no screening, and full
lending is the lender-preferred equilibrium, an equilibrium with screening, partial
lending and partial loan sales is also sustainable. Compared to the no-loan sale
case, there would be no change in the approved borrowers and hence in borrower
welfare, while lender profitability increases through partial loan sales.40
(ii) B − (1
2
η(θF ,
¯
θS) + 1
2
η(θF , θ¯S)
) ·D ≥ 0
In this case, borrowers acceed to the lender preferred equilibrium as their expected
utility is weakly positive in the absence of screening. Compared to the case
without loan sale opportunities, (θS =
¯
θS)-type borrowers obtain a loan with
loan sales, whereas they would not without. While lender profitability increases,
the change in borrower surplus is ambiguous:
40We implicitly assume that the screening decision and its outcome are observable to borrowers who can
choose not to sign the loan contract if they are not screened. Otherwise, lenders would potentially
have an incentive to deviate at the screening and lending stage, which could yield a breakdown of
lending.
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(ii).(a) B − η(θF ,
¯
θS) ·D ≥ 0
In this case, (θS =
¯
θS)-type borrowers have positive expected utility. Hence,
borrower welfare increases through the change in lending standards from
screening to not screening.
(ii).(b) B − η(θF ,
¯
θS) ·D < 0
In this case, (θS =
¯
θS)-type borrowers have negative expected utility. Be-
cause the θS-type can never be inferred from the screening and lending deci-
sion, they obtain a loan, which decreases borrower welfare compared to the
no-loan sale case.
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Security Design with Interim Public
Information
Abstract
We analyze a strategic security design and trading game as in Dang, Gorton, and
Holmstro¨m (2011) but with a generalized structure of public information arrival.
In the absence of private information, optimal securities are those least affected by
interim public information. We provide conditions such that all securities traded
in equilibrium consist of multiple imperfect debt-like tranches: The tranches can
not be combined into a single tranche but, conditional on specifying positive
payoffs, individually share the feature of debt that payoffs are at the limited
liability constraint or on a flat part of the security. Endogenous tranching obtains
in the absence of private information or different risk attitudes and introduces a
misalignment in the security designer’s incentives: standard debt minimizes other
market participants’ incentives to acquire information, but debt-like tranches are
most robust to public information arrival.
4.1 Introduction
The market for collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) has been at the core of the recent
financial crisis. Global CDO issuance ballooned to 520.6 billion US Dollar in 2006 (up
from 158 billion in 2004). While issuance decreased significantly to 4.3 billion in 2009
I am indebted to my supervisors Ernst-Ludwig von Thadden and Volker Nocke for their support
and guidance throughout this project. I thank Bruno Biais, Jana Friedrichsen, Alexander Guem-
bel, Christian Michel, Andras Niedermayer, Florian Sarnetzki, Nicolas Schutz, Christoph Wolf
and Philipp Zahn for insightful discussions. I am furthermore thankful to seminar audiences in
Mannheim and Toulouse as well as participants of the ENTER Jamboree 2013 in Bruxelles and the
SFB Tr 15 Summer School on Incomplete Contracts 2012. I greatly appreciate the hospitality of
the Toulouse School of Economics where part of this research was conducted. All remaining errors
are my own.
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in the wake of the financial crisis, it has started to pick up again, reaching 13 billion
in 2011.41 From these observations and earlier episodes of financial distress it appears
that debt and debt-like security structures are at the core of these periods of distress,
but nonetheless prevail as one of of the major forms of lending in the modern financial
system.42 The structure of assets traded in financial markets has been a matter of
interest to researchers and practitioners alike. The economic literature in the past 30
years has focused on the strategic aspects of their design process. One major finding in
the literature is that standard debt contracts are optimal with respect to informational
concerns in a variety of settings (see among others Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig
(1985), Innes (1990), Nachman and Noe (1994)).
One strand of literature revolves around the information sensitivity of securities and
in particular of standard debt. Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) point out that debt
dominates equity with respect to protecting uninformed market participants from ex-
ploitation by informed ones. Hence, debt is argued to be less information sensitive
than equity. Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011) fully endogenize the security design
process. In a model of strategic security design where securities are traded, they find
that standard debt contracts are optimal. This is due to two features: Standard debt
minimizes other market participants’ incentives to acquire (costly) private information
and therefore mitigates adverse selection. Furthermore, it is most robust to interim
public information as it minimizes resale value variance.
The present article isolates the public information problem in Dang, Gorton, and Holm-
stro¨m (2011) but generalizes its information structure. We find that the securities most
robust to interim public information are composed of debt-like tranches.43 This result
nests the analysis with respect to public information in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m
(2011) as a special case: Standard debt contracts (SDCs) are composed of a single stan-
dard debt tranche - and hence in the class of contracts composed of debt-like tranches
- and are optimal if underlying distributions are ordered by the monotone likelihood
ratio property. However, we provide conditions for the non-optimality of SDCs with
respect to interim public information if the MLRP does not apply. Hence, following
41Data: Securities Industry and Financial Markets (SIFMA) press release, 2012.
42See Gorton and Metrick (2012) for a detailed overview of the role securitization plays in modern
financial systems and in particular the recent crisis.
43While we provide an exact definition later, debt-like refers to the fact that wheras these tranches
mirror the feature of debt that payoffs are either at the limited liability constraint or on a flat part
of the security, this only holds conditional on specifying positive payoffs. Debt-like tranches may
differ from debt tranches in that they do not necessarily start directly after the previous tranche
and thus lack the feature of always paying a positive amount.
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the analysis by Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011), there is a misalignment in the
interests of investors: Standard debt contracts minimize the incentive for private infor-
mation acquisition, whereas debt-like tranches - in certain cases even levered equity -
are most robust to public information arrival.
We identify conditions such that the resulting security traded is composed of multiple
imperfect debt-like tranches, where imperfect refers to the fact that combination into
a single debt tranche is not possible and thus implies multiple residuals which are
kept on the books of the issuer. This result is new in that it is not motivated by
different risk attitudes of market participants and explicitly accounts for the issuance
of multiple tranches. The literature at large typically obtains a result of tranching
where a single debt tranche (or equity tranche) is split off from a cash flow and sold
(or held), see for example DeMarzo (2005). DeMarzo (2005) shows that an informed
investor may exploit her private information best by pooling assets it acquires from an
issuer and tranching off a highly liquid standard debt tranche. This tranche can be
sold due to its low information sensitivity, with the issuer retaining the resulting equity
tranche. Our article, on the other hand, motivates tranching by showing that assets
composed of multiple debt-like tranches are most robust to interim public information
arrival. These tranches are imperfect in the sense that they can not be combined in a
single debt tranche. Hence, the issuer holds on to not one but multiple residual equity
tranches. These are kept on the books of the security issuing institution and correspond
structurally to the risk retention by sponsors of ABCP conduits as documented by
Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) and Gorton and Metrick (2012).
From a technical perspective, the result is novel because the imperfection of the tranches
implies a discontinuous optimal security structure. This is in contrast to the literature
where continuity is either imposed by restricting attention to securities monotonic in
both the payoff of the underlying cash flow and the residual held by the issuer, see for
example Biais and Mariotti (2005), or where it obtains endogenously as solution to the
security design problem (typically in the form of standard debt, see for example Innes
(1990)).44
The interaction of private and public information effects is fundamental for understand-
ing the performance of real world financial markets, particularly the CDO market in
the recent crisis. As Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011) point out, adverse infor-
mation about an asset’s value may render it more information sensitive and thus lead
44It should be noted that we obtain a condition for the non-optimality of standard debt contracts even
when continuity of the security design is imposed via dual monotonicity, see Section 4.6.4.
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to adverse selection and a collapse of trade. The present article does not address this
interaction. However, in contrast to their framework, it exhibits a basic tradeoff for the
security designer, whose incentives with respect to the public and private information
issues may be misaligned. Standard debt is not necessarily optimal with respect to
interim public information arrival.
4.1.1 Relation to the Literature
As noted in the introduction, there are multiple channels through which information
affects the security design process. Private information is a well-known issue since it
may lead to losses when trading with better informed parties. Conversely, if the seller
of a security is informed, she faces a lemons problem as in Akerlof (1970). Another
important factor is public, i.e. symmetric, information arrival since gains and losses
from information may be incurred differently. Specifically, it may be the case that de
facto gains from positive information about an asset’s value may not be fully capitalized
on due to liquidity constraints of potential trading partners. If the value losses from
negative information, however, are fully incurred, even symmetric information arrival
during the holding period affects the security design process: There is an incentive to
create securities which are robust to such public information.
Starting with the seminal papers by Diamond and Verrecchia (1981), Diamond and
Dybvig (1983) and Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), a multitude of authors has exam-
ined the effects of asymmetric information on financial markets and connected it to the
structure of traded assets. Diamond and Verrecchia (1981) focus on information aggre-
gation in markets without financial intermediaries and show that price is not always
fully revealing. Diamond and Dybvig (1983) describe how a financial intermediary can
improve the situation of agents who face idiosyncratic uncertainty by providing liquidity
irrespective of the state of the world.
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) explicitly model both uninformed and informed traders
active in a single market. They show that a financial intermediary can prevent un-
informed traders’ losses to insiders who hold private information by issuing (riskless)
debt. The concept of liquidity in this context revolves around securities or assets which
can be traded without losses to potentially better informed parties. A common feature
in the literature is the existence of debt which is motivated by its feature of low in-
formation sensitivity. Low information sensitivity refers to the concept of minimizing
the value of information. This concept has two main characteristics: On the one hand,
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in the presence of - potentially exogenous - asymmetric information in the market,
gains from exploiting the informational advantage are minimized. On the other hand,
if information has to be acquired, incentives for doing so are minimized because the
aforementioned exploitation yields minimal profits. This strand of literature, however,
takes the existence of debt as given and thus does not explicitly show how debt arises in
an endogenous fashion. While it is established that trading with debt as the financial
instrument of choice is superior (in terms of preventing losses on behalf of the unin-
formed party) to other securities, the issue of actual optimality of debt was not studied
until recently. It should be noted that in settings with costly state verification or non-
verifiable returns, studied for example by Townsend (1979), Gale and Hellwig (1985)
and Aghion and Bolton (1992), debt is shown to be optimal for issuing a security in
a primary market. The asymmetric information in these settings, however, is assumed
to be exogenous instead of arising endogenously following choices and actions of the
involved agents.
DeMarzo and Duffie (1999) analyze a security designer and issuer whose private infor-
mation results in illiquidity in the sense of a downward sloping demand curve. Standard
debt is shown to be optimal under certain conditions, primarily the existence of a uni-
form worst case, because it minimizes the value of the private information the issuer
holds. Furthermore, by retaining the resulting levered equity on its books, the issuer
gives a signal which lessens the lemons problem. This signal is credible but costly
due to the preference for cash over longterm investments. Biais and Mariotti (2005)
consider an alternative approach to the trading game. They let the issuer commit to
a price-quantity menu before private information is observed and the fraction of the
security offered is chosen. Analyzing different forms of competition amongst liquidity
suppliers, they find that debt is optimally issued because it minimizes the consequences
of adverse selection (competitive case) and mitigates the market power of the liquidity
supplier (monopolistic case).
The idea is expanded in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011) and subsequently Dang,
Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2013). Building on Dang (2008), who analyzes bargaining
with endogenous information acquisition, they show that standard debt is least infor-
mation sensitive among the class of nondecreasing securities satisfying limited liability
and nonnegativity constraints. In this sense, they extend the comparative result from
Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). Furthermore, the paper proposes an explanation for the
central role of debt in financial crises: The authors argue that a crisis is a collapse of
trade after one-sided information acquisition has been triggered. This collapse is due to
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adverse selection and hence a sharp drop in trading volume.45 In similar fashion, Yang
(2012) analyzes a game where information acquisition is no longer rigidly structured
but flexible and arrives at the same conclusion: Standard debt contracts minimize in-
centives to acquire information and therefore maximize liquidity. This result is stronger
than that of Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011) in that it holds irrespective of the
composition of the underlying asset pool, i.e. of the number of assets and the correlation
between their returns.
Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011) further show that debt is not only optimal with
respect to potential private information acquisition but also most robust to public in-
formation arrival.46 The incentives of the investor align: standard debt disincentivizes
potential trading partners to acquire information and is least sensitive to public infor-
mation arrival during the holding period.
A related literature considers the extent of information available to market participants
and whether all such information should be disclosed. Kaplan (2006) shows that it
can be efficient for a bank to commit to a policy keeping information about its risky
assets secret despite being thus forced to offer non-contingent deposit contracts only.
Pagano and Volpin (2012) in turn show that issuers of assets choose to publish coarse
instead of precise ratings to enhance liquidity in the primary market, even though this
reduces secondary market liquidity. Both articles have in common that, endogenously,
not all available information is utilized. However, these articles assume the existence
of debt.
Nonetheless, the optimality of debt for trading in both primary and secondary markets
critically relies on the structure of the public information which becomes available
between the trading periods. By altering the structure, incentives to deviate from debt
and instead move towards levered securities may come into play, thus misaligning the
incentives to minimize potential information production and to minimize the resale
value variance.
Farhi and Tirole (2012) consider a security trading game with a binary state of nature.
In this setup, tranching of securities is feasible only in the sense that they consist of a
riskless debt and a pure equity component. They provide conditions under which the
insulation effect, i.e. the effect that tranching off riskless debt protects this tranche
from liquidity risk, outweighs the trading adjuvant effect of increasing the likelihood
45This drop is due to the lemons problem.
46Technically, this result builds on earlier work by DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005).
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that the risky equity tranche is not sold. Furthermore, irrespective of the relative
weight of the two effects, tranching always works against communality of information:
Tranching deters information acquisition when it should be encouraged and encourages
it when it should be deterred. Hence, even if tranching is superior because the insulation
effect outweighs the trading adjuvant effect, it becomes undesirable once information
acquisition is endogenized. Farhi and Tirole (2012) also extend their framework to a
dynamic setting and show that liquidity is self-fulfilling. The expectation of liquidity
in future states increases liquidity in the present.
While the conclusion that tranching has socially adverse effects is seemingly opposed to
our finding that contracts composed of debt-like tranches are optimal, it is important to
note the differences in the analyses: Farhi and Tirole (2012) consider private information
and its potential acquisition whereas we are concerned with interim public information
arrival. Thus, the idea that the incentives of security designers are not aligned with
respect to the different types of information is in fact corroborated. Furthermore,
they analyze a binary outcome space as opposed to a continuum. The richer forms of
tranched securities discussed in this article are not feasible in such a setting.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 4.2 introduces the model as well as key concepts
and definitions. Section 4.3 solves the security design and trading problem after public
information has arrived, and Section 4.4 addresses the security design problem at the
initial trading stage. Section 4.5 further characterizes the optimal contract and provides
examples. Section 4.6 discusses extensions of the model and its robustness. Section 4.7
concludes.
4.2 The Model
The model is that of Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011) without private information
acquisition, but with a generalized public information structure. The framework is kept
deliberately simple to isolate the channel of public interim information in the security
design process. There are three agents in the economy: An institution (called ’bank’ or
’issuing institution’) B, an investor I and a representative agent M who represents the
market. In the absence of private information and associated information asymmetries,
the market is composed of agents willing to transfer utility across periods. The utilities
of the agents across three time periods t = 1, t = 2 and t = 3 are denoted by U i for
each agent i ∈ {B, I,M}. Utilities are given by
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UB = CB1 +
1
φ
CB2 + C
B
3
U I = CI1 + σC
I
2 + C
I
3
UM = CM2 + C
M
3 .
Cit denotes the consumption of agent i in period t and φ > 1, σ > 1 are parameters
reflecting the intertemporal difference in marginal utilities of consumption. The bank
has a (weak) preference for consumption at t = 1. Think for example of a preference
for undertaking outside investment options which require further cash. I prefers con-
sumption in period 2. Consumption is assumed to occur at the end of a given period.
At period 2, M represents agents willing to transfer consumption and therefore utility
from the second into the third period.47
The agents’ endowments are common knowledge, nonstorable and given as follows: The
bank owns a pool of assets with stochastic return X distributed on I ⊆ R+ which is
due at t = 3. For ease of notation, we restrict attention to an open interval of the
form (xL, xH) ⊂ R+, which includes (xL,∞).48 The inclusion of boundary points (if an
upper bound exists) would not alter the results as long as mass points are ruled out.
I holds an endowment of ωI at t = 1, while M holds an endowment of ωM at t = 2.
Formally, letting ω˜i = (ωi1, ω
i
2, ω
i
3) denote the endowment vector of agent i,
49
ω˜B = (0, 0, X)
ω˜I = (ωI , 0, 0)
ω˜M = (0, ωM , 0).
X is stochastic and its payoff is publicly observable at t = 3. At t = 2, information about
the distribution of X arrives: This interim public information is publicly observable
but not verifiable in the sense that it can not be contracted upon. The endowments
ωI , ωM are fixed with ωI > xL.
50 The analysis performed in the following sections
47A preference for consumption in period 3 could be introduced and would not alter the analysis per-
formed. However, the intertemporal rate of substitution is normalized to 1 to simplify expressions.
Likewise, the issuing institution is set up to be indifferent between consumption at t = 1 and t = 3
for expositional purposes.
48Hence, canonical distributions such as exponential distributions or χ2-distributions are valid.
49The remaining endowments are normalized to 0 for simplicity. Cash endowments at these points in
time would lead to first trading them before securitizing the project and trading these securities.
The problem would remain unchanged.
50If ωI ≤ xL, riskless debt with a face value lower or equal to xL can always be issued. This debt is
then unaffected by public information.
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remains unchanged if ωM is stochastic, as long as it is independent of the public news.
Finally, we assume ωI < Ef [X] to ensure that the whole project cannot be acquired
by I at t = 1. Note that since the model abstracts from private information concerns,
there is no disagreement about the value of the assets involved. Thus, the problem is
that of a (limited) number of agents who wish to shift a known amount of consumption
intertemporally. Above some threshold value of owned assets, gains from good interim
news can no longer be realized because there is no agent willing and/or liquid enough
to buy the assets for their underlying value.51 The problem corresponds to that of
Diamond-Dybvig-type models where a limited fraction of the population is patient and
therefore willing to shift a limited amount of consumption into the last period by buying
assets in the interim period, see for example Diamond and Dybvig (1983), Jacklin and
Bhattacharya (1988) and Chari and Jagannathan (1988). This results in a form of
cash-in-the-market pricing as in Allen and Gale (1994). The difference is that whereas
in Allen and Gale (1994), the price of the asset adjusts so that all of it is traded in
equilibrium, in our setup the asset/security is restructured to capture all the available
surplus. The resulting residual is then held for future consumption.
In this setup, a public planner can realize gains from trade through a simple reallocation
of endowments. For I to consume at t = 2, she needs to trade with B at t = 1 by
buying (parts of) the project. She can then sell shares in the project to M at t = 2.
When agents trade, they exchange promises contingent on the observable realization
of X. These promises are called securities. Throughout this article, securities have to
satisfy the following requirements:
Definition 4.1 A security is a mapping from a domain D ⊆ R+ into the real numbers,
s : D→ R,
that satisfies the following restrictions:
• limited liability: s(x) ≤ x for all x ∈ D
• nonnegativity: s(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ D
• nondecreasingness: ∀x1, x2 ∈ D : x1 ≥ x2 ⇒ s(x1) ≥ s(x2).
The set of securities s : D→ R satisfying these restrictions is denoted SD.
51Likewise, portfolio considerations may lead potential buyers to not wish to overinvest in the specific
security class offered. Hence, they have no incentive to buy the assets at their (conditional) expected
value above some threshold.
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For simplicity, stochastic contracts are ruled out because they make the nondecreas-
ingness requirement hard to evaluate. The nondecreasingness restriction in itself is a
standard assumption justified by a moral hazard opportunity of the issuer, see for exam-
ple Innes (1990). As in Innes (1990) and different than for example Biais and Mariotti
(2005), we only impose nondecreasingness and not dual monotonicity, i.e. that both
the security’s payoff s(x) and the payoff of the residual x − s(x) are nondecreasing.
In fact, in contrast to the standard debt contract derived as the optimal contract in
Innes (1990) and Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011), our resulting optimal security
structure explicitly violates nondecreasingness of the residual. We nonetheless feel com-
fortable with this assumption.52 The main moral hazard opportunity which impacts the
security design process in our setting is the upward distortion on behalf of the issuer.
Consider for example a collection of mortgages and let X be the (uncertain) aggregate
repayment. It may be feasible to declare certain unpaid mortgages as repaid. While
the issuer would lose out on the true repayment in that case, she might be better off
were the security decreasing in the underlying aggregate return. Other moral hazard
opportunities seem less plausible, however, in particular the ones which would lead to
imposing dual monotonicity: Once an individual repayment has been made, the re-
sulting paper trail makes it impossible for the issuer to hide it, i.e. to distort the true
repayment downward. Likewise, an upward distortion on behalf of the security acquirer
would require her to find individual mortgage holders and supply them with cash to use
for mortgage repayment. Nonetheless, subsequent to our analysis, we discuss how the
resulting security structure would change if dual monotonicity were imposed instead of
nondecreasingness: The key result that standard debt is not necessarily optimal carries
over to such a setting.53
Pooling of securities based on different projects, i.e. X1, X2, is not included in the
model and explicitly ruled out at t = 2.54 However, the random endowment X can be
interpreted as a collection of different assets/securities. Similarly, the setup does not
rule out tranching. Since all agents in the model have constant marginal utilities of
consumption in any given period, they can be thought of as representing an arbitrarily
large number of identical agents who hold an endowment with an aggregate endowment
52As DeMarzo, Kremer, and Skrzypacz (2005) note, ’a standard motivation for dual monotonicity is
that, if it did not hold, parties would ”sabotage” the project and destroy output. [...] Whether
revenues can be distorted in this way depends on the context.’
53See Section 4.6.4.
54Allowing pooling of securities depending on correlated underlying payoffs would affect the results.
However, the main idea that individual securities should minimize resale value variance subject to
the public information still factors into the security design process. See Section 4.6.2 for a more
detailed discussion.
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equal to what is represented in the model by ωI (in case of I) and ωM (in case of
M) respectively. If that is the case, any tranching which overall still satisfies limited
liability can also be represented by a single contract.55 In interpreting the results,
it is sometimes natural to think of the ’optimal’ security as composed of different
tranches which are sold separately to interchangeable market participants with identical
intertemporal substitution rates.
The timing of the game is as follows: At t = 1, I makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the
bank. This offer consists of a security s conditional on the return of X at t = 3 which
she is willing to buy, and a price p which she pays in exchange. At t = 2, a public
signal regarding the distribution of X is revealed to all agents. Then, I may make a
take-it-or-leave-it offer to agent M . This offer consists of a security sˆ conditional on
the return of s (and hence of X), and a price pˆ. We assume that the bargaining power
lies in the hand of the investor in both stages. This, coupled with the assumption
that marginal utility is constant, is made to isolate the security design process with
respect to arriving public information.56 The second trading stage is only relevant if
trade occurred at t = 1. Furthermore, the limited liability constraint imposes that
sˆ(x) ≤ s(x) for all x ∈ I.
We do not allow contracts between I and M to be written before the public information
is realized. This is due to two reasons: On the one hand, allowing such contracts would
render the problem posed by the interim information irrelevant. It would be ex-ante
optimal and incentive compatible to agree to always trade s in exchange for a cash
payment of Ef [s(x)] at t = 2 irrespective of the public information.
57 This would allow
agents to realize the maximum gains from trade subject to participation constraints.
However, this requires perfect anticipation of I being a seller at t = 2. To rationalize our
setup where contracting is only feasible after information arrival, consider the following
variation: Let I be patient with probability α ∈ (0, 1). If I is patient, she prefers
consumption at t = 3 and will hold the security instead of trading with M . With
probability (1 − α), our current setup arises and I is impatient. For α large enough,
the ’losses’ from writing an ex-ante contract and being patient outweigh the ’benefits’
55Consider for example the issuance of two securities contingent on X, s1(x) and s2(x) with
s1(x) + s2(x) ≤ x, ∀x ∈ (xL, xH), which are also nondecreasing. Due to the constant marginal
utilities of consumption and the unique trading partner (see above), this is equivalent to issuing
a single security s(x) = s1(x) + s2(x),∀x ∈ (xL, xH), which will still satisfy limited liability and
nondecreasingness.
56In this particular game, the security design problem remains identical as long as the investor has at
least some bargaining power in the first trading stage.
57This holds whenever ωI = Ef [s(x)] ≤ ωM . Otherwise, it would be optimal to design sˆ satisfying
limited liability with respect to s and trade sˆ for Ef [sˆ(x)] = ω
M .
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of having such a contract in place when impatient. Hence, only in the impatient case,
a security design problem arises and in particular follows the setup of our model.
Ex ante, X is distributed randomly on I with density f(x), cumulative distribution
function F (x) and finite mean
∫
I xdF (x) < ∞. To model information arrival, let f be
a mixture distribution, i.e. let λ ∈ (0, 1) and
f(x) = λf1(x) + (1− λ)f2(x) (4.1)
where f1 and f2 are strictly positive densities.
58 The public signal arriving at t = 2
reveals the true distribution, i.e. whether X is distributed according to f1 or according
to f2. All distributions are common knowledge, as well as λ. The public information is
not verifiable, i.e. securities can not be made contingent on the realization of the public
signal. Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011) order the underlying distributions by
imposing the monotone likelihood ratio property, i.e. that f1(x)/f2(x) is monotone in x.
We generalize the condition by imposing ordering via first order stochastic dominance:
FOSD: ∀x ∈ (xL, xH) : F1(x) ≥ F2(x). (4.2)
For densities, first order stochastic dominance nests the monotone likelihood ratio prop-
erty. Hence, if the monotone likelihood ratio property holds, first order stochastic
dominance is also satisfied, whereas the reverse is not necessarily true. Note that for
nondecreasing securities, first order stochastic dominance implies that
∀s : Ef1 [s(x)] ≤ Ef [s(x)] ≤ Ef2 [s(x)]. (4.3)
To sum up, this is the timeline of the game in extensive form:
t = 1.0: I makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (s, p) to B
t = 1.1: issuer B accepts the contract (s, p) or not
t = 2.0: distribution Fi, i = 1, 2 is publicly observed
t = 2.1: I makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer (sˆ, pˆ) to M
58The strict positivity facilitates but does not qualitatively change the analyses. It allows for certain
existence and uniqueness statements to be made without accounting for the special case of f(·)
being locally zero.
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t = 2.2: agent M accepts the contract (sˆ, pˆ) or not
t = 3.0: x is realized and publicly observed, I is paid s(x), M is paid sˆ(x).
4.2.1 Concepts and Definitions
There are several classes of securities which play an important role in the subsequent
analysis. One such class is that of standard debt contracts. Standard debt contracts are
contracts which pay out according to the limited liability constraint up to their face
value; in case the realization of the underlying cash flow exceeds this value, the payoff
is capped. Formally, the following definition captures this idea.
Definition 4.2 A standard debt contract (SDC) on an interval I ⊆ R+ is given by
sSDC(x;D) = min{x,D}
where D ≥ 0 is the face value of the debt contract.
Note that if ∀x ∈ I : D ≥ x, sSDC corresponds to an equity contract
sSDC(x;D) = x.
return x
payoff
sSDC(x;D)
Standard Debt Contract
D
Figure 4.1: Standard Debt Contract
A second class of securities which is important for our analysis is the class of levered
equity contracts. levered equity contracts only pay out if the payoff of the underlying
cash flow exceeds a certain threshold (L), but then pay up to the limited liability
constraint. Formally, this is captured by the following definition.
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Definition 4.3 A levered equity contract (LE) on an interval I ⊆ R+ is given by
sLE(x;L) = x · Ix≥L
where L is the equity cutoff.
return x
payoff sLE(x;L)
L
Figure 4.2: Levered Equity Contract
Given ωI < Ef [x] and the strict positivity of densities f1 and f2, there exists a unique
face value D (a unique equity cutoff L) such that the induced expected value of the
standard debt contract (levered equity contract) is equal to ωI . This is captured by
Lemma 4.1.
Lemma 4.1 For any given ωI < Ef [X], there exists a unique D(ω
I) such that
Ef [s
SDC(x;D(ωI))] = ωI .
Likewise, there exists a unique L(ωI) such that
Ef [s
LE(x;L(ωI))] = ωI .
As stated above, the proof follows immediately from the strict positivity of densities
and is thus omitted.
Another important class of contracts are what we denote contracts composed of debt-like
tranches.
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Definition 4.4 A contract composed of debt-like tranches is characterized by a strictly
increasing sequence {xi}Ni=1 ∈ (xL, xH) of points and a strictly increasing sequence
{Di}Ni=1 ∈ R+ of face values where
xi > Di−1∀i ≥ 2.
The contract sTD is then characterized by the following payoff structure:
sTD(x) =

0 for x < x1
min{x,Di} if x ∈ (xi, xi+1), i < N
min{x,DN} if x ∈ (xN , xH)
whenever N is finite, and
sTD(x) =

0 for x < x1
min{x,Di} if x ∈ (xi, xi+1), i < N
min{x,D} if x ≥ supj xj
otherwise, where D = supj Dj if the supremum exists and D = +∞ otherwise.59 At all
points of the sequence {xi}, the payoff is arbitrary but has to be consistent with limited
liability and nondecreasingness of sTD.
Contracts composed of debt-like tranches have payoffs either on the 45 degree line
s(x) = x, which corresponds to binding limited liability, or on a flat part of the security,
up to pointwise deviations with measure 0. However, they differ from regular debt
contracts in that the tranches are imperfect. Contracts which satisfy the definition are
of the following form (here an example with two tranches)
s(x) =

0 for x ∈ (xL, x1)
min{x,D1} for x ∈ [x1, x2)
min{x,D2} for x ∈ [x2, xH)
where D2 > D1 and x2 > D1. This security is the sum of the two tranches:
sDT1(x) =
{
0 for x ∈ (xL, x1)
min{x,D1} for x ∈ [x1, xH)
59Hence, the last tranche is a levered equity tranche in that case.
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sDT2(x) =
{
0 for x ∈ (xL, x2)
min{x,D2} −D1 for x ∈ [x2, xH).
return x
payoff
xL x1 x2 xH
sDT (x)
Senior Debt-Like Tranche sDT1
Junior Debt-Like Tranche sDT2
Figure 4.3: Canonical Contract Composed of Debt-Like Tranches
sDT2 in the example is a junior tranche: It pays out only for high realizations of x, and
thus only after sDT1 , the senior tranche, has been paid in full.
From the above definitions, it is clear that any standard debt contract - as well as any
levered equity contract - is also composed of debt-like tranches, but the reverse does
not hold. Furthermore, the contracts differ with respect to the concept of leverage.
Definition 4.5 A nondecreasing security s on the interval (xL, xH) is levered if
∃x, xˆ ∈ (xL, xH) such that s(x) < x ∧ s(x) < s(xˆ).
Leverage refers to the idea of speculating on high returns. A security is levered if it
does not pay up to the limited liability constraint for certain values, but then has a
higher payoff for higher realizations of the underlying cash flow. By increasing the
payoff where limited liability is not binding, this dependability on high returns can be
mitigated.
The only non-levered contracts are standard debt contracts, whereas contracts com-
posed of debt-like tranches which are not simultaneously standard debt are levered. As
Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011) have shown, leverage leads to higher incentives
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for private information acquisition.
We will show that contracts composed of debt-like tranches are optimal with respect
to interim public information arrival. This introduces a tradeoff in the investor’s incen-
tives: the investor wishes to buy a standard debt contract to avoid private information
acquisition by his potential trading partners and prefers debt-like tranches due to their
robustness to interim public information.
4.3 Security Design and Trading after Information
Arrival
To solve for an equilibrium of the game, we first determine the optimal security designed
and issued after public information arrival at t = 2. At t = 2, the bank B and
representative market agent M cannot profitably trade. Thus, trade may only occur
if I possesses some security s acquired from B at t = 1. She may either sell or use
this security as collateral for a new security which is offered to M at t = 2. Since all
information is public, trade can only occur at a price equal to the common conditional
expected value of the offered security.60 Hence, the optimal strategy for I depends on
the relation of the updated value of s after public information to the market endowment
ωM .
Lemma 4.2 Suppose I holds a security s at t = 2 after the arrival of the public infor-
mation. Any security sˆ which is in equilibrium traded to M satisfies:
(i) If E[s(x)|fi] ≤ ωM : sˆ(x) = s(x) for all x ∈ (xL, xH).
(ii) If E[s(x)|fi] > ωM : E[sˆ(x)|fi] = ωM and sˆ(x) ≤ s(x) for all x ∈ (xL, xH).
sˆ is sold to M at its conditional expected value pˆ = E[sˆ|fi].
One particular sˆ(x) which can implement this for E[s(x)|fi] > ωM is
sˆ(x) = τs(x) for all x ∈ (xL, xH) where τ = ω
M
E[s(x)|fi] .
60Recall that the bargaining power lies with I and that M is indifferent between consumption at t = 2
and t = 3.
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Lemma 4.2 follows immediately from the fact that I makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
M and has preference for consumption at t = 2. Intuitively, if the asset is worth weakly
less than the market endowment ωM , it is optimal for I to sell the whole security to
maximize consumption at t = 2. If the endowment constraint binds, I sells a security
that is worth strictly less than E[s(x)|fi]. This new security sˆ must satisfy limited
liability with respect to s and E[sˆ|fi] = ωM to maximize consumption at t = 2. In this
case, I holds on to the residual security (s − sˆ) and consumes this remainder - if it is
positive - at t = 3 after the realization of X becomes observable and s, sˆ pay out.
Lemma 4.2 greatly simplifies the analysis of the security design problem faced by I at
t = 1. It allows to write the expected utility of I, given that she acquires a security s
at t = 1, as follows:
EU(s) = ωI − Ef [s(x)] + λ
(
σmin {Ef1 [s(x)], ωM}+ max
{
Ef1 [s(x)]− ωM , 0
})
+(1− λ) (σmin{Ef2 [s(x)], ωM}+ max{Ef2 [s(x)]− ωM , 0}) (4.4)
= ωI + (σ − 1) (λmin{Ef1 [s(x)], ωM}+ (1− λ) min{Ef2 [s(x)], ωM})(4.5)
where we have used Ef [s(x)] = λEf1 [s(x)]+(1−λ)Ef2 [s(x)] and Ef1 [s(x)] ≤ Ef [s(x)] ≤
ωI . As σ > 1, utility is weakly increasing in both Ef1 [s(x)] and Ef2 [s(x)]. Thus, it
is weakly optimal for I to exhaust her endowment at t = 1, i.e. to acquire a security
valued Ef [s(x)] = ω
I at t = 1.
Furthermore, gains from trade may be limited by the friction of a limited endowment
ωM of M at t = 2. In (4.5), this is captured by min
{
Ef1 [s(x)], ω
M
}
in the bad
state and min
{
Ef2 [s(x)], ω
M
}
in the good state respectively. As only nondecreasing
securities are considered and since f1 and f2 are ordered by first order stochastic,
Ef1 [s(x)] ≤ Ef2 [s(x)] holds for all s. Thus, a binding endowment constraint in the bad
state, min
{
Ef1 [s(x)], ω
M
}
= ωM , implies a binding endowment constraint in the good
state, i.e. min
{
Ef2 [s(x)], ω
M
}
= ωM . The reverse, however, is not necessarily true.
Consider two securities s1, s2 with the same unconditional expected value Ef [s1(x)] =
Ef [s2(x)] = k, but with differing conditional expected values, i.e. Ef1 [s1(x)] 6= Ef1 [s2(x)].
Without loss of generality suppose Ef1 [s1(x)] < Ef1 [s2(x)] and therefore Ef2 [s1(x)] >
Ef2 [s2(x)] ≥ Ef1 [s2(x)]. Then
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EU(s2)− EU(s1)
= ωI + (σ − 1) (λmin{Ef1 [s2(x)], ωM}+ (1− λ) min{Ef2 [s2(x)], ωM})
− ωI + (σ − 1) (λmin{Ef1 [s1(x)], ωM}+ (1− λ) min{Ef2 [s1(x)], ωM})
= (σ − 1) [(λmin{Ef1 [s2(x)], ωM}+ (1− λ) min{Ef2 [s2(x)], ωM})
− (λmin{Ef1 [s1(x)], ωM}+ (1− λ) min{Ef2 [s1(x)], ωM})] . (4.6)
It follows that EU(s1) ≤ EU(s2), i.e. that the security with the higher expected value
under bad information leads to a weakly higher expected utility. If ωM ≤ Ef1 [s1(x)],
the endowment constraint binds for both securities in both states and expected utilities
are equal. Likewise, if ωM ≥ Ef2 [s1(x)], the constraint never binds and both securities
capture the full surplus. However, if
Ef1 [s1(x)] < ω
M < Ef2 [s1(x)], (4.7)
it follows that EU(s1) < EU(s2), because
Case 1: ωM < Ef1 [s2(x)]
EU(s2)− EU(s1)
(4.6),(4.7)
= (σ − 1) [λωM + (1− λ)ωM − λEf1 [s1(x)]− (1− λ)ωM]
= (σ − 1)λ(ωM − Ef1 [s1(x)])
(4.7)
> 0.
Case 2: Ef1 [s2(x)] ≤ ωM ≤ Ef2 [s2(x)]
EU(s2)− EU(s1)
(4.6),(4.7)
= (σ − 1) [λEf1 [s2(x)] + (1− λ)ωM − λEf1 [s1(x)]− (1− λ)ωM] (4.8)
= (σ − 1)λ(Ef1 [s2(x)]− Ef1 [s1(x)]) > 0.
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Case 3: Ef2 [s2(x)] < ω
M
EU(s2)− EU(s1)
(4.6),(4.7)
= (σ − 1) [λEf1 [s2(x)] + (1− λ)Ef2 [s2(x)]− λEf1 [s1(x)]− (1− λ)ωM]
= (σ − 1) (k − λEf1 [s1(x)]− (1− λ)ωM) > 0
Thus, the following holds for the expected utility of the investor, EU(s):
• Expected utility is increasing in the unconditional expected value Ef [s(x)].
• Holding fixed the unconditional expected value, expected utility is increasing in
the expected value after bad information, Ef1 [s(x)].
Therefore, it is always optimal for I to design and acquire a security s from the bank
which exhausts I’s endowment ωI at t = 1 and which has maximal value after bad
interim information among this set of securities. Formally, solutions to the following
(equivalent) problems are maximizers of I’s expected utility.
(P1) max
s∈SI
Ef1 [s(x)] s.t. λEf1 [s(x)] + (1− λ)Ef2 [s(x)] = ωI
or equivalently
(P2) min
s∈SI
Ef2 [s(x)] s.t. λEf1 [s(x)] + (1− λ)Ef2 [s(x)] = ωI .
Denote SI,ωI ≡ {s ∈ SI such that Ef [s(x)] = ωI}. Then it holds that a solution to
(P1) max
s∈SI,ωI
Ef1 [s(x)]
exists (and hence also a solution to (P2)).
Proposition 4.1 There exists a solution to (P1), i.e.
∃s∗ ∈ SI,ωI : Ef1 [s∗(x)] ≥ Ef1 [s(x)] for all s ∈ SI,ωI .
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The proof for Proposition 4.1 is relegated to the appendix. It can be shown that (P1)
corresponds to the maximization of a continuous mapping from the convex and closed
set SI,ωI into the real numbers. Hence, a maximum is attained on this set.
As noted above, incentives for I are such that acquiring a solution to (P1) at t = 1 is
an equilibrium strategy. Nonetheless, it may be possible that securities which do not
solve (P1) can be traded in equilibrium. The following proposition yields conditions
under which this applies only to solutions to (P1).
Proposition 4.2 Denote Ef1 [s
∗(x)] and Ef2 [s
∗(x)] the expected value of a solution s∗
to (P1) under bad information and good information respectively. If
(i) Ef2 [s
∗(x)] ≥ ωM ≥ ωI or
(ii) Ef1 [s
∗(x)] ≤ ωM ≤ ωI
then only solutions to (P1) are traded in equilibrium at t = 1. Otherwise, there is
multiplicity in the sense that securities with different (state-contingent) expected values
may be issued at t = 1.
The proof is relegated to the appendix. There are parameterizations such that the set
of securities which may be traded at t = 1 in equilibrium consists only of solutions to
(P1). These parameterizations capture economically relevant problems: Unless ωM is
very high or very low, the conditions of Proposition 4.2 are satisfied.
If ωM is high, the security design problem becomes less interesting because many secu-
rities allow a full realization of gains from trade by never inducing a binding endowment
constraint. If ωM is low, any security exhausting the constraint in both states captures
the realizable surplus. The problem is again less interesting because many securities
have this characteristic. Even in cases where the conditions of Proposition 4.2 do not
apply, however, trading solutions to (P1) at t = 1 constitutes equilibrium behavior.
Nonetheless, multiplicity not only in securities (there may be different securities solving
(P1)) but also in state-contingent expected values arises.
For example, in the case of Ef1 [s
∗(x)] > ωM , a security sˆ with Ef [sˆ(x)] < ωI can be
issued at t = 1 in equilibrium as long as Ef1 [sˆ(x)] ≥ ωM , i.e. as long as it exhausts the
endowment of M at t = 2 in both states.
Henceforth, we will focus on characterizing solutions to (P1) and assume that condition
(i) or (ii) from Proposition 4.2 is satisfied.
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To illustrate the impact of the generalized information structure in contrast to Dang,
Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011), consider what happens if the two underlying distri-
butions have an identical upper tail. This is not possible under the MLRP restriction
except for the trivial case f1 = f2, i.e. the case without uncertainty about the distri-
bution (and hence an uninformative public signal), but covered by the assumption of
FOSD. If f1 and f2 possess a common upper tail, levered securities may be traded in
equilibrium because they allow for zero value variance. Their value is not affected by
the interim public revelation of the true distribution; positive payoffs occur only on the
(common) upper tail of the distributions.
Proposition 4.3 If the two distributions f1 and f2 have an identical upper tail, i.e. if
there exists x¯ ∈ I such that
∀x > x¯ : f1(x) = f2(x) = f(x)
and if ωI ≤ ∫ xH
x¯
xdF (x), then any security s∗ with
s∗(x) = 0 for x ∈ (xL, x¯)
and
Ef [s
∗(x)] = ωI
solves (P1). One such security is the levered equity contract
sLE(x;L(ωI)) = x · Ix≥L(ωI).
The Proposition follows from the fact that specifying positive payoffs only on the com-
mon upper tail induces zero resale value variance. Due to (FOSD), securities with zero
resale value variance always solve (P1).61 This yields leverage of the traded securities.
Leverage, however, implies an incentive asymmetry for the security designer in the
Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011) setting: Non-levered standard debt is optimal
with respect to private information, whereas levered securities are perfectly robust to
interim public information.
The following section presents the general security design problem faced by I at t = 1.
61Typically, such securities do not exist - otherwise, the problem would be trivial. However, they exist
for the given restrictions due to the common high tail and upper bound on ω. L(ωI) ≥ x¯ follows
from this upper bound.
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4.4 The Security Design Problem
As noted before, securities are optimal and thus designed and traded at t = 1 if they
are solutions to the problems (P1) and (P2). In the following, we establish that there
always exists a solution to (P1) (and thus also to (P2)) which is contract composed
of debt-like tranches. Moreover, we provide conditions such that all solutions to (P1)
satisfy this property. If the conditions from Proposition 4.2 are satisfied, this implies
that only debt-like tranches are issued and traded in equilibrium at t = 1.
A key role in the analysis is played by the likelihood ratio f1(·)/f2(·). The analysis in
this section proceeds as follows: First, a solution to (P1) is established under specific
global requirements on the behavior of the likelihood ratio, including the decreasing
likelihood case solved in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011). Second, it is shown
that certain local variations of solutions to (P1) do not affect global nondecreasingness
and limited liability while preserving optimality. This is utilized in the proof of the
main proposition: It can be shown that there always exists a solution to (P1) which
are composed of debt-like tranches by breaking the global problem on (xL, xH) ≡ I down
into local ones where the solution is known to be a debt-like tranche. Moreover, under
certain conditions on the underlying distributions f1 and f2, all optimal securities, i.e.
all securities solving (P1), are composed of debt-like tranches.
The following lemma plays an important rule in the subsequent analysis.
Lemma 4.3 Consider two intervals A,B ⊂ I with ∫
A∩B 1dF (x) = 0 and securities
s1, s2. Suppose that for all x ∈ A, s1(x) ≥ s2(x) and that for all x ∈ B, s1(x) ≤ s2(x).
If ∃k ∈ R+ such that
(i)
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF1(x) ≤ k
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF2(x)
(ii)
∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF1(x) ≥ k
∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF2(x) and
(iii)
∫
A∪B s1(x)dF (x) =
∫
A∪B s2(x)dF (x)
then
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(iv)
∫
A∪B
s1(x)dF1(x) ≤
∫
A∪B
s2(x)dF1(x).
If (i) or (ii) holds strictly, so does (iv).
Henceforth, proofs are relegated to the appendix. Lemma 4.3 states the following:
Suppose that two securities have the same expected value on the union of disjoint
intervals A,B under the mixture distribution f . Furthermore, suppose that s1 lies
weakly above s2 on A and s2 weakly above s1 on B. If the ratio of the expected values
of the difference s1−s2 on A under bad information (i.e. f1 being the true distribution)
to that under good information (f2) is weakly (strictly) lower than the ratio of the
expected values of the difference s2 − s1 on B under bad information to that under
good information, then s2 has a weakly (strictly) higher expected value on A∪B under
bad information than s1. The idea is that unconditionally, decreasing s1 to s2 on A and
simultaneously increasing s1 to s2 on B does not change the expected value. However,
of the change in expected value on A, less is attributed to a change in the expected
value under bad information than of the change on B. Therefore, s2 yields a higher
overall expected value under bad information and conversely a lower one under good
information than s1.
The following lemma corresponds to Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011)’s proposi-
tion about the optimality of standard debt contracts whenever f1(x)/f2(x) is weakly
decreasing in x.
Lemma 4.4 Let f1(x)/f2(x) be weakly decreasing in x on I. Then one security solving
(P1) is the standard debt contract
sSDC(x;D(ωI)) = min{x,D(ωI)}.
If f1(x)/f2(x) is strictly decreasing, then the standard debt contract s
SDC(x;D(ωI)) is
the (up to pointwise deviations) unique security solving (P1).
Intuitively, the standard debt contract sSDC(x;D(ωI)) with Ef [s
SDC(x;D(ωI))] = ωI
is optimal because it puts as much of the security payoff on the lower returns of X as
possible. By the MLRP, the relative likelihood of payoffs is decreasing in the realized
value of the underlying cash flow. Therefore, this maximizes expected payoff under bad
information, i.e. whenever f1 is the true distribution.
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As argued previously, the assumption of a decreasing monotone likelihood ratio is re-
strictive. For example, following Proposition 4.3, for distributions with a common
upper tail levered contracts are optimal. The following lemma and its corollary capture
the optimality of levered equity (debt) - in a sense the counterpart to standard debt
- whenever the likelihood ratio is increasing instead. Thus, solutions to the extreme
cases of global behavior of f1(·)/f2(·) are obtained. These are later utilized by relating
a global problem without these restrictions to multiple local problems for which the
solution has been characterized.
Lemma 4.5 Let f1(x)/f2(x) be weakly increasing in x on I. Then one security solving
(P1) is the levered equity contract
sLE(x, L(ωI)) = x · Ix≥L(ωI).
If f1(x)/f2(x) is strictly increasing, then the levered equity contract s
LE(x, L(ωI)) is the
(up to pointwise deviations) unique security solving (P1).
Corollary 4.1 Let f1(x)/f2(x) be weakly increasing in x on I. Then one security
solving the modified problem (P1*) including an upper bound u
(P1*) max
s∈SI
Ef1 [s(x)] s.t. λEf1 [s(x)] + (1− λ)Ef2 [s(x)] = ωI
s(x) ≤ u for all x ∈ I,
where
ωI ≤
∫
I
min[x, u]dF (x),
is the levered debt contract
sLD(x;L(ωI), u) = min{x, u} · Ix≥L(ωI)
where L(ωI) is uniquely determined by Lemma 4.1. If f1(x)/f2(x) is strictly increasing,
then the levered debt contract is the (up to pointwise deviations) unique security solving
(P1*).
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Lemma 4.4, Lemma 4.5 and Corollary 4.1 are statements about how global behavior of
f1(·)/f2(·) on I impacts the solution to (P1). If the likelihood ratio f1(·)/f2(·) is weakly
decreasing, standard debt solves (P1). In the case of an increasing likelihood ratio
f1(·)/f2(·), levered equity or, if an upper bound for the security payoffs is specified,
levered debt are solutions.62 Note that an increasing likelihood ratio is inconsistent
with F1(·) being first order stochastically dominated by F2(·) except for the case of
f1 = f2 = f , i.e. the case where there is no uncertainty about the distribution. It
nonetheless is essential for further analysis: If f1(·)/f2(·) is locally increasing on some
interval (ξ1, ξ2) ⊂ I, the problem on this interval can be transformed into one where
Lemma 4.5 and/or the following corollary applies. Such a transformation also applies
if f1(·)/f2(·) is locally decreasing. Hence, Lemma 4.4, Lemma 4.5 and Corollary 4.1
provide the foundation for the following two observations:
Lemma 4.6 Suppose that f1(x)/f2(x) is weakly decreasing in x on (x, x) ⊂ I. Let s be
an optimal security solving (P1) on (xL, xH) ≡ I. Denote e ≡
∫ x
x
s(x)dF (x).
Define
s∗(x) =
{
s(x) if x /∈ (x, x)
sˆ(x) if x ∈ (x, x)
with
sˆ(x;D(e)) = min{x,D(e)}
where D(e) is the by Lemma 4.1 unique solution to∫ x
x
sˆ(x)dF (x) = e.
s∗ is then also a solution to (P1). Furthermore, s∗ is globally (i.e. on (xL, xH))
nondecreasing and incorporates a debt-like tranche on (x, x).
Lemma 4.7 Suppose that f1(x)/f2(x) is weakly increasing in x on (x, x) ⊂ I. Let s be
an optimal security solving (P1) on (xL, xH) ≡ I. Denote e ≡
∫ x
x
s(x)dF (x).
Define
62The restriction ωI ≤ ∫I min[x, u]dF (x) ensures that there is a security s ∈ SI which satisfies
Ef [s(x)] = ω
I and the constraint s(x) ≤ u.
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s∗(x) =
{
s(x) if x /∈ (x, x)
sˆ(x) if x ∈ (x, x)
with
sˆ(x) =
{
s(x) if x < L
min{x,D} if x ≥ L
where
D = sup
ξ∈(x,x)
s(ξ)
and L(e) is the by Lemma 4.1 unique solution to∫ x
x
sˆ(x)dF (x) = e.
s∗ is then also a solution to (P1). Furthermore, s∗ is globally nondecreasing (i.e. on
(xL, xH)) and incorporates a debt-like tranche on (x, x).
Intuitively, Lemma 4.6 and Lemma 4.7 state that even if a security s is locally incon-
sistent with debt-like tranches, there exists a variation sˆ which is a debt-like tranche
on this local interval. Furthermore, the security s∗ which is equal to s everywhere but
the local interval (x, x), and equal to sˆ on that interval, is globally nondecreasing on
I and satisfies the limited liability and nonnegativity constraints. If s is a solution, s∗
also solves (P1).
We are now able to state the main Proposition of this article: Proposition 4.4 asserts
that if a solution to (P1) exists, there also exists a solution which is composed of debt-
like tranches. Furthermore, if the densities f1(·) and f2(·) are continuous and never
proportional on any interval, any solution s to (P1) satisfies the property: In that
case, any security designed and issued in equilibrium at t = 1 is composed of debt-like
tranches.
Proposition 4.4 Let s be a security solving (P1) on (xL, xH) ≡ I. Then the following
statements hold:
(i) There exists a valid security s∗ which is also a solution to (P1) on (xL, xH) ≡ I
and is composed of debt-like tranches.
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(ii) If f1(x) and f2(x) are continuous and never proportional, i.e. if
∀(ξ1, ξ2) ⊆ I : ∀k ∈ R+∃x ∈ (ξ1, ξ2) : f1 6= kf2
then s is composed of debt-like tranches.
The nonproportionality condition 4.4.(ii) requires that the likelihood ratio is never
constant on any interval in I. It is satisfied by most canonical distributions, including
the class of exponential distributions with different rate parameters λ, the class of χ2-
distributions with different degrees of freedom, and the class of F (d1, d2)-distributions
with fixed d2 and varying d1. Furthermore, it is easy to evaluate given parameterizations
of f1 and f2.
The intuition for the result is as follows: Any interval where the solution s to (P1) is
inconsistent with debt-like tranches can be decomposed into intervals where f1(·)/f2(·)
is weakly decreasing and weakly increasing respectively, up to points with measure zero.
On these intervals, local changes preserving optimality exist by Lemmata 4.6 and 4.7.
These changes yield a security s∗ which is optimal and locally composed of debt-like
tranches. Furthermore, if continuity and local nonproportionality of densities hold,
any interval where a solution s to (P1) is inconsistent with debt-like tranches can be
decomposed into intervals where f1(·)/f2(·) is strictly decreasing and strictly increasing
respectively. On these intervals, however, a local transformation exists which increases
the expected payoff under bad information. This would violate optimality of s, thus
implying that s must have been composed of debt-like tranches.
4.5 Characterization of Contracts Composed of
Debt-Like Tranches
This section provides additional structure for the optimal contracts (under certain con-
ditions) and further presents examples of optimal securities given specific parameteri-
zations of f1, f2.
The following Proposition provides a condition such that the contract solving (P1)
includes a standard debt tranche.
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Proposition 4.5 Suppose that for all x ∈ I it holds that F1(x) > F2(x). Let local
nonproportionality and continuity of densities be satisfied. Then any solution s to (P1)
satisfies
∀x ∈ I : s(x) > xL.
Thus, s includes a standard debt tranche.
∀x ∈ I : s(x) > xL implies inclusion of a standard debt tranche because local nonpropor-
tionality establishes that any solution is composed of debt-like tranches. The condition
of strong FOSD on the interior of I , F1(x) > F2(x), is satisfied by most canonical dis-
tributions, including the aforementioned exponential distributions, χ2-distributions and
F-distributions. Furthermore, as can be seen in Example 4.2 below, if F1(x) = F2(x)
for some x ∈ I, a security perfectly robust to public information can be constructed for
ω below a certain upper bound.
The following proposition yields a condition for the non-optimality of standard debt
contracts.
Proposition 4.6 Denote by D(ωI) the face value of the standard debt contract
sSDC(x;D(ωI)), where Ef [s
SDC(x;D(ωI))] = ωI .
Let G(x) ≡ 1−F1(x)
1−F2(x) . Suppose that f1, f2 are continuous.
If
(i) ∃ξ ∈ (D(ωI), xH) : G(ξ) > inf
x∈(xL,D(ωI)]
f1(x)
f2(x)
then sSDC(x;D(ωI)) is not a solution to (P1). Hence, the optimal contract necessarily
involves leverage.
Propositions 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6 yield the following insight: There are conditions under
which the optimal security is composed of debt-like tranches, includes a standard debt
tranche, but is not simultaneously a standard debt contract. Therefore, the optimal se-
curity is composed of multiple, levered tranches. In the following, Example 4.1 discusses
the analysis of a case where such a structure is optimal.
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4.5.1 Examples
Example 4.1 Consider the following densities f1, f2 and the associated CDFs:
x
f(x)
f(x)
f1(x)
f2(x)
(a) Densities
x
f(x)
F (x)
F1(x)
F2(x)
(b) Cumulative Distribution Functions
Figure 4.4: Densities and CDFs for Example 4.1
In Example 4.1, it is straightforward to see that local nonproportionality of the densities
is satisfied. Hence, the optimal security is composed of debt-like tranches by Proposition
4.4. Furthermore, strict FOSD (F1(x) > F2(x)) holds for all interior x. Proposition
4.5 applies and a standard debt tranche is included in the optimal contract. Since
a standard debt tranche is included, it remains to be checked whether the optimal
contract is indeed a standard debt contract or whether it involves multiple tranches.
Proposition 4.6 identifies a sufficient condition for non-optimality of a standard debt
contract which can be evaluated using the following illustration.
x
f(x)
f1(x)
f2(x)
G(x)
Dˆ
(a) LR and G(·)-function
D(ωI)/x
infx∈(xL,D(ωI)]
f1(x)
f2(x)
/G(x)
infx∈(xL,D(ωI)]
f1(x)
f2(x)
G(x)
Dˆ
(b) G(·)-function vs. infimum of LR
Figure 4.5: Likelihood Ratio and G(·)-function for Example 1
Note that D(ωI) is strictly increasing in ωI . Hence, for large enough ωI and therefore
large D(ωI), condition 4.6.(i) is satisfied multiple tranches are optimal. The optimal
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contract sTD has a structure as indicated in Figure 5.63 Note the endogenous residual
equity tranche(s) which will not be traded but remain(s) on the books of the institution
emitting the security.
x
payoff
sTD(x)
Standard Debt Tranche
Junior Debt-Like Tranche(s)
Residual
Equity
Figure 4.6: Contract Composed of Debt-Like Tranches including a Standard Debt
Tranche
Example 4.2 Consider the following densities f1, f2 and the associated CDFs:
x
f(x)
f(x)
f1(x)
f2(x)
xˆ
(a) Densities
x
f(x)
F (x)
F1(x)
F2(x)
xˆ
(b) Cumulative Distribution Functions
Figure 4.7: Densities and CDFs for Example 4.2
At xˆ, F1(xˆ) = F2(xˆ) = F (xˆ). Therefore, any levered debt-like tranche s
DT with
sDT (x;D) =
{
0 if x < xˆ
D if x ≥ xˆ,
63The number of junior debt-like tranches is not specified; at least one junior tranche is included in
the optimal security by Proposition 4.6.
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where D ≤ xˆ, is perfectly robust to interim public information, i.e.
Ef [s
DT (x;D)] = Ef1 [s
DT (x;D)] = Ef2 [s
DT (x;D)].64
With ω small enough, i.e. ωI ≤ ∫ xH
xˆ
xˆdF (x), there exists a unique D(ωI) which solves
Ef [s
DT (x;D(ωI)] = ωI . Because F1(ξ) > F2(ξ) for all ξ ∈ (xL, xH)\xˆ, the security
sDT (x;D(ωI)) is the unique security which offers perfect robustness. Hence, the optimal
security is composed of a single levered debt-like tranche. Again, a residual equity
tranche is kept on the books of the issuing institution (along with a levered equity
tranche).
x
payoff
sTD(x)
levered Debt-Like Tranche
levered Equity Tranche
Residual
Equity
Figure 4.8: Single levered Debt-Like Tranche
4.5.2 Explaining the Residual Equity Tranches
One prediction of the model are residual equity tranches (see the above examples). The
residual equity tranches are the non-traded parts of the collection of assets, X, initially
owned by B and are hence kept on the books of the issuing institution.We argue that
they structurally correspond to the risk retention by sponsors of ABCP conduits.
Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013) analyze the use of conduits, particularly asset-
backed commercial paper (ABCP) conduits, in the early phase of the financial crisis
of 2007-2009. They document that sponsors of conduits, especially of single seller
conduits, retained significant risk when endowing conduits with assets. Extendible
64Ef [s
DT (x;D)] = D · (1− F (xˆ), Efi [sDT (x;D)] = D · (1− Fi(xˆ)
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return x
payoff
debt tranche DT
sponsor endows conduit with DT
return x
payoff
DT used as collateral
conduit uses DT as collateral for ABCP
payoff
return x
amount of ABCP issued
sponsor
retains
risk
DT repays sufficiently
Figure 4.9: Process of Securitization via Conduit
notes guarantees and guarantees via structured investment vehicles (SIV) lead to partial
insurance of the conduit’s investors. Hence, the conduit’s sponsor retained the risk of
the conduit’s assets - assets which it originally endowed the conduit with. Full credit
and full liquidity guarantees went even further and in effect provided full risk insurance.
This is also noted by Gorton and Metrick (2012) who document that ’SIVs, ABCP
conduits, and credit-card securitizations were often reabsorbed [by their sponsors]’.65
To see the correspondence to the residual equity tranches, suppose that a sponsor
endows its conduit with a debt tranche (either junior or senior debt). The conduit
uses this debt tranche as collateral to secure the asset-backed commercial paper it
issues. If the sponsor is (partially) covering the conduit’s risk, in particular the risk
of a deterioration of the conduit’s asset values - i.e. the value of the debt tranche the
conduit was endowed with - this may give rise to the sponsoring institution being liable
for parts of the residual equity tranche as depicted in Figure 4.9.
65See page 58 of Gorton and Metrick (2012).
139
Chapter 4: Security Design with Interim Public Information
If the debt tranche is used as collateral for the asset backed commercial paper issued by
the conduit, a deterioration of the conduit’s asset values corresponds to a realization
of states of the world where the debt tranche pays off less than the value of the issued
ABCP. This issue is particularly prominent if the face value of the endowment is the
base for the issued commercial paper, ignoring the ’risk’ that the debt tranche itself
may not pay in full. This is depicted in Figure 4.10. If the sponsor provides insurance to
the conduit via guarantees, it implicitly keeps this risk on the books. This structurally
corresponds to holding on to the residual equity tranche.
payoff
return x
amount of ABCP issued
sponsor
retains
risk
DT repays sufficiently
Figure 4.10: Face value of debt tranche equals amount of ABCP
4.6 Robustness and Potential Extensions
There are several ways the presented analysis can be modified and extended. Naturally,
it is of interest to analyze the case of more than two underlying distributions. One
way to model this goes back to Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011). There, the
binary state of the world forms the baseline but the public signal does not reveal
which distribution is the true one but instead the ’updated’ probability of the true
distribution being f1. Hence, the signal reveals λ. This does not affect the results
about the optimality of debt-like tranches.
Furthermore, it is of interest to address pooling. Suppose that the issuing institution
holds not a single collection of assets with uncertain return X but explicitly consider
the case where there are multiple assets X1, X2, · · · , XN which are affected by the same
signal. In this case, it can again be established that for any given bundle, debt-like
tranches are optimal if first order stochastic dominance is satisfied not just for the
solitary assets but also for the bundle.
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This leads to another avenue to explore: How are the results affected if the ordering by
first order stochastic dominance does not hold and f1, f2 (and corresponding F1, F2) are
arbitrary densities with full support? It turns out that there always exists an optimal
security which is either composed of debt-like tranches or can be expressed as a convex
combination of two such security structures. In the latter case, perfect robustness to
interim public information is also implied.
In the following subsections, we address these three modifications of the model in detail.
We also discuss how modifications of the nondecreasingness assumption impact the
security design process in our model.
4.6.1 Multiple underlying distributions
Consider first the modification as in Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011). Let f1, f2
be such that F1(x) ≥ F2(x) for all x ∈ I. However, let the public signal reveal λ, i.e. let
f(x) = λf1(x)+(1−λ)f2(x) be the distribution prior to the interim information arrival
and let f(x|λˆ) = λˆf1(x) + (1 − λˆ)f2(x). Thus, λˆ is the public information arriving at
the interim stage and l(λˆ) the distribution of the public information with support [0, 1]
and λ =
∫ 1
0
λˆl(λˆ)dλˆ.
In that case the analysis remains unchanged and the optimal contract is composed of
debt tranches. To see this, consider a solution s∗ to (P1), i.e. s∗ solving
max
s∈SI,ωI
Ef1 [s(x)] where SI,ωI ≡ {s : λEf1 [s(x)] + (1− λ)Ef2 [s(x)] = ωI}
and any other security s ∈ SI,ωI . Note that since Ef1 [s∗(x)] ≥ Ef1 [s(x)] and Ef2 [s∗(x)] ≤
Ef2 [s(x)] by construction, it holds that
E[s|λ] = E[s∗|λ]
∀λˆ ≤ λ : E[s|λˆ] ≤ E[s∗|λˆ]
∀λˆ ≥ λ : E[s|λˆ] ≥ E[s∗|λˆ].
Furthermore, define λs∗ and λs to be the values of λˆ such that the value of the security
after information arrival equals the endowment ωM . Formally, λs∗ and λs are the unique
solutions to
141
Chapter 4: Security Design with Interim Public Information
ωM = E[s|λs]
ωM = E[s∗|λs∗ ].
Consider now the following cases:
Case 1: E[s|λ] = E[s∗|λ] ≤ ωM
In this case, it follows that λs∗ ≥ λs. Writing the expected utilities of acquiring s and
s∗ in the form
EU(s) =
∫ 1
0
(
ωI + (σ − 1)
(
min{E[s|λˆ], ωM}
))
l(λˆ)dλˆ
= ωI + (σ − 1)
∫ 1
0
(
min{E[s|λˆ], ωM}
)
l(λˆ)dλˆ
= ωI + (σ − 1)
∫ 1
0
(E[s|λˆ]−max{E[s|λˆ]− ωM , 0})l(λˆ)dλˆ
= ωI + (σ − 1)
[
E[s|λ]−
∫ 1
0
max{E[s|λˆ]− ωM , 0}l(λˆ)dλˆ
]
= ωI + (σ − 1)
[
E[s|λ]−
∫ 1
λs
(E[s|λˆ]− ωM)l(λˆ)dλˆ
]
EU(s∗) = ωI + (σ − 1)
[
E[s|λ]−
∫ 1
λs∗
(E[s|λˆ]− ωM ])l(λˆ)dλˆ
]
,
it obtains that
EU(s) ≤ EU(s∗)
due to∫ 1
λs
(E[s|λˆ]− ωM)l(λˆ)dλˆ =
∫ λs∗
λs
(E[s|λˆ]− ωM)l(λˆ)dλˆ+
∫ 1
λs∗
(E[s|λˆ]− ωM)l(λˆ)dλˆ
≥ 0 +
∫ 1
λs∗
(E[s|λˆ]− ωM)l(λˆ)dλˆ
≥
∫ 1
λs∗
(E[s∗|λˆ]− ωM)l(λˆ)dλˆ.
As such, for Case 1, s∗ remains optimal. The same can be established for Case 2.
Case 2: E[s|λ] = E[s∗|λ] > ωM In this case, λs∗ ≤ λs and utilities can be written as
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EU(s) =
∫ 1
0
(
ωI + (σ − 1)
(
min{E[s|λˆ], ωM}
))
l(λˆ)dλˆ
= ωI + (σ − 1)
∫ 1
0
(
min{E[s|λˆ], ωM}
)
l(λˆ)dλˆ
= ωI + (σ − 1)
∫ 1
0
(ωM −max{ωM − E[s|λˆ], 0})l(λˆ)dλˆ
= ωI + (σ − 1)
[
ωM −
∫ 1
0
max{ωM − E[s|λˆ], 0}l(λˆ)dλˆ
]
= ωI + (σ − 1)
[
ωM −
∫ λs
0
(ωM − E[s|λˆ])l(λˆ)dλˆ
]
EU(s∗) = ωI + (σ − 1)
[
ωM −
∫ λs∗
0
(ωM − E[s|λˆ])l(λˆ)dλˆ
]
,
where
EU(s) ≤ EU(s∗)
follows from∫ λs
0
(ωM − E[s|λˆ])l(λˆ)dλˆ =
∫ λs∗
0
(ωM − E[s|λˆ])l(λˆ)dλˆ+
∫ λs
λs∗
(ωM − E[s|λˆ])l(λˆ)dλˆ
≥
∫ λs∗
0
(ωM − E[s|λˆ])l(λˆ)dλˆ+ 0
≥
∫ λs∗
0
(ωM − E[s∗|λˆ])l(λˆ)dλˆ.
As such, s∗ remains optimal and the previous analysis holds. There is always an optimal
security composed of debt-like tranches; under the conditions outlined in Proposition
4.4, this applies to all securities issued in equilibrium.
4.6.2 Pooling of multiple assets
For simplicity, consider the case where the issuing institution ex ante owns two assets
with uncertain return X1, X2. Further suppose that X1 is distributed according to
f(x1) = λf1(x1) + (1− λ)f2(x1) and X2 according to g(x2) = λg1(x2) + (1− λ)g2(x2).
Let the public signal reveal the true distribution in the sense that X1 is distributed
according to f1 and X2 according to g1 with probability λ.
66 With probability (1− λ),
66Thus, there is perfect correlation in the sense that either the true distributions are f1, g1 or f2, g2
respectively. This simplification is made for expositional purposes; pooling any two securities where
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the true distribution of X1 is f2 and that of X2 is g2. By pooling the two assets,
i.e. by considering the asset X ≡ X1 + X2, this asset is distributed according to
h(x) = λh1(x) + (1− λ)h2(x).
If F1(x1) ≥ F2(x1) and G1(x2) ≥ G2(x2) for all x1, x2 in the respective support, i.e.
if the ordering of the distributions by first order stochastic dominance applies in the
same direction (for both assets, the signal is bad with probability λ and good with
probability (1−λ)), then it follows that H1(x) ≥ H2(x) for all x ∈ I. Hence, irrespective
of whether the assets are pooled or not, the analysis performed holds and the optimal
contract will be a composed of debt-like tranches. It nonetheless needs to be evaluated
separately whether pooling is beneficial or not; this in particular will depend on how
the endowments of the liquidity shifters (agents M) covary with the pooling decision.
However, it is possible that the assets’ returns are negatively correlated in the sense
that good news for one asset is bad news for the other. Consider for example the case
that F1(x1) ≥ F2(x1) and G1(x2) ≤ G2(x2). In this case, there is no clear ordering
with respect to the distributions of the pooled asset. This directly leads to the next
modification.
4.6.3 Arbitrary distributions without ordering
Suppose that f1, f2 are arbitrary densities and that first order stochastic dominance does
not hold. Fix ωM = ωI for simplicity and recall that first order stochastic dominance
was only employed to reduce the game to solving the problem (P1). Reconsider
(P1) max
s∈SI
Ef1 [s(x)] s.t. λEf1 [s(x)] + (1− λ)Ef2 [s(x)] = ωI
and denote s a solution to (P1). Note that all solutions have the same expected values
in all states. Furthermore, let
(P1’) max
s∈SI
Ef2 [s(x)] s.t. λEf1 [s(x)] + (1− λ)Ef2 [s(x)] = ωI
and let s′ be a solution to (P1’). By the analysis performed in this paper, it is known
that there always exist s, s′ which are composed of debt-like tranches. There are the
signals have an arbitrary correlation leads to a security design problem as covered in section 4.6.3
where no restriction on the underlying densities is imposed.
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following cases:
Ef1 [s(x)] ≥ ωI Ef1 [s(x)] < ωI
Ef2 [s
′(x)] ≥ ωI Case 1 Case 2
Ef2 [s
′(x)] < ωI Case 3 Case 4
Case 4 is impossible as Ef2 [s
′(x)] < ωI implies Ef1 [s(x)] ≥ Ef1 [s′(x)] > ωI . In Case
1, it follows that a convex combination s∗ of s and s′ can be constructed which has
perfect robustness to public information, i.e. Ef [s
∗(x)] = Ef1 [s
∗(x)] = Ef2 [s
∗(x)] = ωI .
Furthermore, Case 2 corresponds to a case where the endowment constraint ωM may
only bind if the true distribution is f2. If that is the case, the analysis presented in the
previous sections carries through and s will be an optimal security. In Case 3, the role
of f1 and f2 is reversed: s
′ is optimal, f1 can be considered good information and f2
bad information.
This classification allows the statement that irrespective of any ordering imposed on
f1 and f2, there always exists an optimal security which is either composed of debt-
like tranches or which is perfectly robust to interim public information and can be
constructed as the convex combination of two such securities. Hence, even in the case
of pooling where first order stochastic dominance no longer holds, debt-like tranches
play a pivotal role in designing the optimal security with respect to the interim public
information problem.
4.6.4 Modifying the Nondecreasingness Assumption
As outlined in Section 2, the nondecreasingness assumption on securities is not without
question in the literature. Some studies, like Biais and Mariotti (2005), impose dual
monotonicity, i.e. that both the security s(x) and the residual x−s(x) are nondecreasing
in x. Others, mostly in discrete settings as Farhi and Tirole (2012), solve security design
problems without imposing any restriction. In this section, we briefly discuss how our
results are affected when moving from nondecreasingness to either dual monotonicity
or no assumption on the slope of the security.
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Security Design without Nondecreasingness Without nondecreasingness, the anal-
ysis of the security design problem follows that with arbitrary, non-ordered densities.
First, solve for the security design s1 that maximizes the value under f1 and then solve
for the security design s2 that maximizes the value under f2. In the case of s1, securities
which solve the problem
(P1)nr max
s
Ef1 [s(x)] s.t. λEf1 [s(x)] + (1− λ)Ef2 [s(x)] = ωI
∀x ∈ I : 0 ≤ s(x) ≤ x,
i.e. which solve the problem corresponding to (P1) in the absence of the nondecreas-
ingness constraint, can be characterized as follows: Define
r¯ ≡ inf
r
[∫
f1(x)
f2(x)
>r
xf(x)dx ≤ ωI
]
,
i.e. let r¯ be the cutoff value of r such that a security which specifies a payoff at the
limited liability constraint whenever the likelihood ratio exceeds r and a payoff of 0
otherwise has an unconditional expected value of (weakly) less than ω.
It is then straightforward that any solution snr1 to (P1)nr has the property
snr1 =
{
x if f1(x)
f2(x)
> r¯
0 if f1(x)
f2(x)
< r¯
∧
∫
I
snr1 (x)f(x)dx = ω
I ,
i.e. that it specifies maximal payoff (snr1 (x) = x) at those points where the likelihood
ratio is large and minimal payoff (snr1 (x) = 0) when the likelihood ratio is small. It is
possible that there is flexibility in the security design; in particular, whenever
∫
f1(x)
f2(x)
≥r¯
xf(x)dx > ωI ,
the remaining payoff can be freely allocated across states where f1(x)
f2(x)
= r¯. Typically (if
this multiplicity does not occur), snr1 will be of the following form:
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x
payoff
snr1 (x)
Figure 4.11: Solution to Maximization Problem without Nondecreasingness
The structure of snr2 as a solution to the corresponding maximization problem for
Ef2 [s(x)] is similar. As in the case of arbitrary f1, f2 without ordering, the optimal
security can be characterized either as a convex combination of some such snr1 , s
nr
2 (and
offer perfect robustness to public information) or be snr1 (or s
nr
2 respectively) whenever
even snr1 (s
nr
2 ) fails to attain ω
M under f1 (f2). This may only occur, however, when a
large part of the probability mass of x ∈ I under f1 (f2) lies in the region with low x
where the limited liability constraint has a lot of bite.
Non-Optimality of Standard Debt under dual monotonicity In the case where dual
monotonicity instead of single nondecreasingness is imposed, we do not explicitly solve
the optimal control problem leading to the equilibrium security design structure. How-
ever, we obtain a condition for the non-optimality of standard debt which is similar
to that derived in Proposition 4.6. In particular, consider the setting where f1, f2 are
ordered by first order stochastic dominance. We are interested in characterizing the
solution to
(P1)dm max
s
Ef1 [s(x)] s.t. λEf1 [s(x)] + (1− λ)Ef2 [s(x)] = ωI
∀x ∈ I : 0 ≤ s(x) ≤ x
∀x1, x2 ∈ I : x1 > x2 ⇒ s(x1) ≥ s(x2) ∧ x1 − s(x1) ≥ x2 − s(x2).
The following claim states our condition for non-optimality of standard debt.
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Claim 4.1 Denote D(ωI) the face value of the standard debt contract sSDC(x;D(ωI))
with
Ef [s
SDC(x;D(ωI))] = ωI .
Let G(x) ≡ 1−F1(x)
1−F2(x) and Gˆ(x) ≡
F1(D(ωI))−F1(x)
F2(D(ωI))−F2(x) . Suppose that f1, f2 are continuous.
If
(i’) ∃ξ ∈ (D(ωI), xH) : G(ξ) > inf
x∈(xL,D(ωI)]
Gˆ(x)
then sSDC(x;D(ωI)) is not a solution to (P1dm). Hence, the optimal contract neces-
sarily involves leverage.
First note that condition (i’) is stronger than condition (i) from Proposition 4.6. If (i’)
is satisfied, so is (i), whereas the reverse does not hold. Second, while we abstract from
a detailed proof, the following figure outlines the construction of a deviation from sSDC
which improves Ef1 while adhering to dual monotonicity.
return x
payoff
xˆ
xˆ +  D(ω
I ) + 
D(ωI )
D(ωI ) + κ
ξ
ξ + κ
sSDC(x)
s(x)
κ
Figure 4.12: Illustration – Deviation from Standard Debt
Condition (i’) implies that  and κ sufficiently small can be found such that xˆ exists
with
∫ D(ωI)+
xˆ
[sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x)]f1(x)dx∫ D(ωI)+
ξ
[sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x)]f2(x)dx
<
∫ xH
ξ
[s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI))]f1(x)dx∫ xH
xˆ
[s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI))]f2(x)dx
.
Lemma 4.3 then ensures that s is preferred to sSDC(x;D(ωI)). Intuitively, following
(i’),  and κ can be chosen such that
∫D(ωI )+
xˆ [s
SDC(x;D(ωI))−s(x)]f1(x)dx∫D(ωI )+
ξ [s
SDC(x;D(ωI))−s(x)]f2(x)dx
is arbitrarily close
to Gˆ(xˆ) < G(ξ), with
∫ xH
ξ [s(x)−sSDC(x;D(ωI))]f1(x)dx∫ xH
xˆ [s(x)−sSDC(x;D(ωI))]f2(x)dx
arbitrarily close to G(ξ).
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While we abstract from further characterizing the solution to the problem (P1)dm, the
potential incentive asymmetry prevails: If condition (i’) is satisfied, standard debt is not
the optimal security with respect to interim public information, whereas it minimizes
the incentives for private information acquisition of the trading parties.
4.7 Conclusion
This article has built upon the analysis by Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011) to
analyze a security design problem where public information arrives between trading pe-
riods. In the absence of private information acquisition, a security is optimal if it is least
sensitive to interim public information: Since ’gains’ from good interim information can
not be fully capitalized upon whereas ’losses’ from bad information are fully incurred,
an optimal security has maximal value in the bad information state and correspondingly
minimal value after good information has arrived in the interim period.
If good information and bad information can be differentiated according to an ordering
imposed by the monotone likelihood ratio property, standard debt is optimal as shown
by Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011). However, this ordering is restrictive. When-
ever the arriving information only affects e.g. the low tail of the distribution of returns
of the underlying cash flow, a more general information structure seems prudent. We
model such a generalization by imposing ordering by first order stochastic dominance
which nests the previous analysis.
The optimal security structure is given by a composition of debt-like tranches. Con-
tracts satisfying this structure range from standard debt to levered equity and multiple
tranches of different seniorities. We identify conditions under which the optimal security
includes, but is not limited to a standard debt tranche.
The results provide an explanation for the endogenous occurrence of tranches which are
frequently seen in financial markets. This explanation is new in that it is independent
of private information. Instead, the tranches arise because they allow to put the most
weight on those returns of the underlying cash flow which are more likely to be met
even after ’bad’ information arrived. If the monotone likelihood ratio criterion on the
underlying distributions fails to hold, it no longer is necessarily optimal to put the most
weight of the payoffs on the lowest realized returns, i.e. to issue standard debt. Instead,
it may even be optimal to trade levered equity. Furthermore, our notion of tranching
differs from that in the literature. We provide an explanation for designing securities
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composed of multiple, imperfect tranches, whereas the literature typically focuses on
(pooling and) tranching off a single standard debt tranche and holding on to the residual
equity. Following our results, if the initially traded contract is composed of different
debt tranches, the issuer will always hold on to multiple residual equity tranches.
Technically, this is a novel result because it explicitly introduces a discontinuity in the
security structure and thus differs from the literature at large which either imposes
continuity by virtue of the dual monotonicity assumption or endogenously satisfies it
with standard debt solving the security design problem.
The residual equity tranches are a specific prediction of the model. While they are
not explicitly traded in financial markets, we argue that they arise from the use of
conduits in the ABCP market as documented by Acharya, Schnabl, and Suarez (2013)
and Gorton and Metrick (2012). Specifically, a sponsor who endows its conduit with
a debt tranche, and who retains the risk of the conduit through guarantees, implicitly
keeps the risk that the debt tranche does not pay up to face value on the books. This
structurally corresponds to the residual equity tranches.
Lastly, there are implications for the relation between private and public information
concerns. While private information acquisition is abstracted from in our framework,
it is clear from e.g. Dang, Gorton, and Holmstro¨m (2011) and Yang (2012) that lev-
ered contracts do not minimize other market participant’s incentives to acquire private
information. Quite to the contrary, the possible case of levered equity maximizes these
incentives. Furthermore, while tranching is beneficial with respect to the interim public
information arrival, Farhi and Tirole (2012) show that it works against communality of
information in the analysis of the private information problem. Hence, there exists a
tradeoff for the security designer: With the more general structure of public informa-
tion, levered tranches will be optimal in terms of creating a security robust to interim
public information. Nonetheless, a standard debt contract would minimize the other
market participants’ desire to acquire private information. How this tradeoff plays out
is an interesting avenue to explore in the future. Intuitively, for very large costs of pri-
vate information acquisition, the public information issue should dominate and levered
debt tranches should be issued.
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Appendix
4.A Proof of Proposition 4.1
Existence is established in the following way: (P1) corresponds to the optimization of
Ef1 [s(x)] over the set SI,ωI ≡ {s ∈ SI such that Ef [s(x)] = ωI}. The objective Ef1 [s(x)]
corresponds to a mapping h : SI,ωI → R where h(s) = Ef1 [s(x)]. By showing that SI,ωI
is convex and closed and h is continuous, existence of a maximum of h on the set SI,ωI
follows.67
To see that SI,ωI is convex, consider s1, s2 ∈ SI,ωI . It has to be shown that
∀α ∈ [0, 1] : αs1 + (1− α)s2 ∈ SI,ωI . (4.9)
Note that:
• nondecreasingness of s1, s2 implies that αs1 + (1− α)s2 is nondecreasing as well
• (∀x ∈ I : s1(x) ≤ x, s2(x) ≤ x)⇒ αs1(x) + (1− α)s2(x) ≤ x, for all x ∈ I
hence, αs1 + (1− α)s2 satisfies limited liability
• (∀x ∈ I : s1(x) ≥ 0, s2(x) ≥ 0)⇒ αs1(x) + (1− α)s2(x) ≥ 0, for all x ∈ I
hence, αs1 + (1− α)s2 satisfies nonnegativity
• Ef [αs1(x) + (1− α)s2(x)] = αEf [s1(x)] + (1− α)Ef [s2(x)] = ωI .
Thus, (4.9) follows.
To establish continuity of h and closedness of SI,ωI , take the metric
d(s1, s2) ≡ sup
x∈I
|s1(x)− s2(x)|, (4.10)
such that
si
i→∞−−−→ s⇔ d(si, s) i→∞−−−→ 0. (4.11)
67Note that SI,ωI is a subset of the SI-space and bounded there by the integrable functions s(x) = 0
and s(x) = x.
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Closedness follows from the fact that for any converging sequence si
i→∞−−−→ s where
si ∈ SI,ωI for all i, the limit s is contained in SI,ωI . We will show that s ∈ SI,ωI by
establishing that it satisfies limited liability, nondecreasingness, nonnegativity and has
an expected value Ef [s(x)] = ω
I .
First, Ef [s(x)] = ω
I is established. Suppose Ef [s(x)] > ω
I (the contradiction for
Ef [s(x)] < ω
I works analogously). Let δ ≡ Ef [s(x)] − ω. Then si i→∞−−−→ s implies for
any  > 0,  < δ:
∃N : ∀i ≥ N : si(x) ≥ s(x)−  for all x ∈ I. (4.12)
Hence, for all i ≥ N it follows that
Ef [si(x)] ≥ Ef [s(x)]−  > Ef [s(x)]− δ = ωI . (4.13)
This is a contradiction to si ∈ SI,ωI . Next, suppose that s does not satisfy limited
liability, i.e. that s(ξ) > ξ for some ξ ∈ I. By si i→∞−−−→ s, this implies that
∃N : ∀i ≥ N : si(ξ) > ξ. (4.14)
This contradicts si ∈ SI,ωI for i ≥ N . In the same manner, nonnegativity of s is
established.
Finally, suppose that s violates nondecreasingness, i.e. that
∃x1, x2 ∈ I such that x1 < x2 ∧ s(x1) > s(x2). (4.15)
However, si is nondecreasing for all i. Hence, si(x1) ≤ si(x2) for all i. Since si i→∞−−−→ s,
a contradiction again follows. s(x1) > s(x2) requires si(x1) > si(x2) for all i ≥ N for
some N .
Lastly, continuity of h is established. Recall
h(s) = Ef1 [s(x)] =
∫ xH
xL
s(x)dF1(x). (4.16)
Now take si
i→∞−−−→ s. It follows that
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lim
i→∞
h(si) = lim
i→∞
∫ xH
xL
si(x)dF1(x)
=
∫ xH
xL
lim
i→∞
si(x)dF1(x) (4.17)
=
∫ xH
xL
s(x)dF1(x)
= h(s), (4.18)
where (4.17) follows from dominated convergence and which yields continuity of h.68
We have thus established that SI,ωI is convex and closed and that h is continuous.
Hence, h(s) = Ef1 [s(x)] attains a maximum on SI,ωI and a solution to (P1) exists.

4.B Proof of Proposition 4.2
Let Ef1 [s
∗(x)] be the expected value of a solution s∗ to (P1) after bad information.
By construction of (P1), all solutions have the same state-contingent expected values.
Recall (4.5), i.e. the expected utility of I from acquiring a security s at t = 1:
EU(s) = ωI + (σ − 1) (λmin[Ef1 [s(x)], ωM ] + (1− λ) min[Ef2 [s(x)], ωM ]) .
Consider any security s which could be traded at t = 1, i.e. which satisfies
Ef [s(x)] ≤ ωI = Ef [s∗(x)], (4.19)
and which is not a solution to (P1). It needs to hold that
Ef1 [s(x)] < Ef1 [s
∗(x)]. (4.20)
68Recall that functions si(·) are bounded in the SI-space by the integrable functions s(x) = 0 and
s(x) = x.
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If Ef1 [s(x)] ≥ Ef1 [s∗(x)], a contradiction would be obtained in the sense that s∗ is not
a solution or that s is a solution to (P1). To see this, note the following: Ef1 [s(x)] >
Ef1 [s
∗(x)] would imply that sˆ with sˆ(x) ≥ s(x) at all x ∈ I exists, where Ef [sˆ(x)] = ωI
and Ef1 [sˆ(x)] > Ef1 [s
∗(x)]. This violates s∗ being a solution and follows from the strict
positivity of densities.
Similarly, if Ef1 [s(x)] = Ef1 [s
∗(x)] and Ef [s(x)] = ωI , then s would be a solution,
whereas Ef1 [s(x)] = Ef1 [s
∗(x)] and Ef [s(x)] < ωI together with the strict positivity of
densities again would yield existence of sˆ with
sˆ(x) ≥ s(x) for all x ∈ I
∧ ∃A ⊆ I : sˆ(x) > s(x)∀x ∈ A,
∫
A
1dF (x) > 0 (4.21)
∧ Ef [sˆ(x)] = ωI .
Hence, Ef1 [sˆ(x)] > Ef1 [s
∗(x)] due to sˆ(x) > s(x)∀x ∈ A. Thus, (4.20) needs to hold as
otherwise a contradiction is obtained.
If condition (i) or (ii) is satisfied, Ef2 [s
∗(x)] ≥ ωM .69 Therefore, using (4.20),
EU(s) = ωI + (σ − 1) [λmin[Ef1 [s(x)], ωM ] + (1− λ) min[Ef2 [s(x)], ωM ]]
≤ ωI + (σ − 1) [λmin[Ef1 [s(x)], ωM ] + (1− λ)ωM]
= ωI + (σ − 1) [λEf1 [s(x)] + (1− λ)ωM)] (4.22)
< ωI + (σ − 1) [λEf1 [s∗(x)] + (1− λ)ωM)]
= EU(s∗).
Hence we have established that only solutions to (P1) are traded in equilibrium at
t = 1 if (i) or (ii) holds. 
If ωM < ωI and Ef1 [s
∗(x)] > ωM , then multiplicity arises in the sense that securities
which may be traded in equilibrium at t = 1 differ in their expected values across states.
Specifically, any security s which satisfies Ef1 [s] ≥ ωM (and hence also Ef2 [s] ≥ Ef1 [s] ≥
69For condition (ii) this follows from Ef2 [s
∗(x)] ≥ ωI and ωI ≥ ωM .
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ωM by first order stochastic dominance) along with Ef [s(x)] ≤ ωI may be traded in
equilibrium at t = 1. These securities have in common that they fully exhaust the
trading capacity which is limited by the endowment constraint ωM .
If ωI ≤ Ef2 [s∗(x)] < ωM , any security s with Ef [s(x)] = ωI and Ef2 [s(x)] ≤ ωM may
also be issued. Even though those securities have a higher value after good interim
information than solutions to (P1), they still do not induce a binding endowment con-
straint ωM . Gains from trade are fully realized, i.e. the security acquired at t = 1 is
fully sold irrespective of the interim public information.
4.C Proof of Lemma 4.3
The proof is straightforward and done here for (i) or (ii) holding strictly. If both hold
weakly, the same steps yield the result with the weak inequality for (iv). Fix k and
suppose without loss of generality that (i) holds strictly, i.e.
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF1(x) < k
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF2(x). (4.23)
Recall (4.1), i.e. f(x) = λf1(x) + (1− λ)f2(x). It holds that
∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF1(x) ≥ k
∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF2(x)
∧
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF1(x) < k
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF2(x) (4.24)
It follows that
(λ+ 1
k
(1− λ)) ∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF1(x)
= λ
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF1(x) + 1k (1− λ)
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF1(x)
< λ
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF1(x) + (1− λ)
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF2(x) (4.25)
by (4.24) and furthermore
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λ
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF1(x) + (1− λ)
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF2(x)
= λ
∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF1(x) + (1− λ)
∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF2(x) (4.26)
by (iii).
Since
λ
∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF1(x) + (1− λ)
∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF2(x)
(4.24)
≤ λ ∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF1(x) + 1k (1− λ)
∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF1(x)
= (λ+ 1
k
(1− λ)) ∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF1(x)
it holds that
(λ+
1
k
(1− λ))
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF1(x) < (λ+ 1
k
(1− λ))
∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF1(x)
⇔
∫
A
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF1(x) <
∫
B
(s2(x)− s1(x))dF1(x) (4.27)
and therefore
∫
A∪B
(s1(x)− s2(x))dF1(x) < 0
⇔
∫
A∪B
s1(x)dF1(x) <
∫
A∪B
s2(x)dF1(x). (4.28)
This concludes the proof. 
4.D Proof of Lemma 4.4
First note that D(ωI) is unique by Lemma 4.1. Consider the standard debt contract
sSDC(x;D(ωI)) and any contract s with Ef [s(x)] = ω
I and s 6= sSDC(x;D(ωI)) in the
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sense that they differ on a subset of I with positive measure. Formally, consider s such
that, letting
∆ ≡ {x ∈ I such that s(x) 6= sSDC(x;D(ωI))} , it holds that ∫
∆
1dF (x) > 0. (4.29)
To show that the standard debt contract solves (P1), it is sufficient to show that for all
such s, Ef1 [s(x)] ≤ Ef1 [sSDC(x;D(ωI))] and equivalently Ef2 [s(x)] ≥ Ef2 [sSDC(x;D(ωI))].
Since sSDC(x;D(ωI)) is a standard debt contract and Ef [s(x)] = Ef [s
SDC(x;D(ωI))],
it holds that
∃xˆ ∈ I s.t. sSDC(x;D(ωI)) ≥ s(x) if x < xˆ
sSDC(x;D(ωI)) ≤ s(x) if x > xˆ. (4.30)
There exists a point xˆ such that sSDC(x;D(ωI)) lies weakly above s when x < xˆ, with
the roles reversed for x > xˆ.
Furthermore,
∫ xˆ
xL
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF (x) = ∫ xH
xˆ
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF (x) (4.31)
⇔ λ ∫ xˆ
xL
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF1(x) + (1− λ)
∫ xˆ
xL
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF2(x)
= λ
∫ xH
xˆ
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF1(x) + (1− λ)
∫ xH
xˆ
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF2(x).
(4.32)
Let f1(xˆ)/f2(xˆ) ≡ k and recall that f1(·)/f2(·) is weakly decreasing. It follows that
∀ξ ∈ I, ξ ≤ xˆ
f1(ξ)
f2(ξ)
≥ k
⇔ f1(ξ) ≥ kf2(ξ)
⇒ [sSDC(ξ;D(ωI))− s(ξ)]f1(ξ) ≥ k[sSDC(ξ;D(ωI))− s(ξ)]f2(ξ). (4.33)
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Hence,
∫ xˆ
xL
[sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x)]dF1(x) ≥ k
∫ xˆ
xL
[sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x)]dF2(x). (4.34)
By the same argument,
∫ xH
xˆ
[s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI))]dF1(x) ≤ k
∫ xH
xˆ
[s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI))]dF2(x). (4.35)
By Lemma 4.3, it thus holds that
∫ xH
xL
sSDC(x;D(ωI))dF1(x) ≥
∫ xH
xL
s(x)dF1(x). (4.36)
This implies that sSDC(x;D(ωI)) is indeed a solution to (P1) if f1(·)/f2(·) is nonin-
creasing.
The proof for unique optimality of sSDC(x;D(ωI)) whenever f1(·)/f2(·) is strictly de-
creasing follows the same approach. It needs to be noted that if s 6= sSDC(x;D(ωI)) in
the above sense, there exists  > 0 such that, letting A ≡ {x ∈ I\U(xˆ) such that s(x) 6=
sSDC(x;D(ωI))},
∫
A
1dF (x) > 0. (4.37)
s and sSDC(x;D(ωI)) need to be different with positive measure outside of an -
neighborhood around xˆ. If this were not the case, s would be equal to sˆ almost
everywhere. The same construction as in the previous approach can be utilized, but
with
k1 ≡ f1(xˆ+ )
f2(xˆ+ )
< k =
f1(xˆ)
f2(xˆ
<
f1(xˆ− )
f2(xˆ− ) ≡ k2 (4.38)
as reference points. On any interval Γ ⊆ I where ∀x ∈ Γ : f1(x)/f2(x) ≥ k, and for any
γ(x) : Γ→ R, we know that
158
Proof of Lemma 4.4
∫
Γ
γ(x)dF1(x) ≥ k
∫
Γ
γ(x)dF2(x) (4.39)
⇒ λ
∫
Γ
γ(x)dF1(x) + (1− λ)
∫
Γ
γ(x)dF2(x) ≥ λk
∫
Γ
γ(x)dF2(x) + (1− λ)
∫
Γ
γ(x)dF2(x)
⇔
∫
Γ
γ(x)dF (x) ≥ [λk + (1− λ)]
∫
Γ
γ(x)dF2(x)
⇔ 1
λk + (1− λ)
∫
Γ
γ(x)dF (x) ≥
∫
Γ
γ(x)dF2(x). (4.40)
If ∀x ∈ Γ : f1(x)/f2(x) ≤ k, then
1
λk + (1− λ)
∫
Γ
γ(x)dF (x) ≤
∫
Γ
γ(x)dF2(x). (4.41)
Applying this on (xL, xˆ− ) and (xˆ− , xˆ) (with corresponding k2 and k respectively),
coupled with
∫
A 1dF (x) > 0, yields that
∫ xˆ
xL
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF2(x) ≤ 1
λk2 + (1− λ)
∫ xˆ−
xL
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF (x)
+
1
λk + (1− λ)
∫ xˆ
xˆ−
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF (x)
≤ 1
λk + (1− λ)
∫ xˆ
xL
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF (x).
(4.42)
Likewise, applying this on (xˆ, xˆ+ ) and (xˆ+ , xH) (with corresponding k and k1 re-
spectively)
∫ xH
xˆ
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF2(x) ≥ 1
λk + (1− λ)
∫ xˆ+
xˆ
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF (x)
+
1
λk1 + (1− λ)
∫ xH
xˆ+
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF (x)
≥ 1
λk + (1− λ)
∫ xH
xˆ
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF (x)
(4.43)
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need to hold. Finally, by (4.37),
∫ xH
xˆ+
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF (x) > 0 ∨
∫ xˆ−
xL
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF (x) > 0.
(4.44)
Hence, (4.42) or (4.43) needs to hold strictly, i.e.
∫ xˆ
xL
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF2(x) < 1
λk + (1− λ)
∫ xˆ
xL
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF (x)
∧
∫ xH
xˆ
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF2(x) ≥ 1
λk + (1− λ)
∫ xH
xˆ
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF (x)
∨ (4.45)
∫ xˆ
xL
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF2(x) ≤ 1
λk + (1− λ)
∫ xˆ
xL
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF (x)
∧
∫ xH
xˆ
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF2(x) > 1
λk + (1− λ)
∫ xH
xˆ
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF (x)
(4.46)
Thus, by Lemma 4.3,
Ef2 [s
SDC(x;D(ωI))] < Ef2 [s(x)]⇔ Ef1 [sSDC(x;D(ωI))] > Ef1 [s(x)] (4.47)
needs to hold whenever f1(·)/f2(·) is strictly decreasing. sSDC(x;D(ωI)) is therefore
the unique solution to (P1) up to pointwise deviations. 
4.E Proof of Lemma 4.5
This proof is almost identical to the one of Lemma 4.4. L(ωI) is uniquely determined
by Lemma 4.1. Take any security s 6= sLE(x;L(ωI)), in the sense that they are different
on a subset of I with positive measure, with E[s(x)] = ωI = E[sLE(x;L(ωI))]. Note
that by construction of sLE(x;L(ωI)),
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∃xˆ ∈ I s.t. sLE(x;L(ωI)) ≤ s(x) if x ≤ xˆ
sLE(x;L(ωI)) ≥ s(x) if x ≥ xˆ. (4.48)
By repeating the previous analysis, but with an increasing likelihood ratio, it holds that
for k ≡ f1(xˆ)/f2(xˆ):
∫ xˆ
xL
[s(x)− sLE(x;L(ωI))]dF1(x) ≤ k
∫ xˆ
xL
[s(x)− sLE(x;L(ωI))]dF2(x) (4.49)∫ xH
xˆ
[sLE(x;L(ωI))− s(x)]dF1(x) ≥ k
∫ xH
xˆ
[sLE(x;L(ωI))− s(x)]dF1(x).(4.50)
Recalling Ef [s(x)] = Ef [s
LE(x;L(ωI))], applying Lemma 4.3 yields
∫ xH
xL
s(x)dF1(x) ≤
∫ xH
xL
sLE(x;L(ωI))dF1(x). (4.51)
This yields the desired result that sLE(x;L(ωI)) solves (P1). Furthermore, as in Lemma
4.4, this inequality can be established to hold strictly whenever f1(·)/f2(·) is strictly
increasing. Thus, sLE(x;L(ωI)) is the unique solution to (P1) (up to pointwise devi-
ations). The corollary follows because the observation about the intermediate point xˆ
extends to sLD in the modified problem (P1*).
∃xˆ ∈ I s.t. sDE(x) ≤ s(x) if x ≤ xˆ
sDE(x) ≥ s(x) if x ≥ xˆ. (4.52)
Repeating the same steps as in the proof of the Proposition yields the corollary; ωI ≤∫
I min[x, u]dF (x) ensures that a security subject to the restrictions exists.
4.F Proof of Lemma 4.6
First, global nondecreasingness is established. Since D(e) solves
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∫ x
x
sˆ(x)dF (x) = e, (4.53)
D(e) ≥ infξ∈(x,x) s(ξ) has to hold as otherwise
∫ x
x
sˆ(x)dF (x) <
∫ x
x
s(x)dF (x) = e. (4.54)
However, by nondecreasingness of s this implies D(e) ≥ s(x). Likewise, D(e) ≤
supξ∈(x,x) s(ξ) has to hold as otherwise
∫ x
x
sˆ(x)dF (x) >
∫ x
x
s(x)dF (x) = e. (4.55)
Thus, D(e) ≤ s(x), which with D(e) ≥ s(x) and the nondecreasingness of sˆ by con-
struction yields global nondecreasingness of s∗. Next, it needs to be shown that s∗
solves (P1) on I.
First note that s and s∗ have the same expected value outside of (x, x), i.e.
∫
ξ /∈(x,x)
s(ξ)dF1(ξ) =
∫
ξ /∈(x,x)
s∗(ξ)dF1(ξ), (4.56)
since s∗ and s are equal at all those points. Consider the following modified problem
on (x, x):
(P1mod) max
t∈S(x,x)
Eg1 [t(x)] s.t. λEg1 [t(x)] + (1− λ)Eg2 [t(x)] = e
0 ≤ t(x) ≤ x for all x
where
g1(x) = f1(x) · 1
F1(x)− F1(x) (4.57)
g2(x) = f2(x) · 1
F2(x)− F2(x) (4.58)
with associated cdf on (x, x):
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G1(x) = [F1(x)− F1(x)] · 1
F1(x)− F1(x) (4.59)
G2(x) = [F2(x)− F2(x)] · 1
F2(x)− F2(x) . (4.60)
In this formulation, since f1(·)/f2(·) is weakly decreasing on (x, x), so is g1(·)/g2(·) =
f1(·)/f2(·) · F2(x)−F2(x)F1(x)−F1(x) . This implies that (P1mod) corresponds to a problem where
Lemma 4.4 applies. Hence, sˆ solves (P1mod). This in turn implies that
∫ x
x
sˆ(x)dG1(x) ≥
∫ x
x
s(x)dG1(x)
⇒ 1
F1(x)−F1(x)
∫ x
x
sˆ(x)dG1(x) ≥ 1
F1(x)− F1(x)
∫ x
x
s(x)dG1(x)
⇒ ∫ x
x
sˆ(x)dF1(x) ≥
∫ x
x
s(x)dF1(x). (4.61)
Thus, if s is a solution to (P1) on I, sˆ has to be a solution as well. With (4.56) it
follows that
∫ xH
xL
s∗(x)dF1(x) ≥
∫ xH
xL
s(x)dF1(x). (4.62)
4.G Proof of Lemma 4.7
First, nondecreasingness of s∗ on (xL, xH) is established. On (xL, x] and [x, xH), s∗
is nondecreasing by virtue of being equal to the nondecreasing s. On (x, x), sˆ is
nondecreasing by construction. Finally s(x) ≤ s(x) ≤ s(x) for all x ∈ (x, x) as
D = supξ∈(x,x) s(ξ) ≤ s(x).
Hence, s∗ is globally nondecreasing. Since
∫
ξ /∈(x,x)
s(ξ)dF1(ξ) =
∫
ξ /∈(x,x)
s∗(ξ)dF1(ξ) (4.63)
as s∗ and s coincide at all those points, it is sufficient to show
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∫
ξ∈(x,x)
s(ξ)dF1(ξ) ≤
∫
ξ∈(x,x)
s∗(ξ)dF1(ξ) (4.64)
to establish s∗ as a solution to (P1). This follows from the corollary to Lemma 4.5.
Note that e ≡ ∫ x
x
s(x)dF (x) ≤ ∫
(x,x)
min{x,D} by construction of D. The corollary
thus establishes that sˆ solves (P1mod*) on (x, x), where
(P1mod*) max
t∈S(x,x)
Eg1 [t(x)] s.t. λEg1 [t(x)] + (1− λ)Eg2 [t(x)] = e
t(x) ≤ D for all x ∈ (x, x),
and
g1(x) = f1(x) · 1
F1(x)− F1(x) (4.65)
g2(x) = f2(x) · 1
F2(x)− F2(x) . (4.66)
Thus, s∗ solves (P1) on I and is indeed nondecreasing, as well as compliant with the
limited liability constraint. 
4.H Proof of Proposition 4.4
Before turning to the proofs of 4(i) and 4(ii), introduce the following notation: Let
TD be the set of largest disjoint intervals where s is consistent with debt-like tranches.
Further, let NTD be the set of largest disjoint intervals where s is inconsistent with this
property. Denote NTDi the set of largest disjoint intervals in NTD where f1(·)/f2(·) is
weakly increasing and let NTDd be the set of largest disjoint intervals where f1(·)/f2(·)
is weakly decreasing within the complementary set to NTDi with respect to NTD.
Lastly, let P denote the set of points not in TD and NTD, but in I.
Formally,
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TD ≡ {(ξ1, ξ2) ⊂ I|s is composed of debt-like tranches on (ξ1, ξ2)
∧∃ > 0 : s is not consistent with debt-like tranches on (ξ1 − , ξ1) or (ξ2, ξ2 + )}
NTD ≡ {(ξ1, ξ2) ⊂ I|s is not consistent with debt-like tranches on (ξ1, ξ2)
∧∃ > 0 : s is composed of debt-like tranches on (ξ1 − , ξ1) or (ξ2, ξ2 + )}
NTDi ≡ {(ξ1, ξ2) ⊂ NTD|f1(·)f2(·) is weakly increasing in ξ on (ξ1, ξ2)
∧∃ > 0 : f1(·)
f2(·) is not weakly increasing in ξ on (ξ1 − , ξ2) and (ξ1, ξ2 + )}
NTDd ≡ {(ξ1, ξ2) ⊂ NTD\NTDi|f1(·)f2(·) is weakly decreasing in ξ on (ξ1, ξ2)
∧∃ > 0 : f1(·)
f2(·) is not weakly decreasing in ξ on (ξ1 − , ξ2) and (ξ1, ξ2 + )}
NTDp ≡ NTD\ (NTDi ∪NTDd)
P ≡ I\ (TD ∪NTD) .
By construction,
TD ∪NTDi ∪NTDd ∪NTDp ∪ P = I (4.67)
and
∫
P
1dF (x) = 0 =
∫
NTDp
1dF (x). (4.68)
Consider 4(i). Take any interval (ξ1, ξ2) ∈ NTDi. Consider the security
sˆ(x) =

s(x) if x /∈ (ξ1, ξ2)
s(ξ1) if x ∈ (ξ1, L]
min{x, supξ∈(ξ1,ξ2) s(ξ)} if x ∈ (L, ξ2)
(4.69)
where L is the by Lemma 4.1 unique solution to
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∫ ξ2
ξ1
s(ξ)dF (ξ) =
∫ ξ2
ξ1
sˆ(ξ)dF (ξ). (4.70)
By Lemma 4.7, sˆ(x) is composed of debt-like tranches on (ξ1, ξ2) and s
∗ = s(x)+(sˆ(x)−
s(x))Ix∈(ξ1,ξ2) also solves (P1). Likewise, for any (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ NTDd, the security
sˆ(x) =
{
s(x) if x /∈ (ψ1, ψ2)
min{x,D} otherwise (4.71)
where D is the by Lemma 4.1 unique solution to
∫ ψ2
ψ1
s(ψ)dF (ψ) =
∫ ψ2
ψ1
sˆ(ψ)dF (ψ) (4.72)
is composed of debt-like tranches on (ψ1, ψ2) and s
∗ = s(x) + (sˆ(x)− s(x))Ix∈(ξ1,ξ2) also
solves (P1) by Lemma 4.6. Since the above statements hold for any (ξ1, ξ2) ∈ NTDi and
for any (ψ1, ψ2) ∈ NTDd, repeated use of the above local modification on all intervals
in NTDi and NTDd yields a security s
∗ which is composed of debt-like tranches on
NTDi ∪NTDd ∪ TD.
With (4.67) and (4.68) this implies that s∗ is consistent with being composed of debt-like
tranches on I and solves (P1). This concludes the proof for 4(i).
For 4(ii), suppose that s is not composed of debt-like tranches on I. This implies that
∫
NTDi∪NTDd
1dF (x) > 0. (4.73)
Suppose for the remainder of the proof that
∫
NTDi
1dF (x) > 0.70 By the continuity of
f1, f2 and local nonproportionality, i.e.
∀(ξ1, ξ2) ⊆ I : ∀k ∈ R+∃x ∈ (ξ1, ξ2) : f1 6= kf2, (4.74)
70The proof for
∫
NTDd
1dF (x) > 0 is similar and utilizes a contradiction built with the use of Lemma
4.4.
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it follows that f1(·)/f2(·) is strictly increasing on any (ξ1, ξ2) ∈ NTDi.71 Take any
(ξ1, ξ2) ∈ NTDi. Consider the following modified problem on (ξ1, ξ2):
(Pmod) max
t∈S(ξ1,ξ2)
Eg1 [t(x)] s.t. λEg1 [t(x)] + (1− λ)Eg2 [t(x)] =
∫ ξ2
ξ1
s(x)dG(x)
t(x) ≤ sup
ξ∈(ξ1,ξ2)
s(ξ)
where
g1(x) = f1(x) · 1
F1(ξ2)− F1(ξ1) (4.75)
g2(x) = f2(x) · 1
F2(ξ2)− F2(ξ1) . (4.76)
By Corollary 4.1 to Lemma 4.5, the levered debt security
sLD(x) = min{x, sup
ξ∈(ξ1,ξ2)
s(ξ)} · Ix∈[L,ξ2) (4.77)
with L chosen such that
∫ ξ2
ξ1
sLD(x)dG(x) =
∫ ξ2
ξ1
s(x)dG(x) (4.78)
⇔ ∫ ξ2
ξ1
sLD(x)dF (x) =
∫ ξ2
ξ1
s(x)dF (x) (4.79)
is the unique (up to pointwise deviations) solution to (Pmod) on (ξ1, ξ2). Hence, since
s is not composed of debt-like tranches on (ξ1, ξ2) and can thus not be levered debt
there,
Eg1 [s
LD(x)] =
∫ ξ2
ξ1
sLD(x)dG1(x) >
∫ ξ2
ξ1
s(x)dG1(x) = Eg1 [s(x)]. (4.80)
Therefore,
71Weakly increasing and not strictly is ruled out by the nonproportionality, which would be necessary
for a locally constant f1(·)/f2(·).
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∫ ξ2
ξ1
sLD(x)dF1(x) >
∫ ξ2
ξ1
s(x)dF1(x) (4.81)
and thus
∫
I
sˆ(x)dF1(x) >
∫
I
s(x)dF1(x) (4.82)
where
sˆ(x) =
{
s(x) if x /∈ (ξ1, ξ2)
sLD(x) otherwise.
(4.83)
However, by Lemma 4.7 this sˆ(x) is a valid security, i.e. sˆ satisfies limited liability and
nondecreasingness. By construction
∫
I
sˆ(x)dF (x) =
∫
I
s(x)dF (x) = ωI . (4.84)
Hence, optimality of s is violated. Thus, the assumption that s is not composed of
debt-like tranches has to be false. This concludes the proof. 
4.I Proof of Proposition 4.5
The proof is a proof by contradiction. Note first that since local nonproportionality
holds, any solution to (P1) is composed of debt-like tranches. Consider some such
security s with Ef [s(x)] = ω
I which does not satisfy ∀x ∈ I : s(x) > xL. As such,
∃xˆ ∈ (xL, xH) : s(x) > xL ⇔ x ≥ xˆ. (4.85)
We need to show that s cannot be a solution to (P1).
First note that for s to be a solution to (P1), s(x) ≥ xL for all x ∈ (xL, xH) is
necessary. This corresponds to Lemma 4.4 of Biais and Mariotti (2005). To see this,
suppose otherwise. Increasing the payoff to xL at all values x increases the payoff
in both states by the same value (x ≥ xL with probability 1). Furthermore, any
security s with Ef [s(x)] = ω
I > xL has Ef1 [s(x)] < Ef2 [s(x)] by F1(x) > F2(x) for all
x ∈ (xL, xH). Hence, increasing the payoff at all ξ ∈ (xL, xH) where s(x) < xL and
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decreasing the payoff proportionally at all other points such that the expected payoff
Ef remains unchanged increases the expected payoff under bad information. Thus, s
cannot solve (P1).
Having established that s(x) ≥ xL for all x, denote {x1, D1} the pair characterizing
starting point and face value of the first tranche with a face value larger than xL,
D1 > xL. Since s specifies a payoff larger than xL whenever x ≥ xˆ > xL for some
xˆ > xL, it has to be the case that x1 > xL. Suppose that s consists of a finite number
N of tranches and denote xN , DN the starting point and face value of the last debt-like
tranche. Denote
1− F1(xN)
1− F2(xN) ≡ k < 1 (4.86)
F1(x1)− F2(x1) ≡ c > 0 (4.87)
DN −DN−1 ≡ d > 0 (4.88)
Since F1(xL) = F2(xL) = 0, it has to hold that
∃ > xL such that ∀xL < δ <  :
∫ xH
xL
min{x, δ}dF1(x)∫ xH
xL
min{x, δ}dF2(x)
> k, (4.89)
i.e. that for sufficiently small face values δ, the corresponding standard debt tranche
pays out at least k times as much (in expectation) after bad information as after good
information. Existence of  > xL is due to the fact that the k is bounded away from 1,
whereas the initial tranche can be constructed with a ratio arbitrarily close to 1 due to
strict positivity of densities and F1(xL) = F2(xL) = 0. Take some such  and consider
D1 > γ > xL where γ <  and κ ≡
∫ x1
xL
min{x, γ}dF (x) < d[1 − F (xN)]. The contract
s∗ with
s∗(x) =

min{x, γ} for x < x1
min{x,DN} − κ1−F (xN ) for x ∈ (xN , xH)
s(x) otherwise
(4.90)
can be shown to be nondecreasing, to satisfy limited liability, to have an expected
value Ef [s
∗(x)] = ωI and to satisfy Ef1 [s
∗(x)] > Ef1 [s(x)], thus violating the sup-
posed optimality of s. First, Ef [s
∗(x)] = ωI follows from the definition of s∗ and
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κ ≡ ∫ x1
xL
min{x, γ}dF (x). Next, nondecreasingness stems from κ < d[1 − F (xN)] and
γ < D1. Finally,
∫ xH
xL
min{x, γ}dF1(x)∫ xH
xL
min{x, γ}dF2(x)
> k (4.91)
⇒
∫ xH
xL
min{x, γ}dF1(x)− γ[1− F2(x1)− c]∫ xH
xL
min{x, γ}dF2(x)− γ[1− F2(x1)]
> k =
1− F1(xN)
1− F2(xN) (4.92)
⇒
∫ xH
xL
min{x, γ}dF1(x)− γ[1− F2(x1)− c]− κ
1− F (xN) [1− F1(xN)] > 0 (4.93)
⇒
∫ xH
xL
s∗(x)dF1(x) >
∫ xH
xL
s(x)dF1(x). (4.94)
To illustrate this construction, consider the following graph:
return x
payoff
xL
γ
D1
DN−1
DN − κ1−F (xN )
DN
xL x1 xN xH
s(x)
s∗(x)
κ
1−F (xN )
γ
Figure 4.13: Illustration – Inclusion of Standard Debt Tranche
s∗ is different from s in that it includes a standard debt tranche with face value γ and
correspondingly decreases the payoff of the last tranche by κ
1−F (xN ) , thus ensuring that
the expected values Ef [s
∗(x)] = Ef [s(x)] = ωI remain unchanged. The decrease of the
face value of the most junior tranche characterized by {xN , DN} affects the expected
values of the security in the bad and good state with ratio k. By construction, the
inclusion of the standard debt tranche with face value γ increases the expected values
in the good and bad state with a larger proportion. Since the unconditional expected
values of s and s∗ are identical, this implies that Ef1 [s
∗(x)] > Ef1 [s(x)] and thus that
s cannot be optimal.
If s consists of an infinite number of debt-like tranches, there has to exist at least
one tranche where the ratio is bounded away from 1, i.e. where (letting j denote the
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tranche)
F1(xj+1)−F1(xj)
F2(xj+1)−F2(xj) ≤ k < 1. If no such tranche existed, first order stochastic dom-
inance would be violated. The remaining construction is then as above for the last
tranche. This concludes the proof for (4.85). Coupled with the observation that any
solution to (P1) is composed of debt-like tranches, the only securities satisfying the
requirement are composed of debt-like tranches which include a standard debt tranche.

4.J Proof of Proposition 4.6
It can be established that a contract s with Ef [s(x)] = Ef [s
SDC(x;D(ωI))] = ωI
and Ef1 [s(x)] > Ef1 [s
SDC(x;D(ωI))] exists whenever (i) holds. Consider some such
ξ. By continuity of f1, f2, if G(ξ) > infx∈(xL,D(ωI)] f1(x)/f2(x), there has to exist an
-neighborhood around some xˆ ∈ (xL, D(ωI)) such that
∀x ∈ U(xˆ) : f1(x)
f2(x)
< G(ξ) (4.95)
where xL < xˆ−  < xˆ < xˆ+  < D(ωI).
Consider the following security:
s(x) =

x for x ∈ (xL, xˆ− )
xˆ−  for x ∈ [xˆ− , xˆ+ ]
min{x,D(ωI)} for x ∈ (xˆ+ , ξ)
D(ωI) + κ for x ∈ (ξ, xH)
(4.96)
where κ(1 − F (ξ)) = ∫
U(xˆ)
[x− (xˆ− )]dF (x) and  is chosen sufficiently small such
that κ ≤ ξ −D.
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return x
payoff
xˆ
xˆ−  xˆ + 
xˆ− 
xˆ + 
D(ωI )
D(ωI ) + κ
ξ
sSDC(x;D(ωI ))
s(x)
κ
Figure 4.14: Illustration – Inclusion of Junior Debt Tranche
By construction, it holds thatEf [s(x)] = Ef [s
SDC(x;D(ωI))]. Thus, since f1(x)/f2(x) <
G(ξ) for all x ∈ U(xˆ),
∫
U(x)
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF1(x)∫
U(x)
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF2(x) < κG(ξ) = κ
1− F1(ξ)
1− F2(ξ) (4.97)
⇒
∫
U(x)
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF1(x)∫
U(x)
(sSDC(x;D(ωI))− s(x))dF2(x) <
∫ xH
ξ
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI))))dF1(x)∫ xH
ξ
(s(x)− sSDC(x;D(ωI)))dF2(x)
⇒
∫ xH
xL
sSDC(x;D(ωI))dF1(x) <
∫ xH
xL
s(x)dF1(x) (4.98)
where the last implication follows from Lemma 4.3 and the fact that s and sSDC(x;D(ωI))
are identical outside of U(xˆ) and (ξ, xH). s
SDC(x;D(ωI)) cannot be optimal. Intu-
itively, the above construction does not affect the unconditional expected value. How-
ever, the decrease at all points in U(xˆ) yields a decrease in both the expected value
under bad and good information. Of the overall change in expected value, less is at-
tributed to the expected value under bad information (as compared to that under good
information) than in the increase of the payoff by κ at all points in (ξ, xH). Thus,
since the unconditional expected value changes exactly offset each other, s has a higher
expected value under bad information than sSDC(x;D(ωI)). Hence, sSDC(x;D(ωI))
cannot solve (P1). 
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Discussion
In their review of securitization practices in the recent financial crisis, Gorton and Met-
rick (2012) write that “despite the quantitative and theoretical importance of securiti-
zation, there is relatively little research on the subject. In addition, the recent financial
crisis centered on securitization, so the imperative to understand it is paramount.”
In recent years, researchers have produced both theoretical and empirical contributions
which shed light on agents’ incentives in prevalent securitization practices and assess
the impact of securitization on market participants’ behavior and outcomes. However,
there is still much that is not fully understood.
This thesis contributes to the literature by focusing on the interaction between public
information and private information acquisition incentives – the latter of which are
problematic as they may imply illiquidity stemming from asymmetric information.
Chapter 2 explicitly considers the interaction between the opacity of an asset and its
liquidity in a stylized framework and shows that opacity may protect liquidity by avoid-
ing costly private information acquisition. The implicit viewpoint by policymakers that
transparency is a one-way street towards a better financial system thus not necessar-
ily comes without exemptions – liquidity may be adversely affected by transparency
regulation, which should be taken into account.
Chapter 3 assesses lenders’ screening incentives in a setting where loan sales may yield
gains from trade, but where private information may be selectively used during securi-
tization. It is shown that the advent of securitization may in fact lead to less screening
in equilibrium, at least for some prospective borrowers, and that this can have adverse
effects on (borrower) welfare.
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Finally, Chapter 4 derives optimal securities with respect to being robust to interim
public information and shows that robustness in this sense is achieved by securities
which do not necessarily minimize incentives to acquire private information.
Chapters 2 and 3 in particular also pave the way for future empirical analyses, either by
developing testable implications and proposing a basic empirical approach which can
be expanded upon (Chapter 2) or by elaborating on how the model’s key assumptions
can be assessed (Chapter 3). Aside from further theoretical considerations or extensions
outlined in the respective Chapters, this is an avenue which seems promising and fruitful
for future research.
It is my hope that the economic analysis of securitization continues to improve our
understanding of why agents in the financial system behaved in the way they did prior
to the recent crisis. Only then can prudential policy be designed – if necessary – to
avoid future collapses which exert significant negative externalities on all agents in the
economy.
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